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Universal human rights (HR) are often theorized as philosophically neutral.  Because 
they do not espouse any particular theory of the human being, it is argued, they can be 
reasonably appropriated by all.  In this thesis, I explore HR’s universality claim, by focusing on 
the discourse’s secular foundation.  In the universal human right to freedom of religion, I find a 
distinctly modern grammar of ‘religion,’ one that separates ‘religion’ from politics and power, 
law from morality, and the public and private realms.  The modern concept of religion also 
espouses a secular theory of the human, insofar as the human is defined as morally autonomous 
and self-sovereign.  
 To test my critique of human rights’ universality claims vis-à-vis their secularity, I survey 
a number of theoretical engagements with human rights discourse from contemporary Muslim 
scholars.  Positions in this literature range from full endorsement of the philosophical and moral 
foundations of HR, to trenchant critiques of their secular bases.  I propose the Qur’anic term din 
as a conceptual alternative to ‘religion’ for understanding the tremendous variation in 
contemporary Islamic political thought on human rights.  The absence of consensus among 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Rationality of Traditions 
 
 In the late evening of June 12, 2016, a twenty-nine year old man opened fire in a gay 
nightclub in Orlando, Florida.  After several hours of deadly violence and a police standoff, 
Omar Mateen left forty-nine people dead and fifty-three more injured.  In a phone call to 911 in 
the immediate aftermath, the perpetrator pledged allegiance to ISIL.  The FBI ruled the event an 
act of terrorism and a hate crime.1 
While the country and the world reeled from the massacre and as communities came 
together to mourn, make sense and comfort one another, a number of formidable and familiar 
political tensions rose to the surface, albeit in novel combinations.  Questions such as: Why do 
they [Muslims] hate us?; What resources can defeat homophobia?; Why aren’t there stricter gun 
control laws to prevent guns from getting into the hands of the likes of Mateen; How many more 
mass shootings?; Can immigration restrictions prevent Islamic extremism from attacking on 
American soil?; and how can we reaffirm that Islamophobia is not the answer? flooded news 
and social media, workplaces, schools, and faith and community groups. 
As vigils were held across the country, American responses to the Orlando shooting 
covered a wide political spectrum.  Islamophobic presidential hopeful Donald Trump 
immediately issued a statement amounting to I told you so;2 his opportune rival Hillary Clinton, 
who changed her views on homosexuality only recently,3 issued a statement of support for 
                                                          
1 See Lizette Alvarez and Richard Perez-Pena, “Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50 Dead.”  The 
New York Times, June 12, 2016.  Avail: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/orlando-nightclub-
shooting.html?_r=0.  Accessed July 1, 2016. 
2 Trump tweeted “What has happened in Orlando is just the beginning. Our leadership is weak and ineffective. I 
called it and asked for the ban. Must be tough”. 
  Avail: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/742096033207844864.  Accessed July 1, 2016. 
3 Clinton opposed gay marriage as late as 2013.  See Conor Friedersford, “Hillary Clinton’s Gay-Marriage Problem.”  
The Atlantic, June 13, 2014.  Avail: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/hillary-clintons-gay-
marriage-problem/372717/.  Accessed July 1, 2016. 
2 
 
America’s LGBTQ community.4  A homophobic Baptist pastor bemoaned that Mateen ‘didn’t 
finish the job.’5  Many insisted that the principle problem is America’s gun violence writ large.6  
Mosques and Muslim community groups issued statements of condolence, held vigils and 
conducted blood drives.7  LGBTQ communities came out against the scapegoating of Muslims, 
as the tragedy brought Muslim and LGBTQ communities together (many for the first time) to 
jointly denounce homophobia and Islamophobia.8 
                                                          
4 Clinton tweeted “You have millions of allies who will always have your back.  I am one of them.” June 13, 2016.  
She subsequently tweeted, “Gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights.  Being LGBT does not 
make you less human.” June 19, 2016.  Avail: https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton.  Accessed July 1, 2016. 
5 Pastor Roger Jimenez of Verity Baptist Church in Sacramento, California said “I’m kind of upset he didn’t finish the 
job — because these people are predators,” Jimenez said. “Are you sad that 50 pedophiles were killed today?  Um, 
no.  I think that’s great.  I think that helps society.  I think Orlando, Fla., is a little safer tonight.”  See Tobias 
Salinger, “Church whose pastor celebrated Orlando shooting to lose lease.”  Daily News, June 21, 2016.  Avail: 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/church-pastor-celebrated-orlando-shooting-lose-lease-article-
1.2682475.  Accessed July 1, 2016. 
6 See “The state of gun violence in the US, explained in 18 charts.”  Vox, February 22, 2016.  Avail: 
https://youtu.be/bX4qUsgHa4Y.  Accessed June 15, 2016.  See also Zachary Crockett, “The Orlando massacre was 
one of 43 shootings yesterday.”  Vox, June 13, 2016.  Avail: http://www.vox.com/2016/6/13/11923290/orlando-
shooting-gun-violence-us.  Accessed July 1, 2016. 
7 See Shanika Gunaratna, “Muslim Americans rush to condemn Orlando massacre.”  CBS News, June 13, 2016.  
Avail: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/orlando-shooting-pulse-nightclub-muslims-condemn-attack/.  Accessed 
June 30, 2016; Kristina Cooke and Idrees Ali, “Muslim leaders condemn Florida massacre, brace for backlash.”  
Reuters, June 13, 2016.  Avail: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-florida-shooting-mosques-idUSKCN0YZ2K6.  
Accessed June 30, 2016; Carlos Lozano, “Several vigils are planned around Southern California for the Orlando 
shooting victims.” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2016.  Avail: http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-vigils-
20160612-snap-story.html.  Accessed June 30, 2016; Sean Mooney, “Tucson mosque condemns shootings in 
Orlando.”  KVOA, June 13, 2016. Avail: http://www.kvoa.com/story/32205011/tucson-mosque-condemns-
shootings-in-orlando.  Accessed June 30, 2016; Niraj Warikoo, “Metro Detroit Muslims strongly condemn Orlando 
shooting.”  Detroit Free Press (USA Today), June 12, 2016.  Avail: http://www.kvoa.com/story/32205011/tucson-
mosque-condemns-shootings-in-orlando.  Accessed June 30, 2016; Samantha Galvez, “Harrisburg mosque holds 
prayer vigil for Orlando victims.”  WHTM-TV, June 13, 2016.  Avail: http://abc27.com/2016/06/13/harrisburg-
mosque-holds-prayer-vigil-for-orlando-victims/.  Accessed June 30, 2016; Whitney Leaming, “Orlando Muslims 
turn to prayer after shooting puts community ‘on edge’.”  The Washington Post, June 13, 2016.  Avail: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/national/orlando-muslims-turn-to-prayer-after-shooting-puts-
community-on-edge/2016/06/13/9c1c8aec-3134-11e6-ab9d-1da2b0f24f93_video.html.  Accessed June 30, 2016; 
and Paradis Afshar and Michael Seiden, “Muslim community condemns Orlando attack, calls for blood donations.”  
WPLG, June 13, 2016.  Avail: http://www.local10.com/news/muslim-community-condemns-orlando-attack-calls-
for-blood-donations.  Accessed June 30, 2016. 
8 See Geoffrey Vendeville, “Muslim and LGBTQ communities stand together against hatred and prejudice after 
Orlando shooting.”  Toronto Star, June 26, 2016.  Avail: https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2016/06/26/muslim-
and-lgbtq-communities-stand-together-against-hatred-and-prejudice-after-orlando-shooting.html.  Accessed: June 
27, 2016; Eman Idil Bare, “Muslim community joins Regina pride parade for 1st time.”  CBS News, June 25, 2016.  
Avail: http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/canada/saskatchewan/muslim-community-joins-regina-pride-parade-
1.3653094.  Accessed June 27, 2016; and Jenna  DeAngelis, “Muslim and LGBT community hold vigil for 
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I am especially interested in the variety of Muslim responses to the Orlando shooting for 
what these reveal about the Islamic tradition’s current negotiations and developments in liberal 
socio-political ground.  Afroz Ali, founding president of the Sydney-based Al-Ghazzali Centre 
for Islamic Sciences and Human Development, contextualizes the Orlando shooting in America’s 
epidemic of mass shootings: 
“the massacre at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando represents [the] 173rd mass shooting by the 163rd 
day of 2016.  And this is not just a bad year: there have been 994 mass shootings in 1004 days ¬ 
[that’s] less than three years.  Nearly one mass shooting per day.  Since 1775, 1.2 million 
Americans have been killed in war, whereas 1.6 million have been killed domestically by guns 
since 1963.  The fact is, we know more about the United States’ gun problems than we know 
about what motivated Omar Mateen to kill 49 individuals from the LGBTI community who were 
partying at the Pulse nightclub on 12 June.”9 
 
Hamza Yusuf, president of the first Muslim liberal arts college in the United States (Zaytuna 
College, CA) and member of ISIS’ kill-list, also points to our culture of violence.  Yusuf had 
been googled by Mateen several days before the attack.  He blames the violence in culture that 
attracts young men to the scourges of war, whether in video games, ISIS recruiting videos, or as 
signaled in Mateen’s attraction to law enforcement and prison correction.  He also points to the 
internet’s role in “spreading the memes of mayhem to malleable young minds:”10 
“But in the chaotic tenor of our current culture, we lack an understanding the ancients deemed 
self-evident: the need for what the Japanese called bushido, the Arabs called futuwwa, and what 
we in the West once called paideia — a type of chivalrous education for young men, where they 
were challenged to ‘tame the savageness of man and make gentle the life of the world,’ as 
Aeschylus put it.  This is what we lack.  Youthful vigor should be channeled to engage in study of 
the normative Islamic tradition with an emphasis on the tools of learning.  With knowledge to 
ground them, they can face the complexities and challenges of our time with wisdom, not rage.  I 
wish Omar had called me; I like to think I could have dissuaded him or advised him to seek 
professional help, or at least helped him channel his anger and frustration into something 
productive and meaningful.  Instead, surfing the Internet, he found a crypt full of contempt and 
hate that allowed him to clothe his naked aggression in a coat of religiosity.”11 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Orlando victims in Hartford.”  WTIC-TV, June 12, 2016.  Avail: http://fox61.com/2016/06/12/muslim-and-lgbt-
community-hold-vigil-for-orlando-victims-in-hartford/.  Accessed June 30, 2016. 
9 See Afroz Ali, Opinion: “Guns, Gays and Muslims: Reflections after Orlando.”  Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, Religion and Ethics, 20 Jun 2016. 
  Avail: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2016/06/20/4485499.htm.  Accessed June 25, 2016. 
10 Hamza Yusuf, “The Orlando shooter Googled my name.  I wish he had reached out to me.”  Washington Post, In 
Theory, June 24, 2016.  Avail: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/06/24/the-orlando-





But while the Muslim position on the Orlando shooting as murderous rampage is 
unanimously condemnatory, the picture is less clear with regard to the politics of sexual freedom 
that the occurrence brings up.  Unlike Yusuf, who preaches a non-judgmental, non-
interventionist stance with regard to people’s life choices but who cannot from a traditionalist 
perspective condone homosexuality,12 some Muslims responded to the Orlando shooting with 
equal parts of condolence and critique of Muslim homophobia.  Junaid Jahangir, a regular 
contributor to the Huffington Post Canada, has authored many opinion pieces over the last 
several years dealing with Muslim homophobia.  His staunch critiques of homophobia in the 
Muslim community can be found in such articles as: “Queer Muslims Get Straight Respect,” 
“There is No Place for Homophobia in Islam,” “Queer Muslims Deserve More Than Scriptural 
Zealotry,”, “One Imam Teaching Homophobia Does Not Speak for All Muslims,” “Homophobic 
Muslims Need to Grow Up,” “Gay Muslim Men Shouldn’t Be Pressured into Heterosexual 
Marriages,” “Conservative Muslims Harm Themselves Through Heterosexist Outbursts,” and 
“Straight Muslim Allies Must Work With LGBT Muslim Activists.”13  In a similar vein, gay 
Muslim activist and contributor to Huffington Post Queer Voices and Patheos Omar Sarwar, 
criticizes the American Muslim community for tolerating homophobia.14 
After Orlando, especially strong allegations of homophobia were made against a 
statement by Abdullah bin Hamid Ali, professor of Islamic Law at Zaytuna College.  Prominent 
Muslim American feminists Jerusha Tanner Lamptey and Amina Wadud conveyed dismay at 
                                                          
12 See Yusuf’s interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN, June 28, 2016.  Avail: 
http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2016/06/28/exp-gps-0626-hamza.cnn.  Transcript excerpts from another CNN 
interview, in which Yusuf is pressed to elaborate his views on homosexuality and gay Muslims, avail: 
http://blog.zaytuna.edu/a-joint-muslim-statement-on-the-carnage-in-orlando.  Accessed June 27, 2016. 
13 See The Huffington Post, Canada Living.  Avail: http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/news/muslim-homophobia/.  
Accessed June 25, 2016. 
14 See Omar Sarwar, “American Muslims Must Address Religiously-Sanctioned Homophobia.”  The Advocate, June 
16, 2016.  Avail: http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2016/6/16/american-muslims-must-address-religiously-
sanctioned-homophobia.  Accessed: June 27, 2016. 
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Ali’s piece, entitled “The Homosexual Challenge to Muslim Ethics.”15  Ali sets out to ask 
whether there is a biological basis for homosexual tendencies, and if so, what this means for 
Islamic moral teachings.  He states that feminist, liberation-theological and gay rights attacks on 
the Catholic Church are rooted in a shared critique of “notions of normalcy and nature as 
espoused by the historical patriarchs of the Church.”16  Islam, which also advances notions of 
human nature and normalcy, prohibits homosexuality: 
“There is no doubt that the Islamic law deems sodomy and other sexual acts between people of the 
same gender to be unlawful and utterly depraved — for Islam recommended the severest of 
punishments for public indecency of all sorts, including bestiality, fornication and adultery.”17  
 
Behaviors suggestive of a homosexual lifestyle, such as cross-dressing or transgenderism, are 
also harshly opposed.18 
Further critique can be made of Ali’s piece on account of his citing a researcher from 
NARTH, the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality.  NARTH 
promotes and provides ‘therapy’ for those wishing to diminish their homosexuality and develop 
their heterosexuality.19  NARTH and its ‘ex-gay’ symposiums are harshly criticized for being 
homophobic; Ali’s citation of NARTH researcher Julie C. Harren can color his work as 
homophobic, even though his reference and her work advocate that homosexuality is rooted in 
complex, developmental processes that cannot be fairly represented in the biology vs. choice 
framing. 
                                                          
15 See Abdullah bin Hamid Ali, “The Homosexual Challenge to Muslim Ethics.”  Lamppost Educational Initiative.  
Avail: http://www.lamppostproductions.com/abdullah-bin-hamid-ali/.  Accessed June 27, 2016.  See Amina 
Wadud’s facebook post strongly criticizing Ali’s piece, including “At least they are coming back out of their closets 
and NOT pretending they give a shit…”  See also Jerusha Tanner Lamptey’s comment, “gross” in the comment 
section below the post.  Both dated June 17, 2016.  Accessed June 25, 2016. 
  Avail: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1819740018253845&id=1542191152675401. 
16 Ali, “The Homosexual Challenge,” 7. 
17 Ibid, 12. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
19 NARTH was founded in 1992, in reaction to the American Psychological Association’s 1972 decision to remove 




But while Ali’s piece can be read as homophobic, or at least heterosexist, there is another 
way of reading it that is not so.  He acknowledges that homosexuality has always existed in 
every society.20  In showing how gender obscurity and outwardly gay mannerisms were 
traditionally understood by Muslims, Ali points out the questions legalists asked and answered 
regarding pseudohermaphrodites.21  The existence of these discussions: 
“is extremely revealing, because it has become a common understanding among non-Muslims and 
many Muslims alike that Islam never envisioned accommodating people of obscured gender or 
those who outwardly appear to be gay in their mannerisms.  The very existence of such 
discussions, however, manifests the dynamism of both Muslim jurists and Islamic jurisprudence to 
deal with new social challenges and find workable solutions for them.”22 
 
Furthermore, canonical scholars differentiated between innate (“a natural disposition”) and 
choice-based homosexual tendencies.23  The former having been created by God is free from 
blame, censure, sin or punishment.  The latter is pretentious, and blameworthy.   
 Ali points to the high-level of sophistication among classical Muslim scholars as 
indicative of a functional secularity with regard to social life, and this dynamism allowed them 
“to find ways to incorporate every living soul into life in Muslim society.”24  Ali enjoins 
Muslims to have more empathy and less prejudgment in engaging homosexuality as a legal 
norm.  When differences can’t be reconciled, tolerance is the enlightened response.25  The 
difficulty lies in the belief held by Muslims and others “that ‘secular’ republics are justified in 
regulating the private space of its citizens.”26 
                                                          
20 Ali, “The Homosexual Challenge,” 8. 
21 These included: “the ways to determine the true gender of hermaphrodites, their designated prayer locations in 
cases when the gender remains obscured, the dangers involved in allowing a recovering sodomite to lead the 
congregational prayers, and the appropriate percentages to be allocated to them upon the demise of their family 
members.”  Ibid., 12. 
22 Ibid., 11-12. 
23 Ali cites the scholarship of At-Tabari (10th century), Al-Nawawi (thirteenth century) and Al-Asqalani (15th 
century).  Ibid., 17-19. 
24 Ibid., 19. 




 Jonathan Brown, chair and professor of Islamic civilization in the School of Foreign 
Service at Georgetown University and Director of the Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim 
Christian Understanding, echoes a similar response to the Orlando shooting and its aftermath 
renewed questioning of Islam’s stance on homosexuality.  Brown has studied and researched 
across the Muslim world and authored several works on prophetic hadith, the Prophet 
Muhammad’s legacy, Islamic law, Salafism, Sufism, Arabic lexical theory and pre-Islamic 
poetry.  Brown states that same-sex attraction and activity has not been unusual in Muslim 
societies.  Neither Islamic discourse nor Muslim societies conceived of homosexuality as an 
identity, but did acknowledge occurrence of same-sex attraction, often for ‘natural’ reasons.  
Rather, specific acts, such as sodomy, appear as sins in the shari’a.27  Historically, there was “a 
widespread cultural acceptance of same-sex attraction in Muslim societies.”28  In premodern 
Islamic civilization, says Brown, the “guardians of the Shariah (judges, concerned scholars, 
market police, etc.) turned a blind eye to the private lives of the populace.”29 
 Furthermore, the Qur’anic punishment regarding sodomy (which the legists classified as 
an extension of fornication and adultery) was/is almost impossible to enforce: 
“The Quran ordains that the punishment for fornication is 100 lashes, but it also requires four 
witnesses who saw penetration occur to prove it (the Quran adds that, if someone makes this 
accusation without four witnesses, s/he is punished with 80 lashes for slander) (Quran 24:2-4).”30 
 
The jurists, following a prophetic enjoinder, always sought leniency by way of procedural 
safeguards: 
“…in a commandment that has been central to the application of justice in Islamic history, the 
Prophet ordered judges to “Ward off the Hudud [crime punishable through clear Qur’anic or 
prophetic speech texts] from the Muslims as much as you can, and if there is a way out for [the 
accused] then let him go.  For it is better for the authority to err in mercy than to err in 
                                                          
27 See Jonathan Brown, “The Shariah, Homosexuality & Safeguarding Each Other’s Rights in a Pluralist Society.” 







punishment.”  Muslim jurists encapsulated this rule in their maxim ‘Ward off the Hudud by 
ambiguities (shubuhat),’ compiling vast lists of all the procedural technicalities by which Hudud 
punishments could be set aside.”31 
 
Brown says that it is important to remember that one’s personal morality is not the law of the 
land.  In practice, Muslims in America accept and are willing to live amongst a plurality of 
lifestyles.  There are plenty of aspects of American cultural practice that goes against Muslim 
beliefs – drinking alcohol, adultery and fornication, eating pork, etc.  But Muslim don’t seek to 
apply the shari’a to their neighbors.  And this is hardly surprising given Islamic history: 
“In classical Islamic civilization, Muslim authorities allowed Zoroastrians to engage in brother-
sister marriage, Jews to charge interest, and Christians to cultivate wine and pigs. Muslim judges 
could even hear such cases brought by non-Muslim litigants by applying the laws of their 
respective communities instead of the Shariah.”32 
 
While Brown shares much with Ali by way of how American Muslims should embody 
ethical norms in a liberal political culture, the two differ in one important way.  Both take the 
traditionalist Islamic position opposing homosexual acts and transgender behavior, but where 
Brown supports civil marriages for same-sex couples because “every religious community” has 
the right “to advocate for its own vision of sexual propriety,”33  Ali would not advocate same-sex 
marriage, and, for consistency’s sake, would concede that the government also withdraw legal 
and financial benefits for heterosexual marriages.34 
 What do such diverse Muslim arguments about homosexuality in the wake of the Orlando 
shooting (an event discussed in the public intellectual space in conjunction with discourses of 
terrorism, religious extremism, immigration, etc.), reveal about: the secular liberal public space?  
Universal norms?  Tradition-rooted arguments pertaining to human rights?  Historian and 
feminist Joan Wallach Scott, who has authored and edited over seventy works on French history, 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ali, Homosexual Challenge, 20. 
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the history of gender and intellectual history, has theorized that secularism structures how we 
think about religion, and can lead to cultural assaults.  In The Politics of the Veil, Scott argues 
that the controversial Muslim headscarf ban in France in 2005 was part of a larger project of 
protecting the nation, where Muslim and Arab identity (collapsed into one) has historically been 
France’s threatening ‘other.’35  French nationalist identity was constructed on a sense of 
universality, one which is threatened by hybridity and the public display of difference.36 
 Judith Butler, gender theorist and philosopher who has authored over thirty works on 
feminism, gender, queer theory and performativity, supports the freedom norm but opposes how 
sexual freedom is coercively instrumentalized by states.  Butler critiques how personal liberty 
and attitudes toward homosexuality are used to legitimate unfair immigration policies within a 
secular teleology that equates modernity with progressive sexual politics. 37  She explores how 
“hegemonic conceptions of progress define themselves over and against a premodern temporality 
that they produce for the purposes of their own self-legitimation.”38  Europe and the sphere of 
modernity is defined “as the privileged site where sexual radicalism can and does take 
place…[which] must be protected against the putative orthodoxies associated with new 
immigrant communities.”39 
 For example, in the Netherlands’ citizenship test, immigrants are asked to look at a 
picture of two men kissing, and are then asked if it is offensive, representative of personal 
liberties, and whether the applicant values open gay expression.40  This protocol indicates that 
accepting homosexuality equals embracing modernity, and modernity equals sexual freedom, 
                                                          
35 See Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007: 26-50. 
36 Ibid., 248. 
37 See Judith Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture, and Secular Time.”  British Journal of Sociology, Vol . 59, No.1 (2008): 
1-23. 
38 Ibid., 1. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Ibid., 3. 
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especially for gay people.41  This causes a certain paradox to ensue, says Butler, “in which the 
coerced adoption of certain cultural norms becomes a requisite for entry into a polity that defines 
itself as the avatar of freedom.”42   
 Liberal freedoms rest on a hegemonic culture called modernity, says Butler.43  She 
examines how this logic plays out in the torture chambers (i.e. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) in 
America’s ‘War on Terror.’  There, “the scenes of sexual debasement and physical torture are 
part of the civilizing mission and, in particular, its efforts to seize absolute control over the 
construction of the subject of torture.”44  Butler sees in these relations of domination “a 
civilizational war…that casts the army as the more sexually progressive culture.”45  The army 
seeks to break down the prisoners’ Muslim moral codes, which it constructs as premodern, 
subhuman, uncivilized.  It affirms their status as such by performing sexually radical politics, i.e. 
homosexual and sexually open acts upon the prisoners.  It is ironic, since the army is itself 
homophobic and misogynist: 
“Thus, we have to understand the torture as the actions of a homophobic institution against a 
population that is both constructed and targeted for its own shame about homosexuality; the 
actions of a misogynist institution against a population in which women are cast in roles bound by 
codes of honour and shame, and so not ‘equal’ in the way that women ostensibly are in the 
West.”46 
 
In everyday culture outside the torture chambers, when the norms of Islamic community are 
excluded because they are perceived as posing a threat to cultural, citizenship and humanization 
norms, the rationale for torturing those subjects is secured.  For Butler, torture is a technique of 
modernization, not aberrant moments “but, rather, the cruel and spectacular logic of US imperial 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 4. 
43 Ibid., 6. 
44 Ibid., 16. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
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culture as it operates in the context of its current wars.”47 
 What these ruminations about the post-Orlando discursive terrain suggest is that the 
divide between a universal freedom norm and culturally Euro-American radical sexual politics is 
mitigated by secularism as epistemology and the variations on the theme of Muslim otherness.  
In this thesis I propose that universal human rights espouse a secular theory of the human being 
and operationalize a modern grammar of ‘religion’ that privatizes religion and serves discourses 
of othering.  As such, universal human rights fit perfectly with certain historical traditions, but 
not all, i.e. human rights are not universal.  Other than the secular as a field of power with 
institutional and discursive aspects and the modern definition of religion as proscribing 
traditional religious forms, my theoretical framework is built upon Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept 
of the rationality of traditions.  According to MacIntyre, rival accounts of justice and practical 
rationality may be irreconcilable by their very nature, and this, I argue, crumbles the universality 
claims of human rights.  It is with this concept that I begin. 
 
The Rationality of Traditions 
Alasdair MacIntyre is a prominent contemporary moral and political philosopher.  He is 
professor of philosophy at London Metropolitan University and the University of Notre Dame, 
and has authored and edited twenty-seven books on the history of philosophy and theology over 
a period spanning five decades.  According to MacIntyre, who is often associated with 
communitarian philosophy alongside Michael Sandel, all rational enquiry takes place from 
within a tradition.  A tradition: 
“is an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and 
redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition 
who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 19. 
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interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements 
come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.”48   
 
Such a definition of tradition accounts for both change over time (redress of inconsistencies, 
development of ideas, accommodation of new social realities, etc.) and continuity through it 
(fundamental agreements, key principles, the paradigmatic character or defining features of the 
tradition, etc.).  Traditions order goods and generate values accordingly.  What justice consists of 
and justificatory rationales are generated within a tradition.  Traditions are marked by theorizing, 
and are always to some degree local.  In addition to ordering goods, traditions also differ in 
“their catalogs of the virtues, in their conceptions of selfhood, and in their metaphysical 
cosmologies.”49 
MacInytre sketches the history of modern conceptions of justice and practical rationality, 
which he says are not part of: 
“a coherent way of thinking and judging, but one constructed out of an amalgam of social and 
cultural fragments inherited both from different traditions from which our culture was originally 
derived (Puritan, Catholic, Jewish) and from different stages in and aspects of the development of 
modernity (the French Enlightenment, the Scottish Enlightenment, nineteenth century economic 
liberalism, twentieth century political liberalism).”50 
 
Without repeating his entire account, I will discuss two major stages in the development of 
justice and practical rationality – the Homeric/Platonic/Aristotelian and Augustinian/Thomist – 
to show contrast with modern renditions and establish that tradition matters and is conceptually 
determinative. 
 In the Homeric worldview, the universe was thought to be governed by a single order that 
structured nature and society alike.  To enact dike, or justice, was to act according to themis, or 
that which is ordained by order.51  Goodness (agathos) and virtue/excellence (arête) serve the 
                                                          
48 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice?  Which Rationality?  Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988: 12. 
49 Ibid., 349. 
50 Ibid., 1-2. 
51 Ibid., 14. 
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dual function of fulfilling one’s role and preserving order.  In such a scheme, one’s self-interest 
is not distinguishable from the interests of others.52 
Contrast can be noted with modern reasoning’s division of how nature and society are 
thought to be ordered, the division (antagonistic in some schools) between one’s self interests 
and others’ interests, and in the premises for action beginning with ‘I want’ rather than ‘I ought 
to…in accordance with order.’  Homer’s poems show how: 
“the structures of normal life are understood as a local expression of the order of the cosmos…So 
the institutionalization of justice at Athens is in a very clear sense taken to be the local expression 
of the justice of Zeus.”53 
 
 In the post-Homeric inheritance of ancient Greece, the goods of effectiveness became 
distinct from the goods of excellence.  The polis was to be site where both goods would be 
mitigate and maximized, and all the life activities that the ancient Greeks valued (i.e. warfare, 
athleticism, poetry, agriculture, rhetoric, art, mathematics, philosophy, etc.) would be integrated.  
Politics was to be the knowledge of how to achieve this task according to the best ordering: 
“The constitution of each particular polis could therefore be understood as the expression of a set 
of principles about how goods are to be ordered in a way of life.”54 
 
Conceptions of justice were always therefore local, generated by each polis.  Where groups 
aiming at the goods of effectiveness prevailed, justice resulted from contract and negotiation; 
where the goods of excellence prospered, justice was an integrating concept positioning 
individuals within a broader web of social inter-relations united by common allegiance to 
good(s).55 
Conceptions of virtues, who should rule and practical reasoning also differed between the 
goods of effectiveness and the goods of excellence.  For example, according to the goods of 
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53 Ibid., 26. 
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“one is educated in the specific form of activity aimed at achieving a specific good – as well as in 
what those goods are.  By contrast, where the goods of cooperative effectiveness are concerned, no 
consideration counts as a reason except in respect of its actually motivating a person.”56 
 
This shows how differently justice and practical rationality can be conceptualized in different 
traditions, as in the opening scene of Plato’s Republic in which various answers are given to the 
question what is justice?  Thucydides’ analysis of the wars between the Greek city-states and the 
Athenian bid for empire espoused that “justice was entirely at the service of effectiveness” with 
“no appeal beyond the realities of power.”57  In the Republic, Thrasymachus continues this view: 
only limitations in strength of the powerful compel them to enter into agreements with others and 
uphold some sort of justice.  Glaucon’s contribution is that justice is the result of the practical 
need for mutual protection and survival against one another’s arms and interests. 
 But Plato answers both of these.  He answers Thrasymachus’ account of the ruler, which 
rests on techne (craft) as a skill-set based on means-ends generalizations derived from 
experience, with the view that: 
“no one is master of a techne who does not understand how and in what way the end which that 
specific techne serves is a good, and that understanding requires a knowledge of goods and good 
in general.”58 
 
He answers Glaucon by arguing that justice is worth having for its own sake. 
 Aristotle, according to MacIntyre, sought to finish Plato’s work.59  In Politics he made a 
compilation of constitutions: 
“in order to discover what form of constitution could be treated as the paradigm in relation to 
which all deviations from it could be classified in terms of the various types of misunderstanding 
and failure which they embody.”60 
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59 Ibid., 85. 
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15 
 
For Aristotle, the polis and the broader order of the cosmos provide the context for understanding 
justice and rationality.61  The polis aimed not only at political goods, but at all human goods, the 
highest of which was contemplative understanding, or theoria.62  The proponents of the goods of 
effectiveness, however, reasoned that rational action was essentially a cost-benefit analysis in the 
service of one’s aims.  For Aristotle, being virtuous was necessary for rational judgment and 
action.63   
 These virtues were to be cultivated by performing just acts.  It is a dialectical movement 
between aiming at the good without fully knowing it, and learning it through the practice of right 
judgment and action.64  Education plays an important role in enjoining phronesis, or practical 
intelligence, upon the younger citizens.65 
 Aristotle’s views on both justice and practical rationality embedded these in the polis’ 
tradition.  Again we can note the contrast with the modern appraisal of these: 
“That one’s rationality should be not merely supported by but partly constituted by one’s 
membership in and integration into a social institution of some one particular type is a contention 
very much at odds with characteristically modern views of rationality.”66 
 
Aristotle’s account of practical rationality maintained that aimed-at goods will only be genuinely 
good if they are derived from the arche, that well of fundamental principles from which practical 
reasoning draws.67 
 The second example from MacIntyre I present here is from the Augustinian and Thomist 
traditions of justice and rationality.  The backdrop to Augustine’s thought was comprised of 
                                                          
61 Ibid., 101-102. 
62 Ibid., 107. 
63 Ibid., 109. 
64 Ibid., 113-118. 
65 Ibid., 121. 
66 Ibid., 123. 
67 Ibid., 121. 
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Stoic, Hebrew and Pauline conceptions of universal humankind and natural law.68  For him, to 
know justice is to know its form, which is present in the mind already and not learned from sense 
perception.  To be just is to give to each what is owed, with the qualification that it is of utmost 
importance to love one another: 
“Everyone can discover within his or her own mind that timeless form or conception of justice 
which is the measure of right action…[but] the full intellectual apprehension of the form of justice 
is not by itself sufficient to generate right action.”69 
 
Since mental knowledge is not enough, love must be directed “toward that form is something 
which we are only able to achieve when our love is directed toward a life which perfectly 
embodies that form in its actions, the life of Jesus Christ.”70 
 Augustine added a new element to understanding the genesis of action: the will.  The will 
distinguishes between those actions moved by a love of God (which alone will be just) from 
those moved by pride and self-love (which will be unjust).71  His theory of the will formed the 
basis of his political theory, such that justice “exists only in that republic which is the city of 
God, of which Christ is founder and in which Christ rules.”72  While for Plato and Aristotle, 
reason had its own ends and failure to act for one’s good was a defect of either education or 
controlling the passions, for Augustine reason itself was moved by the will, which explained 
wrong choices even when knowledge was present and passions controlled.73  Divine grace was 
of utmost for Augustine in guiding the will to good, but the will also had to assent to divine 
grace.  Justice was important to Augustine’s scheme, but humility was even more so and 
determinative of whether one’s character would be just.74 
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 St. Thomas Aquinas was trained in the classical Greek rationalist and Augustinian 
theological traditions.  His own work aimed to integrate the two into one.  In Aquinas’ 
understanding, there is an ultimate truth that is a terminus for all understanding.  Each individual 
has within him or her the capacity for right answers to act in accordance with it, but this is 
achieved by discovering first principles dialectically.  But unlike some modern proponents of 
practical rationality – which require neither the existence of reality external to their web of 
beliefs such that truth is “nothing more than an idealization of the concept of warranted 
assertability,”75 nor the virtuous life for perfecting rational action – Aquinas argued that “good 
practical reasoning cannot occur without some development of the moral virtues and that in turn 
cannot occur without education.”76 
 For Aquinas, the precepts of natural law “are the expression of divine law as apprehended 
by human reason.”77  Aquinas’ practical rationality is Aristotelian in general structure while 
integrating central themes of Augustine’s psychology.78  For him, religion is a moral virtue: 
“requiring of us devotion, prayer, adoration, sacrifice, and offerings in support of the institutions 
of religious observance…what we owe to God is accompanied by a duty to others; piety, for 
example, involves proper respect not only for God but also for parents, family, and patria and 
observance similarly requires respect for excellence in others.”79  Such a socially embedded 
concept of religious life differs significantly from the modern grammar of religion, which 
renders religious essentially a private matter (a point I elaborate in chapter 3). 
 MacIntyre’s history of the ideas of justice and practical rationality as they developed and 
changed in various stages illustrates his thesis on the rationality of traditions.  One of his claims 
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is that liberalism, despite being born in opposition to tradition, is itself a tradition in the 
aforementioned sense.  One of the key principles at the foundation of the liberal tradition is that 
traditional structures of authority are not determinative for rational enquiry.  One of the 
Enlightenment’s central aspirations was to pose standards and methods of rational justification 
such that reason would replace authority.80  In this context, the liberal subject is defined as a 
morally autonomous and self-sovereign subject.  The liberal tradition has produced a number of 
discourses of universality, including Kant’s universal rationality theory and Hegel’s universal 
history thesis, implying that all traditions will eventually arrive at the summit of liberal freedom.  
Universal human rights is one contemporary manifestation of this. 
Talal Asad, professor of anthropology at the City University of New York Graduate 
Center, has authored several books and scholarly articles on the anthropology of religion, 
secularism and knowledge/power.  His areas of specialization include postcolonialism, 
Christianity and Islam.  Asad’s recent theorizing on traditions compliments MacIntyre’s 
definition.  He characterizes traditions in two ways: 1) as theoretical locations for questioning 
authority, time, language use and embodiment; and 2) as empirical arrangements of everyday life 
connecting discursivity and materiality.81  The discursive aspect of tradition is the language 
through which learning and relearning occurs, and is something passed down.  Embodied 
practices cultivate sensibilities that can change the self (i.e. emotions, language, dispositions) and 
the environment.82  What is learnt, says Asad, is not a doctrine but a mode of being, a capacity 
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81 Talal Asad, “Thinking About Tradition, Religion and Politics in Egypt Today.”  Critical Inquiry, University of 
Chicago: 2014.  Available at: 
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82 Ibid.  See also Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject.  Princeton: 
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19 
 
for experiencing that can’t be renounced.  Like MacIntyre, Asad affirms that disagreements are a 
constitutive part of traditions.  In theory, traditions can accommodate rupture as well as 
continuity.  There are entries and exits.83 
MacIntyre claims that the tradition of cosmopolitan modernity postulates a false notion: 
“the confident belief that all cultural phenomena must be potentially translucent to understanding, 
that all texts must be capable of being translated into the language which the adherents of 
modernity speak to each other.”84 
 
This belief in universal translatability, says MacIntyre, cannot register the fact that rival 
accounts of practical reasoning and justice emerge from within different conceptual frameworks, 
each with their own modes of argument.  There is, in other words, no “neutral court of appeal.”85  
Various attempts to establish a tradition-independent moral standpoint have all failed.  This, 
precisely, “was and is the project of modern liberal, individualist society.”86  MacIntyre says the 
interminable debate over what the principles of shared rationality actually are has itself 
transformed liberalism into a tradition.  This tradition has produced universal human rights, and 
in this thesis I will explore the ways in which Islamic arguments about human rights 
provincialize the discourse, i.e. unsettle its universality claims. 
 
Statement of the Argument 
 Having argued in this introduction that all enquiry is rooted in a tradition, and therefore in 
a set of agreements over the good, values, the human being, etc., I argue in the following 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
embodied and performed through the vehicle of piety and the pedagogy of religious instruction.  I discuss her work 
in detail in chapter 5, “Muslim Approaches to Human Rights II: Islam as Din.” 
83 Asad, “Thinking About…”.  See also Sherman A. Jackson, Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third 
Resurrection.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.  Jackson argues, in evaluating the inferior position afforded 
to Blackamerican Muslims by their immigrant counterparts (Arab and South Asian migrant Muslims to the U.S.), 
that failure to transfer religious authority in a timely fashion has resulted in the reification of Immigrant Islam’s 
‘false universals.’ 
84 MacIntyre (1988), 327. 
85 Ibid., 333. 
86 Ibid., 335. 
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chapters of my thesis that: 1) the concept of ‘religion’ at play in universal human rights inscribes 
a secular political negotiation; 2) contemporary Muslim political thought in the Western public 
intellectual space interacts with the freedom of religion norm in multiple ways, generating no 
consensus around argued Muslim commitments to human rights; and 3) as such, human rights 
are not universal. 
In chapter 2, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” I survey the history of 
the freedom of religion norm as it travelled from Western European hostility towards the 
perceived secularist communist onslaught against Christian democracy, to contemporary 
European nationalist policies whose secular public space is offended by Muslim communities.  I 
survey human rights theorists from three prominent approaches today – a moral autonomy 
approach, a Rawlsian minimal-standards approach, and a human dignity approach – and show 
that secularist universalism is a constant assumption.  Human rights espouses what some have 
called ‘liberal anti-pluralism,’ a false universalism that cannot accommodate a wide range of 
difference but instead announces the authority of a global public law.  I show how the language 
of freedom of religion in international rights covenants subjects the freedom to the discretionary 
power of the state – a secular negotiation. 
In chapter 3, “Religion, the Secular and Din,” I show how the universal human right of 
freedom of religion employs a secular grammar of ‘religion.’  I present arguments by Jonathan 
Smith, William Cavanaugh and Tomoko Masuzawa that the concept ‘religion’ is a modern 
invention, one that does not correspond to premodern or non-western understandings of religio 
(or din; see below), enables comparative religion and othering, and is implicated in imperial 
violence.  I contend that the secular is a field of power with discursive and institutional aspects, 
as Talal Asad has argued.  It enables a number of (historical, valued) binaries, i.e. 
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religion/secular, law/morality and public/private.  These binaries, as well as secular grammars of 
concepts like ‘the social,’ ‘agency,’ and time/space, provide secular substance to human rights as 
a knowledge frame. 
In the final part of chapter 3 I present a textual analysis of a Qur’anic concept – din – 
which is the descriptive noun that identifies Islam in the Muslim sacred text.  The etymological 
web surrounding din within the broader epistemic system of the Qur’an provides a conceptual 
alternative to ‘religion’ for understanding human rights pertaining to religious life.  Din is a 
concept being brought into the analysis of human rights universality from the Islamic tradition.  
In chapters 4 and 5, I test my critique of the provinciality of human rights vis-à-vis their secular 
rendition of ‘religion’ by surveying a wide spectrum of Muslim political thought in the Western 
public intellectual debate.  The textual analysis of din provides necessary insight into some of the 
prior commitments adherents of the Islamic tradition bring to engagements with universal human 
rights.  Through a deep conceptual survey of ten Muslim political thinkers on human rights, I 
show various configurations of how Islam, as either ‘religion’ or din, can fit with the universal 
human right of freedom of religion.  What congruences can be articulated?  What contradictions 
are generated? 
Without aiming to forge binaries, I find that Western Muslim thinkers (i.e. those who live 
in Europe or North America and who write in English or else are widely available in translation 
in American academia) can be broadly mapped along two tendencies: 
1. In chapter 4, “Muslim Approaches to Human Rights I: Islam as Religion in the Modern 
Sense,” I present thinkers who pose Islam as a religion in the modern sense.  These 
thinkers promote full-scale adoption of universal human rights.  People like Abdullahi 
An-Na’im, Abdolkarim Saroush, Fatima Mernissi, Abdulaziz Sachedina and Jerusha 
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Tanner Lamptey all endorse universal human rights.  To differing degrees, they share the 
following values: 
- the secular state is the best protector of the freedom of religion; 
- rationality enjoys a privileged position in epistemology, and other ways of knowing 
should be subjected to it; 
- the Islamic tradition should undergo theological, epistemological and legal reform 
according to universally rational human rights norms; 
- traditional authoritative structures such as the madhdhaahib (schools of jurisprudence 
and their methodologies) should be cleared away as inherited, antiquated accretions; 
- the primary Islamic texts – and in these they tend to favor the Qur’an over the 
prophetic example – should be reinterpreted from a clean slate, based again on 
universally rational HR norms; 
- gender equality should be sought and achieved on the pattern of secular liberalism; 
and 
- democracy is the most desirable political form, including for Muslim-majority nation-
states. 
2. In chapter 5, “Muslim Approaches to Human Rights II: Islam as Din,” I present 
arguments by thinkers who pose Islam as other than religion in the modern sense, i.e. as 
din (as explained in chapter 3).  These thinkers engage human rights discourse more 
critically; they do not call for the wholesale adoption of human rights, but bring 
important challenges to its assumptions.  People like Sherman Jackson, Naquib Al-Attas, 
Saba Mahmood, Abdulhakim Murad (also known as Timothy Winter) and Katherine 
Bullock present the following challenges: 
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- the liberal state espouses a false universalism; 
- democracy, like all human institutions, should be neither automatically shunned nor 
adopted, but should be put through the “sieve” of scriptural principles; 
- rationality is only one way of knowing among the human faculties of knowledge, and 
is neither free-standing nor the most important; 
- liberal feminism with its liberatory/tradition-subverting definition of agency cannot 
compute other forms of female agency that Muslim women may desire to embody 
and enact; 
- gender equality from a secular point of view pertains only to material social 
arrangements while gender equality in a more traditionalist perspective is ‘more 
meaningful’ and pertains to opportunities for God-consciousness and salvation.  It is 
difficult to reconcile these two approaches since their theories of the human being are 
completely different (naturalist in the first, embodied spiritual in the second); and 
- the inherited madhdhaahib and theological schools should not be wiped clean away, 
but themselves contain (like all traditions do, according to Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Talal Asad’s theories of ‘tradition’) the mechanisms for necessary renewal and 
change over time. 
 
I examine these ten Muslim political thinkers’ treatments of Islamic human rights themes 
like fitra, the equality of women and men and the place of rationality in epistemology to gauge 
the limits and possibilities of human rights universality among Muslim settings.  Since the 
Muslim political theorists I survey do not show a consensus on whether Islam is a religion in the 
modern sense or is better conceived as the conceptual alternative din, and conclude in various 
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degrees of endorsement and problematization of human rights, freedom of religion and the 
broader human rights discourse that announces it may be less than universal after all. 
 In my concluding chapter, I explore the ways in which the emergent ‘postsecular’ turn 
can redress the false universality claims of human rights.  I ask the question: what can 
postsecular feminist theory potentially contribute to the current state of the Islam-and-human-
rights discourse in the Western public intellectual debate?  What can a postsecular feminism that 
is both liberatory in its promise and attuned to secular hegemony offer a discourse that, in many 
ways, attempts to force the square peg of Islam into the round hole of human rights?  I return full 
circle to MacIntyre’s rationality-of-traditions approach.  Incorporating this approach may have 
the effect of humbling and critically opening postsecular feminist theorists in their subject/object 
or intersubjective relations with non-secular women. 
There is no consensus among contemporary Muslim political engagements with human 
rights as to whether Islam is a religion in the modern, privatized, disembodied (apolitical) sense 
or if it is something more comprehensive, social and rooted in the public good, like din.  As such, 
applying a ‘traditions’ approach to encountering and interpreting Muslim commitments would 
help open up space for non-secular renditions (i.e. a truer respect for difference).  Macalester 
College professor of Political Science David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, Ithaca College 
professor of International Relations and Economic History, have pointed out that even when 
some International Relations theorists temper cosmopolitanism with ‘humane governance’ and 
grassroots/‘from below’ voices, secular liberal values and norms are still positioned 
authoritatively: 
“Instead of something that emerges in a dialogical process and whose direction cannot be forecast 
readily, these world order values are taken as given.  These values are then used to distinguish 
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those agents fostering civility from those whose incivility must be purged to create a global 
order.”87 
 
Cosmopolitanism and human rights, according to these authors, perpetuate neo-modernization 
theory and an inability to deal with difference.  Revisiting MacIntyre’s insights from his 
rationality-of-traditions approach may contribute to an acknowledgement that human rights are 
less than universal, which in turn may improve and enrich the discourse on human rights and 
Islam and make more widely valuable and acceptable the international currency of human rights 
as a site of protection and liberation from political and economic excesses of various kinds. 
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Chapter 2: Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today 
 
Human rights discourse claims universal validity and applicability.  The emergence of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 is normally celebrated as a landmark 
accomplishment representing international solidarity.  Jack Donnelly, professor of international 
relations and the philosophy of social science at the University of Denver, has authored several 
books on universal human rights.  Donnelly argues that the UDHR model: 
“is rooted in an attractive moral vision of human beings as equal and autonomous agents living in 
states that treat each citizen with equal concern and respect…a certain kind of liberalism provides, 
if not the best, then at least a good justification for this system of rights.”1 
 
Donnelly states that the UDHR represents a consensus, despite the fact of “the considerable, at 
times profound, philosophical differences that exist between (and within) civilizations, cultures, 
and societies in the contemporary world.”2 
The immediate context of the emergence of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration was the Second World War.  These institutions aimed to prevent future generations 
from the “scourge of war” which had dealt “untold sorrow” upon mankind.3  By the criteria of 
the “conscience of mankind,” the United Nations aimed to suppress “acts of aggression” and to 
affirm the equality of small and large nations.4  To this end, the drafters of the UDHR aimed at a 
religiously neutral, philosophically ‘foundationless’ framework in the hopes of achieving the 
broadest possible consensus amidst the diversity of nation states.  Since philosophical agreement 
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could not be accomplished, it was thought, it would suffice to achieve the practicable political 
project of human rights.5 
The inclusivity of its secular framework was meant to be its strength.  In this spirit, 
certain human rights theorists argue that because human rights bypass the complicated 
entanglements of philosophical differences to aim at a practicable concept of constraints against 
states, peoples of various religious and cultural beliefs can commit to human rights without 
having to forego their philosophical commitments.  For example, James Nickel states that 
“today’s human rights are not part of a political philosophy with an accompanying epistemology.  
They make philosophical assumptions, but they do not require acceptance of a particular 
philosophy or ideology.”6  Since the objective at the drafting of the UDHR was the creation of 
international law, normative foundations were neither sought nor identified.7  Nickel maintains 
that because the language of human rights utilizes more than rights verbiage – i.e. prohibitions, 
requirements and general normative principles – these “alternative vocabularies offer both 
normative and philosophical flexibility.”8 
This conception of philosophical neutrality has been widely affirmed.  Donnelly claims 
that the use of human rights affords a great deal of flexibility for universal application because it 
does not endorse any particular philosophical anthropology, or theory of the human being.  
Admitting of the variety of such theories, he states: 
“There are many well-developed and widely accepted philosophical anthropologies: for example, 
Aristotle’s zoon politikon; Marx’s human natural being who distinguishes himself by producing 
his own material life; Mill’s pleasure-seeking, progressive being; Kant’s rational being governed 
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by an objective moral law; and feminist theories that begin by questioning the gendered 
conceptions of ‘man’ in these and most other accounts… 
 
“Given that philosophical anthropologies are so controversial, there are great dangers in tying 
one’s analysis of human rights to any particular theory of human nature.  The account of human 
rights I have sketched is compatible with many (but not all) theories of human nature.”9 
 
Donnelly believes this flexibility constitutes the strength of human rights.  As such, human 
nature cannot be the foundation of human rights, and “there is no other foundation either.”10  But 
is this in fact the case?  Are human rights truly foundationless, i.e. philosophically neutral?  
Some theorists answer ‘no.’ 
According to Samuel Moyn, Harvard professor of law and history and author of several 
works on democracy, human rights and history, a small number of Western Europeans spoke of 
human rights in the aftermath of the Second World War as cosmopolitans seeking another mode 
past national-welfare contexts.11  The nation-state had won as political form, and nationalism as 
political ideology, exiting the patriotic war.12  Moyn claims that: 
“Only in Western Europe, in the era of conservative and Christian Democratic hegemony, did 
human rights survive as an idealistic slogan from wartime and were legalized on paper with 
supranational scope.”13 
 
These Western European elites soon took shelter under the United States during the Cold War.  
Moyn states: 
“Both the American and Soviet side were to fight the cold war in cosmopolitan terms or as, 
ultimately, a humanistic struggle with (where necessary) humanistic violence; and no international 
human rights movement emerged from this struggle immediately.”14 
 
 Instead, the national welfarist consensus emerged as the significant feature of World War II’s 
aftermath.  The legacy of the rights of man was the mobilizational collective demand for a 
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revolutionary nation-state.  Rights-talk emerged in the twentieth century and was incorporated 
into constitutions as long as it didn’t speak of rights above the nation-state.15 
The discourse on universal human rights only became immensely popular in the 1970s, in 
the context of Cold War geopolitics: 
“international human rights politics originated in the 1970s by sticking, perhaps defensibly, to a 
minimal package of norms like free speech and integrity of the body.  The problem is that this 
occurred as the more thoroughgoing dreams for national welfare of the 1940s were dropped, and 
no agenda of global welfare has followed in compensation.”16 
 
Until that time, the colonized subjects of European imperial states preferred subaltern 
internationalisms as alternatives to human rights, as indicated by the Bandung Conference in the 
1950s and the New International Economic Order of the 1970s:17 
“…human rights in the contemporary sense were put off or left aside because the nation-state was 
not seen as an affirmation of particularity but as a highly idealistic vehicle of cosmopolitan 
humanity enjoying a modular nationalism with no provision for superordinate constraint.  The 750 
million people the United Nations left colonized voted with their feet for a cosmopolitanism that 
implied their collective emancipation with more assurance and with more practical meaning than 
international human rights did.”18 
 
Hence there was more support outside Europe for the Atlantic Charter of 1941 (which called for 
self-determination) than for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 (which failed to 
condemn empire).19 
Moyn’s account of the history of human rights represents a revision to the usual narrative 
as represented by Donnelly and Nickel.  For Moyn, the passage of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights was a relatively insignificant event achieved by a small number of international 
elites, which only gained currency decades later due to geopolitical interests during the Cold War 
and the failure of other, more meaningful forms of cosmopolitanism.  Alison Renteln, professor 
of political science, anthropology, public policy and law, has authored several books and articles 
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16 Ibid., 383. 
17 Ibid., 378. 
18 Ibid., 379. 
19 Ibid., 376-377. 
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on comparative law, multiculturalism and international law, and global bioethics.  Renteln 
claims, like Moyn, that while the UDHR was signed by nearly all states, “the role of government 
elites at international settings may not be indicative of the traditional value systems which they 
are supposed to represent.”20  Irene Oh, professor of religion at George Washington University 
and director of its Peace Studies program, cautions that the 1948 passage of the Universal 
Declaration was riddled with: 
“Power imbalances…between colonizing nations and their former colonies…The norms that 
receive the label ‘universal’ may, in fact, not be universal at all…may have been forced as a result 
of systematically distorted communication.”21 
 
While the aims enumerated in the UN Charter are indeed desirable, they may not necessarily 
constitute universal purposes sufficient for imposing the entire catalog of universal human rights 
upon all traditions and societies.  Critics of human rights’ universality claims often point to the 
broader Western tradition of presuming moral universality.  Renteln states that human rights 
reflect the views of Western philosophers and the political cultures in which they operate.22  The 
theoretical definitions of human rights reveal that: 
“human rights are presumed to be universal in character.  This would not in itself be problematic 
(indeed it is desirable), except that the philosophical foundations are never adequately 
demonstrated… Because they take the validity of the rights to be a self-evident proposition, there 
has traditionally been little room for debate.”23 
 
In practice, the universality-claims of the human rights discourse encounter much 
resistance.  This is due to the fact that, whereas “natural rights were not widely contested because 
they were asserted in a universe of shared values, human rights have been highly 
controversial.”24  The central problem becomes how to prove the validity of any particular 
interpretation.  And in “the absence of a satisfactory grounding for human rights, theorists are 
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compelled to fall back upon mere assertions as to the self-evident nature of particular human 
rights.”25 
If we think of Moyn’s historical revision of the usual human rights historiography in light 
of MacIntyre’s claim (see chapter 1) that liberalism is a tradition in the local, argument-through-
time sense, then “universal” human rights appear more provincial than universal.  The 
transcendent air attached to human rights is replaced by a concrete political history.   Human 
rights still retain a transcendent air insofar as they constitute the moral restraints of the nation-
state, which supposedly transcends sectarian difference, rules by transcendent authority, and 
upholds transcendently-claimed rights.  Nonetheless, identifying the uses of human rights within 
political historical contexts can call their universality claims into question. 
Human rights discourse is emergent, and as such, is in the process of testing its 
assumptions through appropriations in various cultural and discursive contexts.26  Since the early 
1990s, there have been a number of critical challenges levelled against human rights’ 
universality claims.  One example is the Asian Values argument.  The Bangkok Declaration of 
1993 and 1995 draws attention to the peculiarly Western values inherent in human rights 
standards.  This document was signed by nearly forty Asian and Pacific states.  They claimed 
that human rights’ emphasis on the individual clashes with Asian values that privilege the 
community.  They also criticized HR’s stress on civil and political rights, whereas Asian cultures 
place higher value on economic and social rights, which bear a more collective character.27 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 349. 
26 See Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; 9.  He states that human 
rights are “unlike more settled and longstanding normative practices such as might be found, say, in a mature legal 
system.”  And this, says Beitz, helps to explain the lack of widespread agreement on human rights. 
27 See David Little, “Rethinking Human Rights: A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other Matters.”  The 
Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1999): 149-177: 153. 
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Another example is the Cairo Declaration of 1990, which represents an attempt to alter 
and appropriate human rights norms in a manner acceptable to the particular requirements of 
Islamic tradition.28  Renteln provides more examples that challenge human rights universality, 
with regard to property, political systems, and marriage: 
“Article 17 provides that ‘Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others’ and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.’  The value underlying 
this standard is hardly universal.  One commentator refers to the problem with Article 17 as one of 
cultural imperialism because it ‘... seeks to impose free enterprise and capitalism on the rest of the 
world’ (Zvobgo 1979: 95).  Another human rights analyst rejects the universality of Article 17 (1): 
‘The community ideology does not admit of private property, except in consumer goods’ (Sinha 
1978: 144)… 
 
“Some of the articles concerning elections reflect a preference for a particular kind of political 
system.  Articles 18, 19, and 20 provide for rights to freedom of thought, religion, and association.  
Article 21 guarantees the right to participate in government, equal access to public service, and 
free elections…these articles clearly embody the preferred set of political devices of Western 




The same limitations are observed in areas of social life, as in norms pertaining to marriage and 
the general privileging of the nuclear family.  Renteln states that the human rights requirement 
that marriage be entered into with full, free consent fails to account for norms of arranged 
marriages.  The discourse’s general preference for the nuclear family as the basic unit of society 
does not accommodate norms of extended kinship structures.30  In these ways, human rights 
neglect to acknowledge family and social, as well as economic values foreign to the liberal 
Western tradition. 
Proponents of human rights as foundationless, neutral and universal counter-argue that 
human rights can be reasonably accommodated in a diversity of cultural and national contexts.  
Donnelly argues in reference to the Asian Values challenge that while human rights are 
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understood as fundamentally universal, substantial cultural space is permitted for implementing 
their norms.31  Princeton University professor of politics and author of several works on political 
philosophy and international political theory Charles Beitz argues that, with regard to 
international toleration, a “progressive convergence” can be achieved across divergent cultures 
and religious worldviews.32  International toleration can be conceived of as primarily societal 
(variations in the constitutions and cultural practices of states should be tolerated on analogy to 
individual liberties of self-choice) or individualistic (toleration as an extension of individual 
liberties, not by analogy).33 
Nickel states that cultural differences should not problematize acceptance of universal 
human rights because various factors lead to non-collusion of beliefs.  These include 
psychological or practical compartmentalization (such that people place conflicting beliefs in 
different realms, like theory vs. practice), agreement on human rights without agreement on the 
grounds of human rights (i.e. a Rawlsian distinction between ideology and political institutions), 
and the often loose, non-systematized organization of people’s religious beliefs.34  Political 
theorist and radical feminist Zillah Eisenstein, who is professor of politics at Ithaca college and 
author of numerous works on women, war, race, and capitalism, advocates the liberatory, 
transnational potential of human rights for global activists and their networks.  She argues that 
autonomy itself is not an exclusively liberal notion: 
“There are other locations for this thinking about woman’s freedom.  It is wrong-headed to assume 
that the notion of feminist individuality and autonomy is always an extension of liberal 
individualism.  There are other notions of autonomy that are not simply liberal individualist at 
their core.  As such, the notion of autonomous woman comes from other locations besides the 
West.  There are varieties of autonomy besides liberal individuality that are liberatory.”35 
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Despite these reasoned arguments for human rights applicability across cultures, some 
theorists remain unconvinced that the particular tradition responsible for HR’s genesis can create 
a framework for truly universal participation.  Joseph Massad, professor of Middle Eastern, 
South Asian and African Studies at Columbia University and author of several works on Arab 
and Israeli national identities and Arab intellectual history in Western representations, argues 
that the history of the governmentalization and internationalization of gender issues beginning in 
the 1970s was deeply implicated in Western hegemony.36  The process of envisioning women’s 
rights as human rights proceeded along the hegemony of Western interventionism in the Cold 
War political context.  ‘Transnational’ and ‘international’ organizations and solidarity networks 
were often codes for the proliferation of Euro-American and European knowledge frames.37 
Massad claims that the emergent human rights norms in this period issued from “white 
Euro-American middle class and Protestant culture,” and that the international culture of 
modernity “is nothing less than the institutionalization of these cultural norms.”38  Women-
focused world conferences since the 1990s (such as Vienna 1993, Cairo 1994 and Beijing 1995) 
reveal not only tensions and discrepancies of interests between North and South, but also that the 
woman question is posed in exclusively Western ways.39  The liberal framing of global 
campaigns like the one to end violence against women is internal to a “technology of 
transnational governmentality.”40  In this context, focus on military humanitarianism, capacity-
building, civil society and empowerment betrays human rights’ relationship to a neoliberal world 
order: 
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“Its imperial mission aside, the discourse (and organized campaigns) of human rights has more of 
a symptomatic relationship to neoliberal global capitalism: it broaches moments of critique; it 
attempts to inoculate against neoliberalism’s worst excesses; sometimes it pretends to offer 
something almost like a counter-public, yet it continues to operate insistently outside the economic 
sphere, the most important of neoliberalism’s theaters of operations.”41 
 
 
 In what follows, I argue from the postulate that human rights are not philosophically 
neutral but advance specifically secular values – a disembodied and privatized definition of 
religion, the separation of law and morality, the public/private binary and the morally 
autonomous and sovereign individual subject.  The chapter proceeds as follows.  I begin by 
tracing the history of rights discourse in Western political thought.  I then survey common 
philosophical assumptions across three prominent approaches to human rights today: a Kantian 
approach that focuses on moral autonomy, a human dignity approach, and a Rawlsian 
‘political’/minimalist approach.  In all these approaches, human rights espouse a distinctly 
secular philosophical anthropology, or theory of the human being.  Closer inspection of the 
universal human right of freedom of religion illustrates that ‘religion’ is also defined in secular 
terms.  Freedom of religion implies that religion is essentially a disembodied matter pertaining 
principally to the private realm – distinct from politics and economics – and is subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the state.  I survey the history of the freedom of religion norm as it 
travelled from Western European hostility towards the perceived secularist communist onslaught 
against Christian democracy, to contemporary European nationalist policies whose secular public 
space is offended by Muslim communities.42 
 
The History of Rights Discourse in Western Political Thought 
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Because I adopt a MacIntyrian approach to traditions, namely that all enquiry is rooted in 
some tradition and a tradition is an argument extended through time that negotiates and 
renegotiates the meanings of key principles with both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders,’ I treat universal 
human rights as one such tradition.  I also claim that the human rights tradition is not universal.  
In order to substantiate my claim, I will historically situate the discourse.  In the previous 
section, I enumerated the immediate historical emergence of HR (i.e. its popularity in the 1970s 
as informed by failures of national welfarism and other cosmopolitanisms).  Now, I briefly trace 
the genealogy of modern rights through historical Western discourse – and this, I suggest, argues 
against claims for the ‘foundationless’ or philosophically neutral character of human rights. 
Anthony Pagden is professor of Political Science and History at the University of 
Califronia, Los Angeles.  He has authored several works on the relations between Europe and the 
rest of the world, the political theory of empire, cosmopolitanism and nationalism.  In 
researching natural rights, Pagden claims that neither Plato, Aristotle, nor Greek law used ‘right’ 
as distinct from justice.43  He places the genesis of the modern conception of rights in the jurists 
of the Roman republic, from the second to the sixth centuries, claiming that “there is no 
autonomous conception of rights outside this culture.”44  Initially in Roman law, rights and duties 
were correlative, the same word being used to indicate both (ius).  Roman law did not assume 
that rights existed as a natural or universal category.  While individuals could claim their rights 
under the law, it was not on the basis of their humanity, but their connection to civil rule.  With 
the regime of the emperor Justinian in the sixth century, this understanding changed.  He 
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“introduced the notion of a natural law,” which according to Pagden, “was a legalized version of 
the Stoic notion of a koinos nomos, that is, a ‘common order’ for the whole world.”45 
 In the thirteenth century with St. Thomas Aquinas, Justinian’s concept of natural law 
became Christianized.  He transformed it into “a body of universal, and innate, principles which 
would act as a bridge between the human and the divine.”46  Human beings were imagined as 
belonging to a universal mankind governed in common by this natural law.  But there was also, 
by historical necessity, customary law among nations.  Later theorists would develop 
international law on the basis of the concept of natural law.  Louis Henkin states that the modern 
conception of human rights “finds its authentic origins in the seventeenth century in the natural 
rights of John Locke.”47   In his Second Treatise on Government, Locke establishes security from 
aggression and the recognition (i.e. protection) of property as the basis of both civil society and 
the legitimacy of the Sovereign.  His version of natural law, however, differed significantly from 
earlier accounts. 
Pagden identifies two types of universalism which emerged within the natural law 
tradition.  The first was the Aristotelian-Thomist vision, in which: 
“natural law (unlike positive law) was ‘the participation in the Eternal Law by rational 
creatures’…[it was] made of the ius naturae, a body of innate, and thus self-evident, principles 
implanted ‘in the hearts of men’ by God at the creation.”48 
 
The second type of universalism was the modern version, espoused by Hobbes and the other 
social contract theorists as well as by Hugo Grotius.  In this version, natural law was reduced to 
“simple principles of security.”49  Like Hobbes, Grotius was also “determined to dismantle the 
scholastic edifice of the Aristotelian natural virtues in favor of a set of simple irreducible moral 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 174. 
46 Ibid.  Also see chapter one above, for MacIntyre’s treatment of Augustine and natural law. 
47 Louis Henkin, “The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights.” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 506, Human Rights Around the World (Nov. 1989): 10-16; 12. 
48 Pagden, 178. 
49 Ibid., 179. 
38 
 
concessions.”50  This modern version of universal natural law/rights had a distinctly secular 
effect: 
“The natural law which had once offered a complex argument for human sociability could now be 
reduced to a minimal moral core, upon which, in Grotius's view, no reasonable man, no matter 
what his religious convictions or his local customs and preferences, could fail to agree.”51 
 
Whereas for Aristotle and Aquinas, human conviviality was prior to the individual (i.e. man as 
political animal whose ultimate felicity could only be realized in society, and the universal 
brotherhood of humanity), for Grotius and the social contractarians, society was made purely by 
an act of will.52  David Little, a research fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkeley Center for 
Religion, Peace and World Affaris and author of several works on religion and human rights, 
maintains that Grotius’ personal religious beliefs played an important role in his prescriptions for 
secular international cooperation: 
“The basic premise is that, since true Christian commitment is born exclusively of direct inner 
consent to God's sovereignty by each individual, and is thus subject to the ‘law of the spirit’ rather 
than the ‘law of the sword,’ it is contrary to the Christian Gospel to try to impose belief by civil 
means, or to deprive individuals of civil freedoms and privileges because of their religious 
convictions… 
 
“If, on this account, religion cannot serve as the foundation for making and enforcing human laws 
within as well as among nations, then that foundation must be sought elsewhere.  This is, 
obviously, where Grotius's famous doctrine of natural law comes in…To call an obligation 
‘natural’ in Grotius's sense is to assert that the obligation is accessible to and incumbent upon 
human beings, independent of specially revealed (religious) knowledge.  Therefore, regardless of 
religious affiliation, human beings may be held universally accountable according to natural law.  
It is only because natural law has this logical status, prior to and independent of religious 
knowledge, that it can serve as a universal standard for resolving disputes among nations with 
different religious orientations…”53 
 
 Grotius’ historical context, which had witnessed bloody religious warfare among 
Christian European monarchies, informed his religious beliefs as well as his theory of 
international law.  As Timothy Samuel Shah (associate director of the Religious Freedom Project 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 180. 
53 See David Little, “Religion – Catalyst or Impediment to International Law?  The Case of Hugo Grotius.”  
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 87, Challenges to International 
Governance (March 31 - April 3, 1993): 322-327; 325-326. 
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also at the Berkeley Center, and author of works on religious freedom) has put it, “Grotius’ 
response to religious pluralism was to quell religious conflict by reducing ‘orthodoxy’ to 
‘morality.’”54  In his Meletius, Grotius “sought to do nothing less than to give Christianity a new 
centre of gravity, replacing dogma and creed with a morality oriented to social peace…”55  This 
move, says Shah, reversed the previous hierarchy of theology over ethics. 
 In the brief conceptual history of rights that I am recounting here, Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophy represents another significant milestone.56  His thought is paradigmatic of the 
universalist and rationalist tendencies that emerged in the Enlightenment. Kant’s categorical 
imperative, which maintains that one must act only in accordance with the possibility that one’s 
action can be universalized, presupposes the existence of universal moral principles.  In his 
moral theory, the “abstract rational process is presumed to bear a single and universal result, 
irrespective of cultural differences.”57  The French Revolution provided the rights tradition with 
yet a new chapter, where the specifically modern formulation of human rights is thought to have 
its origin.58  Whereas natural law had been thought of as prior to and above human law, the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen confined the bases of such rights within 
citizenship to a society constituted as a nation.59  The rise of the ‘rights of man’ signaled the end 
of natural law as it was previously understood: 
“The rights of man were no longer those rights which could be held against society, or across 
differing societies.  They were those which could only be held in society, and furthermore only in 
a society of a particular kind, republican, democratic, and representative.”60 
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56 I deal in detail with Kant’s notion of moral autonomy below, in the section on the moral autonomy approach to 
human rights. 
57 Renteln, 349. 
58 Pagden, 189. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 190. 
40 
 
As this brief genealogical sketch illustrates, contemporary human rights discourse that 
roots itself in the Western political tradition of rights has a history.  It is a discourse – like all 
discourses – that has been shaped by historical contingencies and the values and assumptions of 
particular thinkers, committed to beliefs about human nature, the place/non-place of the Divine 
and religion in human/public life, the principles that should govern social and political 
interaction, etc.  Claiming that human rights represent neutral ethical standards, or the “just 
requirements of morality” to use the phraseology of the Universal Declaration, is therefore 
questionable.  Perhaps such universality claims only help identify human rights with the tradition 
that brought it into being, i.e. secular liberal modernity. 
 
Contemporary Approaches to Human Rights 
According to human rights theorist Sally Engle Merry, professor of anthropology at New 
York University and author of several works on human rights, gender and culture, various 
approaches to human rights share a particular modernist vision that privileges autonomy, choice, 
equality, and bodily protection.61  She states: 
“This is the paradox of making human rights in the vernacular: To be accepted, they have to be 
tailored to the local context and resonant with the local cultural framework.  However, to be part 
of the human rights system, they must emphasize individualism, autonomy, choice, bodily 
integrity, and equality, ideas embedded in the legal documents that constitute human rights law.”62 
 
I extend Engle’s observation and argue that human rights approaches share a distinctly secular 
epistemological knowledge frame.  Three prominent approaches to human rights today are: a 
Kantian approach that centers moral autonomy; a human dignity approach that bases human 
rights on the inherent worth of every human being, as in the works of Jack Donnelly and James 
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Griffin; and a minimalist approach espoused by John Rawls and Charles Beitz that claims human 
rights are based on political, not metaphysical grounds. 
 
The Moral Autonomy Approach 
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is exemplary of the rationalizing, secularizing spirit 
of the Enlightenment.  While the Enlightenment itself was polyvocal rather than monolithic, 
characterized by debates as much as by consensus, a certain ‘critical attitude’ can be identified 
with it.  Nicholas Tampio states that while the Enlightenment was a “plural tradition – 
encompassing diverse ideas, authors, movements, and tendencies” and consisting of various rival 
Enlightenments,63 it was nonetheless “united by its common goal of refusing the political-
religious model that contributed to the devastation of the Thirty Years War.”64  Jack Donnelly 
similarly claims that, “‘Liberalism’ is a complex and contested set of orientations and 
values…rooted in a commitment to…individual autonomy.”65  Drawing on the French 
Enlightenment and British liberalism, Kant’s moral formulation perpetuates the notion of the 
morally autonomous subject.  Kant’s concept of moral autonomy can be said to be one of the 
“fundamental agreements,” to use MacIntyre’s term, of the post-Enlightenment tradition of 
secular modernity. 
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 According to Tampio, the concept of autonomy “expresses the key insight of modern 
moral philosophy that each person is capable of knowing and respecting the moral law (moral 
autonomy) or their own life plans (personal autonomy).”66  Kant’s concept of the absolute moral 
autonomy of the individual is based on his theory of the human being as a free agent with the 
potential to act in accord with a pure, good will.  Human beings exist in two worlds, which are 
governed by two different sets of laws.  In the sensible world, our bodies are governed by 
inviolable laws of nature.  In the intelligible world, we are free agents, free to make decisions 
towards good or evil.67  Morality consists in autonomy for Kant, when a free rational agent wills 
herself to abide by the laws of reason.68  This formulation becomes evident in his doctrine of the 
categorical imperative.  The categorical imperative, which is the universal, supreme principle of 
morality, states that: 
“I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law.”69 
 
Kant’s categorical imperative is situated within the broader context of his critical 
philosophy as it deals with the antinomy between freedom and necessity (or causality).  On one 
side of this third conflict of the transcendental ideas, freedom is defined negatively, as 
independence from causality, which is the series of successive conditions that define laws of 
nature.70  Theodor Adorno summarizes the third antinomy as follows: 
“If causality rules absolutely, if, in other words, there is nothing but the law of cause and effect, 
this would make an absolute of the laws imposed by human beings on the things in themselves of 
which they actually know nothing, that is, of everything that is needed to control nature, both 
human and extra-human.  This would confer on that absolute the same quality of blindness and 
externality which…is characteristic of causality in nature and knowledge in terms of the categories 
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as developed in the spirit of Kant.  The domination of nature – and we might well say, as blind 
domination it means mere nature – would itself become an absolute.  If, on the other hand, there 
were nothing but freedom, or as Kant puts it, ‘freedom without guidance’, without a law that could 
organize the phenomenal world, it would be a form of freedom that is quite devoid of any element 
of law, and hence it too would signify a relapse into a mere state of nature, namely into the natural 
chaos of a purely arbitrary state of affairs.”71 
 
Causality is necessary for experience; no experience is possible without this a priori condition.  
Freedom is also a prior necessity, if moral choice is to have any meaning.  In his Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant states: 
“Causality in accordance with the laws of Nature is not the only causality from which the 
appearances of the world can one and all be derived.  To explain these appearances, it is necessary 
to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom.”72 
 
To explain how a free rational agent can bring new causal series into being independent of 
natural causality, Kant arrives at a unique type of causality: causality through freedom.  The 
categorical imperative is instrumental to moral philosophy and to addressing the third antinomy 
by explaining that human agents are moral insofar as they choose, through free choice, to behave 
in accordance with universal laws of reason.  The third antinomy describes the fact that by 
reason alone we cannot know that we are free; but if we act ‘as if’ we are free, then we prove it 
through the doing of it.  It is essentially a pragmatic argument.  Morality, rationality, and 
freedom unite, in Kant, in the principle of autonomy. 
In Kant’s thought, the absolute moral autonomy of the individual as contextualized 
within his broader metaphysical framework has clearly secular implications.  In Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant develops his critical philosophy by sketching a new “metaphysics as science,” as 
distinct from the old metaphysics which lay claims to theoretical knowledge of transphenomenal 
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realities such as God, freedom of the will and immortality of the soul.73  Kant does not dispense 
with the idea of God, but claims that God cannot be known as an object of empirical experience.  
In his second Critique, Kant denounces as one of the principles of heteronomy  
“the theological concept which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will; not 
merely because we cannot intuit God’s perfection and can only derive it from our own concepts, 
among which that of morality is the most eminent; but because, if we do not do this (and to do so 
would be to give a crudely circular explanation), the concept of God’s will still remaining to us – 
one drawn from such characteristics as lust for glory and domination and bound up with frightful 
ideas of power and vengefulness – would inevitably form the basis for a moral system which 
would be in direct opposition to morality.”74 
 
Part of Kant’s proposal for a rational metaphysics was the elimination of what he deemed 
dogmatic metaphysics.  Kant could neither refute nor confirm God’s existence on the basis of 
empirical experience (which can only determine that people believe in God’s existence) or 
rational speculation.  He did, however, refute the three classical speculative proofs of God’s 
existence: 
1.  The ontological argument, which is entirely a priori, states that God can’t not exist.  This 
argument fails according to Kant because it poses existence as a ‘real predicate’ whereas 
‘it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing.  It is 
merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves’; 
2. The First Cause, or cosmological argument, states that the world exists, therefore God 
exists, the First Cause.  This argument fails because the use of the causal category itself 
assumes a particular causal scheme.  It also mistakenly assumes that the only way to 
avoid an actually infinite causal series is by posing a first cause.  This argument also rests 
on the validity of the Ontological Proof; and 
3. The argument from Design, which is based on the design of the universe.  This argument 
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fails on account of the previous errors, but also because it proves only the existence of an 
architect of the universe, not a creator.  Such an architect “would possess remarkable but 
not infinite powers.”75 
 
In the Groundwork, Kant provides a formal justification for the existence of God – as well as for 
the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul – as useful postulates of pure practical 
reason, or the pure moral will.76  God, freedom and immortality are not needed for theoretical 
knowledge, but are recommended by reason as working hypotheses for practical life; they are 
“cardinal propositions of ethics.”77 
For Kant, these concepts cannot be confirmed by experience, nor do they enter into the 
‘categories’ – those a priori preconditions that allow experience in the first place, i.e. space and 
time.78  In this way, by denying the existence of God any epistemological certainty or concrete 
truth value, and by positing the immortal soul and the human being’s free will as postulates, Kant 
prepares the way for a secularly-based moral philosophy.  I use secularism in the sense afforded 
by Cornelis van Peursen, as the “deliverance of man first from religious then from metaphysical 
control over his reason and language.”79  Freedom, and its supreme principle the moral law, are 
given independently of a sovereign God; in the categorical imperative, freedom is nothing but 
pure practical reason unrestrained by external factors.  Kant’s morally autonomous human being 
is a self-legislating agent, unrestrained in her reasoning by religion in any concrete way.  Kant 
does not make any claims regarding actual human beings who may indeed act morally because 
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they believe, but claims that human reason cannot prove the necessity of any particular religious 
belief as universally binding on all others. 
 Emphasis on autonomy has been substantively criticized from various feminist and 
Marxist standpoints.  Even within the secular tradition, Kant’s moral autonomy has been 
critiqued because the individual subject appears as isolated from the determining force of social 
relations, collectivities and ideologies.  Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar’s Relational 
Autonomy, for example, critically challenges conventional individualist renderings of 
autonomy.80  In McLeod and Sherwin’s chapter, relational, or contextual autonomy, is 
understood: 
“to involve explicit recognition of the fact that autonomy is both defined and pursued in a social 
context and that social context significantly influences the opportunities an agent has to develop or 
express autonomy skills.  In relational autonomy, it is necessary to explore an agent’s social 
location if we hope to evaluate properly and respond appropriately to her ability to exercise 
autonomy….By making visible the ways in which autonomy is affected by social forces, 
especially oppression, relational autonomy challenges assumptions…that autonomy be viewed as 
an achievement of individuals.  We must, therefore, evaluate society and not just the individual 
when determining the degree to which an individual is able to act autonomously.”81 
 
The influence of an agent’s social location and external social forces on autonomy is also the 
subject of criticism from certain Marxist standpoints.  In a telling passage from his Essays in 
Self-Criticism, Louis Althusser defends Marx’s emphasis on bourgeois ideology rather than 
beginning with (the bourgeois myth of) a theory of man.  It is worth quoting at length:  
“Marx's theoretical anti-humanism, as it operates within historical materialism, thus means a 
refusal to root the explanation of social formations and their history in a concept of man with 
theoretical pretensions, that is, a concept of man as an originating subject, one in whom originate 
his needs (homo oeconomicus), his thoughts (homo rationalis), and his acts and struggles (homo 
moralis, juridicus and politicus).  For when you begin with man, you cannot avoid the idealist 
temptation of believing in the omnipotence of liberty or of creative labour -- that is, you simply 
submit, in all ‘freedom,’ to the omnipotence of the ruling bourgeois ideology, whose function is to 
mask and to impose, in the illusory shape of man's power of freedom, another power, much more 
real and much more powerful, that of capitalism.  If Marx does not start with man, if he refuses to 
derive society and history theoretically from the concept of man, it is in order to break with this 
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mystification which only expresses an ideological relation of force, based in the capitalist 
production relation.  Marx therefore starts out from the structural cause producing this effect of 
bourgeois ideology which maintains the illusion that you should start with man.” 82 
 
Althusser justifies Marx’s elaboration of bourgeois ideology and structures of domination 
because to begin with the human being as a self-creating autonomous individual would be to 
entertain the bourgeois diversion.  This stays within Marx’s assertion that productive forces are 
the basis of all history.83  Marx posited the causal chain as follows: 
productive faculties  patterns of commerce and consumption  social constitution, family, 
classes, civil society  political conditions  Ideas, categories.84 
 
Beginning with concrete structures and relations rather than a theory of the human being does 
not abstract the human being needlessly, says Althusser, because in all his analysis, Marx refers 
back to the concrete effects such bourgeois structures of domination and their attendant ideology 
have on the concrete conditions of human beings: 
“Marx starts with the given economic formation, and in the particular case of Capital, with the 
capitalist production relation, and the relations which it determines in the last instance in the 
superstructure. And each time he shows that these relations determine and brand men, and how 
they brand them in their concrete life, and how, through the system of class struggles, living men 
are determined by the system of these relations. In the 1857 Introduction Marx said: the concrete 
is a synthesis of many determinations. We might paraphrase him and say: men in the concrete 
sense are determined by a synthesis of the many determinations of the relations in which they are 
held and to which they are parties. If Marx does not start out from man, which is an empty idea, 
that is, one weighed down with bourgeois ideology, it is in order finally to reach living men; if he 
makes a detour via these relations of which living men are the ‘bearers,’ it is in order finally to be 
able to grasp the laws which govern both their lives and their concrete struggles.”85 
 
His reference to the determining power of ‘the relations in which’ human beings are held 
resounds with feminist relational autonomy’s emphasis on social location and contextual subject-
formation.  Both can be read as critiques of the overemphasis on concepts of personal or moral 
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autonomy, to the exclusion of accounting for the interrelated effects of ideology, dominating 
relations and other social forces. 
 Peter Hallward makes a similar point in “The Will of the People: Notes Towards A 
Dialectical Voluntarism”: 
“To affirm the primacy of a prescriptive will is to insist that in politics all external (natural, 
sociological, historical, unconscious, technical…) forms of determination, however significant, are 
nonetheless secondary, as are all forms of regulation and representation…The will of the people 
involves collective action and direct participation.  A democratic political will depends on the 
power and practice of inclusive assembly, the power to sustain a common commitment.”86 
 
Hallward draws on Rousseau’s concept of the volonte general to argue that while autonomous 
individuals are required for free action and moral causality, the ‘will of the people’ requires 
something more.  Meaningful political action that reflects the will of the people needs collective 
action and direct participation, which in turn necessitate inclusive assembly and collective 
commitment.  Such a formulation is more commensurate with socially constituted selves than 
with autonomous individuals. 
 While the Kantian notion of moral autonomy has its contemporary detractors, the concept 
still figures importantly in assumptions inhering in human rights discourse.  Human rights are 
part of a broader system of international law established after the Peace of Westphalia.  
According to the Westphalian arrangement, public international law and public (national, 
constitutional) law both distinguish between public and private realms, and advance the notion of 
fundamental rights.  The underlying push toward public law is that it establishes the 
preconditions of community and social order, by limiting the freedoms of legal subjects (whether 
these subjects are citizens or states themselves).  Conversely, the drive toward the public/private 
divide and fundamental rights is to reduce the demands of the social order itself, by protecting 
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the pre-existing liberties of legal subjects.87  However, and this is where we move into the realm 
of Kantian moral philosophy (particularly its implications for a cosmopolitan world system), the 
Westphalian model no longer describes our modern condition.  Normatively, it is critically 
challenged by cosmopolitan and global conceptions of justice and human rights.88 
 Human rights discourse assumes universal applicability as well as universal, objective 
rationality.  Post-Westphalian international law doctrines are largely structured in keeping with 
Enlightenment critiques of Christianity.  The freedom of religion as an international right, for 
example, is part of this history of the modernist turn to subjectivity.89  Richard Bernstein has 
described the epistemic shift as follows: 
“The idea of a basic dichotomy between the subjective and the objective; the conception of 
knowledge as being a correct representation of what is objective; the conviction that human reason 
can completely free itself of bias, prejudice, and tradition; the ideal of a universal method by 
which we can first secure firm foundations of knowledge and then build the edifice of a universal 
science; the belief that by the power of self-reflection we can transcend our historical context and 
horizon and know things as they really are in themselves.”90 
 
Such self-critical, tradition-free, universally rational connotations often resound in human rights 
discourse.  They are part of a broader “liberal prescription of a universal regime.”91  In this 
context,  
“Public international law no longer regulates relations between states only, but has extended its 
reach to regulate the rights and duties of individuals within states.”92 
 
The convergence thesis advanced by some liberal thinkers93 celebrates that public 
international law increasingly treats not only states, but individuals.  This undermines national 
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sovereignty by converging it with human rights.94  Peter Danchin is a professor of law and the  
co-director of the International and Comparative Law Program at the University of Maryland.  
Danchin, who has published numerous works on religious freedom, international law and 
collective security, problematizes the convergence thesis, arguing that it rests on what some 
theorists have termed ‘liberal anti-pluralism.’95  Liberal anti-pluralist accounts, while 
“relying on a contingent and thus contestable conception of individual autonomy…do not in fact 
seek to challenge the rationale for public law or public reason itself.  On the contrary, such 
accounts advance a vision of ‘universal’ or ‘global’ social order governed by a ‘neutral’ public law 
that limits the freedom of its subjects pursuant to the single ‘trumping’ or ‘covering’ value of 
individual freedom itself.”96 
 
Kant had echoed a prototype of this formulation in both his moral philosophy and his idea for a 
universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose.  For Danchin, however, this type of order itself 
becomes a peril to liberty and pluralism by undermining the law’s established limits upon the 
international code.  This it does by “effectively eliminating the public private distinction and by 
redefining fundamental rights to mean only, or ultimately, the rights of autonomous 
individuals.”97  Whereas national sovereignty, in the traditional Westphalian  understanding, 
mediated between a multitude of (private) national ways of life and (public) international society, 
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the new cosmopolitanism of liberal anti-pluralists undermines this sovereignty and replaces it 
with a “universal global law.”98 
 Moral autonomy is a central assumption of human rights, but it is framed in a variety of 
ways.  Anna E. Galeotti is professor of political philosophy at the University of Piemonte 
Orientale (Italy) and senior research scholar at Harvard University’s Edward Safra’s Center for 
Ethics.  Her work Toleration as Recognition terms the two approaches to liberalism neutralist 
and perfectionist approaches.99  In the neutralist approach, the liberal order is posited as a 
hospitable, empty box in which any culture, tradition, way of life, worldview, etc. is welcome to 
pursue its dream.  Pluralism consists of allowing competing visions and suspending judgment on 
their rightness; there is no imperative to produce better citizens.  By contrast, the perfectionist 
approach holds that liberalism entails a distinct and concrete moral outlook.  Pluralism is less 
valued than in the neutralist approach; producing better citizens is a direct interest.  Those at 
odds with autonomy, secularism, self-development and freedom may be tolerated or coerced to 
comply, depending upon a number of pragmatic considerations.100  Galeotti’s thesis reflects the 
potentially hegemonic effect autonomy – secularly defined and ranked as a supreme value and 
organizing logic – can have on non-liberal constituents in a liberal order. 
The interplay between the autonomy norm, national sovereignties and global public law 
(such as human rights) reveals several tensions pertaining to how difference is to be tolerated (or 
                                                          
98 Ibid.  Danchin states: “On this view, sovereignty becomes a human right and thereby loses its traditional 
intersubjective and value-pluralist function in international law: that is, to maintain the conditions necessary for 
peaceful coexistence between different ways of life as opposed to their merging into that single form of life we 
have known since at least the late nineteenth century as ‘civilization.’”  The intersubjective nature of international 
law is important because it achieves reconciliations and reaches political settlements between “conflicting claims 
to freedom of differently situated subjects and the divergent assertions of right and justice to which they 
continually rise.” (32) 
99 Anna E. Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition.  Edinburgh: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
100 Ibid., 27-52. 
52 
 
not).  Human rights proponents who espouse procedural autonomy and a ‘charter liberalism’101 
can be said to be neutralist in their liberal toleration, while those who espouse substantive 
autonomy can display perfectionist and liberal anti-pluralist tendencies.  A substantive 
understanding of autonomy fits only with certain theoretical and political views, i.e. using one’s 
autonomy towards fulfilling liberal goals of non-constraint.  Donnelly poses it as follows: 
“The core commitment to equality and autonomy…require[s] that the range of substantive 
positions within that consensus be strictly bounded by a shared commitment to equal autonomy 
for all.  This is perhaps the essential insight in Rousseau’s distinction between the general will and 
the will of all: there are some individual wills that simply cannot be allowed to be expressed in the 
general will if it is to maintain its moral character.”102 
 
A procedural understanding of autonomy would imply freedom with regard to the values, desires 
and actions for which autonomy is operationalized.  Pennsylvania State University philosophy 
professor and moral theorist John Christman states: 
“In the western tradition, the view that individual autonomy is a basic moral and political value is 
very much a modern development. Putting moral weight on an individual's ability to govern 
herself, independent of her place in a metaphysical order or her role in social structures and 
political institutions is very much the product of the modernist humanism of which much 
contemporary moral and political philosophy is an offshoot.”103 
 
Autonomy today implies moral self-governance, the authenticity of desires and values, and a 
minimal sense of responsibility and self-representation.  It also represents the capacity of self-
government, its actual condition, a personal ideal, and a bundle of rights characterizing self-
ownership.104  These meanings imply individual freedom from constraint by others (as well as 
religion), and a basic competency to decide for oneself. 
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The late Alan Gewirth, professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and author 
of several works on moral philosophy and human rights, claimed that autonomy and self-reliance 
for individuals was the ground and the goal of human rights beyond state aid and action.105  
Autonomy, for Gewirth, was the center of human rights: 
“The rational autonomy which is the aim of the human rights involves that each person is to be a 
self-controlling, self-developing agent, in contrast to being a dependent, passive recipient of the 
agency of others.  Even when the rights require positive assistance from other persons, their point 
is not to reinforce or increase dependence but rather to give support that enables persons to be 
agents, that is, to control their own lives and effectively pursue and sustain their own purposes 
without being subjected to domination and harms from others.”106 
 
Similarly, James Griffin identifies the personhood account of human rights as the best 
substantive account thus far available.  This account centers on human agency to choose one’s 
own path, and consists of autonomy (including a basic education in order to make informed 
decisions), a minimum provision of resources for these ends, and basic liberty not to be impeded 
by others.107 
As I argue in the following chapter, secularism forms the unstated epistemological base 
of human rights.  Human rights theorists accept and applaud this.  For example, Henkin states: 
“The human rights ideology is a fully secular and rational ideology whose very promise of 
success as a universal ideology depends on its secularity and rationality.”108  Little maintains 
that, based on the fact that the UDHR is taken as a common standard, and that Article 2 sets 
forward nondiscrimination, “it follows that human rights would have to be secular, at least in the 
sense of excluding religious identity as a criterion for citizenship.”109  John Garvey claims that 
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the public/private distinction characteristic of modernity sets governmental jurisdiction over 
public behavior according to secular rules, while in private, religion can enjoy its influence: 
“There is a certain way of thinking about law and politics that is characteristic of modern 
industrial nations…I will call this habit of thought the public/private distinction.  Its central 
premise is that social life can be divided into public and private realms.  The function of 
government is to regulate behavior in the public sphere according to secular rules. Within the 
private sphere people are free to do as they like, in religious and other matters.”110 
 
The public-secular/private-religious distinction quoted above finds resonance in the 
‘philosophically neutral’ aims of the UDHR’s drafters, as well as in the human rights 
articulations of Henkin, Little and Garvey. 
 
The Human Dignity Approach 
Another prominent approach to human rights today that espouses a secular knowledge-
frame is based on human dignity.  James Griffin, philosopher and author of works on ethics, 
human rights and moral philosophy, defines human rights as the various interpretations of the 
protection of human dignity.111  Donnelly expresses the core place of human dignity as 
intimately tied to autonomy.  While any “plausible account of human dignity must include 
membership in society,” says Donnelly, 
“[n]onetheless, a human rights conception of human dignity and political legitimacy rests on the 
fact that human beings have an essential, irreducible moral worth and dignity independent of the 
social groups to which they belong and the social roles that they occupy.”112 
 
This is an important reconciliation between individual autonomy and the socially constituted 
self.  Donnelly posits ‘human nature’ as a “social project more than a presocial given,” but 
arrives finally in the realm of self-creation (i.e. ‘the buck stops’ at the self-legislating agent): 
“Just as an individual’s ‘nature’ or ‘character’ arises from the interaction of natural endowment, 
social and environmental influences, and individual action, human beings create their ‘essential’ 
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nature through social action on themselves.  Human rights provides [sic] both a substantive model 
for and a set of practices to realize this work of self-creation.”113 
 
This underlying tenet of individualism – that human rights are rights one has by virtue of being 
human alone114 – is what leads Donnelly to severely narrow which conceptions of human dignity 
from around the world actually count as human rights.  Traditional societies had and continue to 
have duties, he states, but these aim at achieving human good completely detached from human 
rights.  He sees in such formulations and praxis substitutes for, rather than alternate articulations 
of, human rights.115 
 In excluding most non-Western cultural expressions of human dignity and rights, 
Donnelly claims that his argument is structural rather than cultural.116  For example, in his 
treatment of Islam, Donnelly dismisses various works by Muslim thinkers proposing human 
rights models in religious conceptual vocabulary because rights in such schemes are either 
divinely commanded, duties in disguise, or are tied to some legal or spiritual status (i.e. not by 
virtue of being human alone).117  The fatal flaw in clinging to traditional human dignity 
formulations in a modern world, says Donnelly, is due to: 
“the hazards to human dignity posed by modern markets and states.  The political power of 
traditional rulers usually was substantially limited by customs and laws that were entirely 
independent of human rights.  The relative technological and administrative weakness of 
traditional political institutions further restrained abuses of power.  In such a world, inalienable 
entitlements of individuals held against state and society might plausibly be held to be superfluous 
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(because dignity was guaranteed by alternative mechanisms), if not positively dangerous to 
important and well-established values and practices. 
 
“Such a world, however, exists today in only in a relatively small number of isolated areas.  The 
modern state, even in the Third World, not only has been freed from many of the moral constraints 
of custom but also has a far greater administrative and technological reach.  It thus represents a 
serious threat to basic human dignity, whether that dignity is defined in ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ 
terms.  In such circumstances, human rights seem necessary rather than optional.  Radical or 
unrestricted relativism thus is as inappropriate as radical universalism.  Some kind of intermediate 
position is required.”118 
 
Donnelly’s acknowledgement of the irreparable destruction leveled against traditional forms of 
life by modern markets and states is well-placed.  However, he seems to arrive at the conclusion 
that modernization through the protections afforded by human rights is the answer.  He does 
make space for cultural interpretation of human rights concepts and norms,119 espousing a weak 
relativism/‘tempered universalism’.120  In such a position the core concepts of human rights are 
considered invariant, but are subject to differing interpretations within the conceptual range.  
Implementation also has a wide range.  However, Donnelly forecloses the possibility of a 
foundation for human dignity/rights other than ‘foundationless,’ by-virtue-of-being-human-alone 
rights.  How does this limit those traditions in Donnelly’s own discussion whose foundations 
cannot conceptualize a human being independent of: social locations such as “age, sex, lineage, 
achievement, or community membership”121 (as in traditional Africa – Donnelly does not specify 
an ethnicity or nation); a relationship to a common code of ethics, including paths to filial piety 
(as in traditional Confucian China); or servanthood to God (as in Islam)? 
 Donnelly warns of the dangers of extreme cultural relativism, recalling instead “the 
inherent universality of basic moral precepts…most evident in Kant’s deontological 
                                                          
118 Ibid., 91-92. 
119 For Donnelly, there is considerable leeway in the substance of rights articulated by the UDHR (the ‘concepts’).  
It is implementation often causes controversy.  Human rights are a common standard, such that the “ways in 
which these rights are implemented, however, so long as they fall within the range of variation consistent with the 
overarching concept, are matters of legitimate variation.” Ibid., 97. 
120 This is Andrew Nathan’s term.  See ibid., 119. 
121 Ibid., 79. 
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universalism.”122  But it may well be – and this is my overall question concerning the 
universality claims of human rights discourse – that Donnelly’s own concepts of human dignity 
(as originating within the human subject herself) and the basis of rights (by virtue of being 
human alone) are themselves historical and cultural articulations.  Perhaps a claim like “…if 
society is the source of all individual rights, such an individual has no human rights,”123 is only 
coherent if one theoretically justifies civil society on the origin myth of the human in a 
Hobbesian or Lockean state of nature. 
 The heart of the weakness of Donnelly’s argument for foundationless human rights 
grounded in human dignity may be how he defines – or rather, fails to define – ‘tradition.’  
Tradition is an argument extended through time, a set of discursive themes and lived practices 
which adherents and thinkers constantly reinvigorate in light of contemporary conditions.124  
Tradition is also a theoretical location for questioning authority, time, language, use and 
embodiment, as well as an empirical arrangement of everyday life connecting discursivity and 
materiality.125  In such a formulation, tradition is neither empiricist theories of knowledge, nor 
relativist theories of justice; in theory, traditions can accommodate rupture as well as continuity, 
and are singular as well as plural.126  Donnelly, on the other hand, takes a somewhat darker view 
of traditions.  He characterizes as one of the fortes of human rights that they: 
“empower people to modify or reject parts of their traditional culture.  Cultural traditions are 
socially created legacies.  Some are good.  Others are bad.  Still others are simply irrelevant.  And 
which is considered which varies among individuals and changes with time.  Tradition 
legitimately governs and limits fundamental life choices covered by human rights guarantees only 
to the extent that individuals and groups choose to follow, and thus reproduce, that tradition.”127 
 
                                                          
122 Ibid., 93. 
123 Ibid., 114. 
124 See chapter 1, in which I present MacIntyre’s concept of ‘tradition.’  
125 These are the two ways Talal Asad has used tradition.  See chapter 1. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Donnelly, 122. 
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This type of positing suggests that traditions tend toward stasis, while dynamic human rights 
allow change, even historical process itself.  Donnelly is correct to criticize the misuses of 
tradition (as when corrupt leaders appeal to it in order to veil their own violations), but he 
displays a strong bias when he castes traditions generally against critical thought ‘by reason 
alone’: 
“‘Foundational’ arguments operate within (social, political, moral, religious) communities that are 
defined in part by their acceptance of, or at least openness to, particular foundational 
arguments…But a skeptic cannot be compelled by reason alone to start here.”128 
 
Needless to say, traditionalists cannot reasonably expect ‘outsiders’ to accept their first premises; 
to do so would bring the outsiders ‘into the fold.’  However, it is Donnelly’s endorsement of a 
universal code of human rights, formulated on the basis of a narrow rendition of human dignity 
(non-social, non-religious, etc.) that forecloses much communitarian, pluralistic collaboration.  
He states: 
“Human rights, as specified in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants, represent the 
international community’s best effort to define the social and political parameters of our common 
humanity.  Within these limits, all is possible. Outside of them, little should be allowed.”129 
 
The human dignity approach to universal human rights articulated by Jack Donnelly espouses a 
universalism that is distinctly secular in character.  It posits rational (i.e. secular) foundations for 
human rights as diametrically opposed to religious ones. 
 
Rawls’ Political Conception of Human Rights 
 The third prominent approach to human rights today that advances secularism in its 
politics and theory of the human being is a minimalist, political conception of human rights 
articulated by John Rawls.  Rawls underscores the importance of human rights in his theory of 
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the law of peoples.130  Not all states need be liberal, he states, but all states must honor basic 
human rights.131  He claims that HR are a minimum standard, and can be adopted by all decent, 
well-ordered societies (even if they are traditional, religious, or based on an exclusivist 
comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophy of the good).132  Rawls also posits the adoption of 
human rights by a society as a sufficient criterion for delegitimizing intervention by other 
states.133 
 Rawls is adamant in maintaining that his conception of justice as fairness (which forms 
the backbone of his theory of the law of peoples) does not rest on any metaphysical or 
comprehensive philosophical/moral conception.134  This is because: 
“Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I 
believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in a democratic 
society.”135 
 
Justice as fairness avoids claims to universal truth and claims about the essential nature or 
identity of persons.136  This is what is meant by a (purely) ‘political,’ or public conception of 
justice as the optimal conditions for social cooperation.  Avoiding “controversial philosophical 
and religious doctrines” is key.137 
Because ‘first principles’ are not appropriate to forming a political conception of justice, 
Rawls looks to: 
“our public political culture itself, including its main institutions and the historical traditions of 
their interpretation, as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles.”138 
 
                                                          
130 See John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Autumn, 1993): 36-68. 
131 Ibid., 37-38. 
132 Ibid., 57-61. 
133 Ibid, 60-61. 
134 He states that neither the original position nor the veil of ignorance have any metaphysical implications.  See 
John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 
1985): 223-251; especially 238-239. 
135 Ibid., 230. 
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The assumption that animates this process of finding the foundation of just social cooperation is 
that society is comprised of free and equal persons.139  Again, Rawls claims that this assumption 
“need not involve…questions of philosophical psychology or a metaphysical doctrine of the 
nature of the self.”140 
Coequal citizens conduct the mental exercise (‘device of representation’ as Rawls terms 
it141) of the original position with its veil of ignorance to arrive at the terms of social cooperation.  
Their analysis involves that they eliminate: 
“the contingencies of the social world…the bargaining advantages which inevitably arise within 
background institutions of any society as the result of cumulative social, historical, and natural 
tendencies.  These contingent advantages and accidental influences from the past should not 
influence an agreement on the principles which are to regulate the institutions of the basic 
structure itself from the present into the future.”142 
 
Rawls continues: 
“We can use it [the veil of ignorance as a device of representation] to help us work out what we 
now think, once we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what justice requires when 
society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal persons over time from 
one generation to the next.”143 
 
Rawls also rests this process on the freedom of political persons as “self-originating sources of 
valid claims.”144  Citizens are morally autonomous, and they enjoy this freedom independent of 
duties.145 
In so positing, Rawls tacitly claims the ability to recognize and espouse universal 
rationality.  Despite his claim that his ‘method of avoidance’ successfully circumvents 
metaphysics or philosophical assumptions about the human being, he nonetheless rests his 
arguments on premises that are valued and historically specific.  As I show in the following 
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chapter, ‘religion’ in the modern sense is a secular political concept that privatizes a disembodied 
version of religion.  The public sphere, on the other hand, is the space of political, rational debate 
and action, and is not to be contaminated by divisive, particularistic religious conceptions.146  He 
also posits the human as morally autonomous and independent of duties in her/his political 
character, which is more an Enlightenment naturalist conclusion than a universally held 
principle.  Rawls’ schema rests on the divisibility of ‘religion’ from purely political concerns, 
something that is inconceivable in premodernity as well as in traditional religions and cultures 
outside the West in modernity.147 
Rawls’ reliance on universal rationality to build his argument is notably problematic in 
his idea of the original position.  In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills takes up the problem of 
Rawls’ conception of justice as well as the mental exercise of the original position.148  In this 
work, Mills shows that social contractarian and Enlightenment theories of personhood were 
simultaneously (and explicitly) theories of racialized subpersonhood.  White supremacy, he 
states, is “the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today.”149  
The domination of non-whites by whites is not mentioned in the history of political philosophy 
because it is the mute background on which political systems develop and operate, and is not 
itself seen as a political system.150  The racial contract is a moral contract that underlies the 
expressly political social contract in both its classical (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) and modern 
(Rawls, Nozick) formulations.151  According to Mills, the racial contract has an epistemological 
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147 I will elaborate more on these arguments, made by William Cavanaugh in his The Myth of Religious Violence in 
the following chapter. 
148 See Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
149 Ibid., 1. 
150 Ibid., 2-3. 
151 He states: “The Racial Contract is that set of formal or informal agreements, or meta-agreements (higher-level 
contracts about contracts, which set the limits of the contracts' validity) between the members of one subset of 
humans, henceforth designated by (shifting) ‘racial’ [phenotypical/genealogical/cultural] criteria C1, C2, C3…as 
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aspect – and this is where Rawls’ original position becomes questionable.  Mills identifies an 
epistemology of ignorance prescribed by the Racial Contract, as: 
“a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and 
socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to 
understand the world they themselves have made…Whiteness…is a cognitive model that 
precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of social realities.”152 
 
Where Rawls prescribes the mental exercise of the original position with its veil of ignorance for 
coequal citizens to collectively agree on the terms of just social cooperation, Mills’ analysis of 
the racial contract claims that norms of cognition can actually work against successful cognition: 
“Systems of domination affect us not merely in terms of material advantage and disadvantage, but 
also in terms of likelihoods of getting things right or wrong, since unfair social privilege 
reproduces itself in part through people learning to see and feel about the world in ways that 
accommodate injustice. ‘Ignorance’ is actively reproduced and is resistant to elimination. This is, 
of course, an old insight of the left tradition with respect to class. I was just translating it into a 
different vocabulary and applying it to race.”153 
 
From this point of view, Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and with it the possibilities for 
generating principles of justice through the mental exercise of the original position, become 
untenable.  How can a person – white or nonwhite – achieve a “clear and uncluttered view of 
what justice requires” when the political landscape and moral subjectivities of people are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
‘white,’ and coextensive (making due allowance for gender differentiation) with the class of full persons, to 
categorize the remaining subset of humans as ‘nonwhite’ and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, 
so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled politics the whites either already inhabit 
or establish or in transactions as aliens with these polities, and the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the 
behavior of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites or apply 
only in a qualified form (depending in part on changing historical circumstances and what particular variety of 
nonwhites involved), but in any case the general purpose of the Contract is always the differential privileging of the 
whites as a group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, 
and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them.  All whites are beneficiaries of the Contract, though 
some whites are not signatories to it.”  Ibid., 11.  Ariella Azoulay makes a similar point.  She argues that, in the 
French Revolution as in other revolutions, the use of universal language was not disturbed by the fact of 
differential governance.  She states: “From the eighteenth century we inherited a universal political discourse 
established by means of differential mechanisms that created and allowed – and made obvious – differential 
domination of different populations made distinct on a changing basis of race, gender, or wealth.”  See Ariella 
Azoulay, “The Language of Revolution – Tidings from the East.”  Critical Inquiry, University of Chicago Press, 2011.  
Available at: http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/the_language_of_revolution_azoulay/.  Accessed May 13, 2016. 
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historically sedimented by the racial contract?  In other words, how can a person ‘forget’ her 
social position and hope to escape the unfair social privileges that either oppress or benefit her?  
Rawls refers to social inequalities as (mere) “bargaining advantages” that “inevitably arise within 
the background institutions of any society as the result of cumulative social, historical, and 
natural tendencies.”154  They are “contingent advantages and accidental influences from the 
past,” and as such should be slighted in deliberations about just social cooperation.155  Mills 
disagrees; the epistemology of ignorance is: 
“a cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement.  
And these phenomena are in no way accidental, but prescribed by the terms of the Racial 
Contract, which requires a certain schedule of structured blindnesses and opacities in order to 
establish and maintain the white polity.”156 
 
Rawls’ minimalist, purely political basis for universal human rights turns out to be: imbued with 
an exclusively secular definition of the human being (as morally autonomous and self-sovereign) 
and the public/private binary (i.e. disembodied ‘religion’ for the private realm of inner 
conscience, political rationality for the public realm);157 colored by objectivity-pretentions of a 
universal rationality; and unreflective of the cognitive dysfunctions that can be required by 
deliberately achieved social inequalities – epistemological dysfunctions that would render the 
original position impossible to achieve even in theory. 
 Following John Rawls’ lead, Charles Beitz also espouses a minimalist, ‘purely political’ 
approach to universal human rights.  Beitz wishes “to explore a different approach, one we might 
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describe as practical.”158  Beitz’s practical approach claims authority for the practice of human 
rights, on two accounts.  First, human rights norms are regarded with great seriousness both 
politically and doctrinally.  Second, human rights practice should be valued prima facie because 
it seeks to protect people from very real and potentially devastating violations.159  To grasp the 
idea of human rights, says Beitz: 
“we do not suppose that human rights must express or derive from a single basic value or that they 
constitute a single, fundamental category of moral concern.  Instead, we treat international human 
rights as a normative practice to be grasped sui generis and consider how the idea of a human right 
functions within it.”160 
 
This supposed independence of politics from broader metaphysical assumptions is precisely the 
modernist secular negotiation.161 
 
‘Foundationless’ human rights in the political thought of Donnelly, Griffin, Gewirth, 
Little, Henkin, Rawls and Beitz are secular insofar as they assume the distinction between human 
rights, social cooperation, and equality of citizenship on the one hand, and metaphysical or 
religious beliefs about the human being on the other.  The moral autonomy, human dignity and 
minimalist political approaches to universal human rights differ in important theoretical ways (as 
I have outlined above), but nonetheless have a shared substrate of secular universalism.  In the 
following chapter I will unpack the implications of this secular substrate. 
 
Freedom of Religion as a Universal Human Right 
Universal human rights seek to establish a set of restraints against states for the protection 
of basic rights that all persons are entitled to by virtue of being human alone.  One of these sets 
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of rights pertain to the freedom of religion.  Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights states: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.”162 
 
The International Covenants on Civil and Political as well as Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights (the ICCPR and ICESCR respectively, both drafted in 1966 and effective 1976) also 
address the freedom of religion as a basic human right.  The ICCPR further stipulates that no one 
shall be coerced with regard to adopting the religion of his choice (article 18.2) and that the 
“Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”163 
 
The ICCPR also maintains that States parties to the covenant will respect the right of parents and 
legal guardians to determine their children’s/wards’ religious upbringing.164  Importantly, the 
covenant ensures the freedom of all persons to enjoy equal protection of the law, regardless of 
religion or other factors.165  It also calls for the protection of religious minorities.166 
 The covenant on social, economic and cultural rights also addresses freedom of religion 
as a basic human right.  Insofar as the ICSECR advances the right of all people to self-determine 
(politically, economically, socially and culturally), have access to technology for such 
development, and enjoy gender equity in these and other rights, it does so in a manner that 
doesn’t discriminate on the basis of religion.167  Like the ICCPR, the ICSECR also defines the 
limit of the rights it enumerates.  States parties to the covenant may subject these rights to such 
limitations as: 
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“determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and 
solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”168 
 
 In 1981, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.169  
This resolution lists the freedoms associated with freedom of religion in both the realm of the 
individual’s conscience and the communal, institutional aspects of religious practice (i.e. 
confession, observance, producing literature and proselytization, observing holidays, 
congregating, establishing places of worship, parental rights in religious upbringing of children, 
etc.).  The limits to such freedoms are to be found, again, in the State’s discretionary power, 
corralled by the rule of law: 
“Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”170 
 
It is in the ambiguity of the space opened up for state power that human rights language 
pertaining to freedom of religion reveals its particular grammar of ‘religion.’  When human 
rights refer to freedom of religion, they are underscoring the strict separation of politics and 
religion, delineating the public and private realms (respectively) as the appropriate realms of 
each, and in so doing are operationalizing a modern definition of ‘religion.’ 
 Moyn shows that, in practice, the religious freedom norm is a device of discrimination in 
the European Court of Human Rights.  Recent cases reveal that Muslim practices and symbols 
are litigated against while their Christian counterparts are treated more favorably.171  In Lautsi v. 
Italy, the Court permitted crucifixes in Italian schools, while the same verdict was not passed in 
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cases involving Muslim women’s headscarves, such as Dahlab v. Switzerland, Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey and Belgin Dogru v. France.172  Moyn suggests that the partiality is explained as follows: 
“…contemporary headscarf and related cases in the European Court draw not solely upon the 
exclusionary legacy of Western secularism but also upon the exclusionary legacy of Western 
hostility to secularism.  One of the avatars of the contemporary Muslim, whose practices are 
viewed as inimical by the court to democracy’s essentials, is the communist.”173 
 
As Scott had argued in relation to France’s 2005 ban on headscarves in public schools (see 
introduction), something about Muslim identity and practices in the public space seem to offend 
the identity of the secular nation.  Moyn traces the roots of Europe’s present problem with 
Muslims to its experiences with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
 The religious freedom norm was internationalized with the Universal Declaration and 
Europeanized with the 1950 European Convention that brought the Court into being.  Religious 
freedom was finalized, however, “when the Cold War created new circumstances for the 
ideological salience of religious freedom.”174  Religious freedom became central to European 
human rights because of the perceived need to protect Christian democratic societies from atheist 
communists.  However, after the collapse of Christianity in European societies, the norm evolved 
to signify the need – “in the contemporary European imagination” – to protect European 
secularism from the religiosity of its Muslims.175 
 In the same vein as the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR articles on freedom of religion listed 
above, article 9 of the European Convention ensures freedom of religion within what’s deemed 
‘necessary in a democratic society.’  The ambiguity opens up space for state power, and indeed 
this is what the case law is showing.  The European Court’s decisions in the above-mentioned 
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Muslim headscarf cases deferred to local interpretations and ingrained national traditions by 
invoking the controversial “margin of appreciation” principle, which essentially cedes to national 
policy.176  Article 9.2 specifically allows abridgments of religious rights in “the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”177  Moyn admonishes the bias of the European Court: 
“A minimum required in a democratic society should not simply provide high principles for a bias 
against Islam, even in self-declared secularist countries, especially when Christian practices are 
given a pass…The Muslim headscarf cases are troubling not because Europe should return to the 
public Christianity it has largely given up, so spectacularly and so quickly, but because its version 
of secularism is discriminatory rather than inclusionary.  And some sources of the policing of 
Muslims may lie, surprisingly enough, in cultures, laws, and doctrines once crafted to stave off 
secularism.”178 
 
The European Court’s inconsistent decisions in cases involving Christian v. Muslim religious 
symbols and practices shows that the language of universal human rights may be insufficient for 
redressing historical legacies, political realities and othering discourses of power.  Human rights 
appears as the cultural-discursive production of the liberal secular argument extended through 




In this chapter I located the modern articulation of universal human rights in the 
overlapping histories of the Western natural law tradition, postwar geopolitics and secular 
universalism.  I made the claim that human rights are secular, and attempted to substantiate this 
claim by surveying thinkers from three prominent approaches to human rights today.  The moral 
autonomy, human dignity and political-minimalist approaches to human rights all build upon 
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secular notions of the human being and religion, i.e. the separation of religion from 
politics/economics/etc., the distinction between law and morality, the public/private binary and 
the morally autonomous individual subject.  In the following chapter, I draw on the works of 
Jonathan Smith, William Cavanaugh and Tomoko Masuzawa to argue that ‘religion’ as a concept 
– the same at work in the universal human right of freedom of religion – is a modern invention 
that proscribes non-secular understandings of religion and enables discourses of othering. 
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Chapter 3: Religion, The Secular and Din 
 
 To gauge the utility and consonance of universal human rights for contemporary 
Muslims, I first unpack the implications of the particular grammar of ‘religion’ at work in the 
freedom of religion doctrine.  I draw on the works of three prominent historians of religion to 
argue that ‘religion’ as a conceptual category is a modern invention.  The idea of generic religion 
distinct from particular historical believing communities – religion in the sense of a privatized 
matter of conscience – only emerges historically with certain discursive shifts following the 
Enlightenment and colonial practices of othering.  Premodern Christians and religious 
communities outside the West in modernity did/do not organize religious life and thought 
according to the parameters outlined by ‘religion.’  Rather, geopolitics and Western 
epistemological developments (i.e. the rise of secularized social/human sciences) account for 
religion’s modern emergence and naturalization.  This is the subject of the first part of the 
present chapter. 
 Next, the normative environment in which discussions and negotiations of human rights, 
freedom of religion and secularity take place cannot be taken for granted.  The secular constitutes 
a field of power, according to Talal Asad’s definition of modernity,1 and constitutes the 
philosophical subtext of universal human rights.  I contrast this with paradigmatic premodern 
shari’a, and examine the relation between human rights and the secular more closely in the 
second part of this chapter.  In the final part of this chapter I show how certain interpretations of 
Islamic self-understanding bypass the religion/secular binary.  The Qur’an identifies Islam with 
the term din, which I will argue is entirely distinct from ‘religion’ in the modern sense of the 
term in important ways.  The distinction is to be found in the separation of religion from politics, 
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economics, etc. and in the embodied vs. disembodied nature of belief.  Din can potentially 
provide human rights theorists with an alternative conceptualization to address some of the 




As discussed in the previous chapter, universal human rights address the freedom of 
religion.  They do so in a way that grants religious freedoms of beliefs and practices to 
individuals and groups, so long as these do not offend the state’s upkeep of public morality, 
safety, democratic minimums and other ambiguities.2  It is in the ambiguity of the space opened 
up for state power that human rights language pertaining to freedom of religion reveals its 
particular grammar of ‘religion.’  When human rights refer to freedom of religion, they are 
underscoring the strict separation of politics and religion, delineating the public and private 
realms (respectively) as the appropriate realms of each, placing religion under the regulatory 
supervision of the state, and in so doing are operationalizing a distinctly modern definition of 
‘religion.’ 
 In what follows, I draw on the works of three prominent historians of religion to unsettle 
the universal and natural aura surrounding the concept ‘religion.’  These thinkers argue that 
‘religion’ is an invented category, an Enlightenment inheritance, integral to the discourse on 
othering and deeply instrumental to geopolitics.  
William Cavanaugh, professor of theology at DePaul University, is author of several 
books on theology, politics and Christian history.  His areas of specialization include political 
theology, economic ethics and ecclesiology.  In The Myth of Religious Violence, Cavanaugh 
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claims that it is a prevalent modern-day myth that there is such a thing as ‘religion’ in a 
transcultural, transhistorical sense.3  He shows that both functionalist and substantive approaches 
to religion essentialize it.  Substantive definitions of religion (as in the works of Bremmer 1994 
and Fitzgerald 2001) are theoretically exclusivist, posing religion as beliefs and practices 
concerning gods or the transcendent.  In this account, ‘religion’ is what world religionists believe 
and do.  Functionalist definitions of religion on the other hand (as in the works of Durkheim, 
Durham and Sewell 2006, Solle 1984, Loy 1997 and Nelson 2001) are more inclusive and 
consist of ideologies and practices not commonly thought of as religious, such as Marxism, 
nationalism, free-market ideology, etc.  Functionalist approaches look “not at content but at the 
way these ideologies and practices function in various contexts to provide an overarching 
structure of meaning in everyday social life.”4 
Despite these differences, however, both accounts are essentialist, treating religion as 
transhistorical and transcultural.  The heart of the problem does not lie in the various theoretical 
weaknesses espoused in such arguments, but rather in the concept of ‘religion’ itself.  This 
concept presupposes that there is such a thing as ‘religion’ that is “a transhistorical, transcultural 
feature of human life, essentially distinct from ‘secular’ features such as politics and 
economics.”5  What is meant by ‘religion’ in the modern sense indicates something “essentially 
interior, and essentially distinct from public, secular rationality.”6  Religion and secular are 
presented as timeless, universal and natural categories, but they are not.7  Jonathan Z. Smith, 
historian of religions and professor of religious studies at the University of Chicago, has 
authored several books on the history of religions.  His areas of research include the theory of 
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ritual, discourses of othering and the stretching of language to accommodate new concepts.  
According to Smith, religion is not an empirical category but a second-order abstraction.8  He 
states: 
“Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study.  It is created for the scholar’s analytic 
purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization.  Religion has no independent 
existence apart from the academy.”9 
 
The third historian of religion whose work I consider here, Tomoko Masuzawa, also 
maintains that religion was invented.  Masuzawa, professor of history and comparative literature 
at the University of Michigan, has authored several books and contributed chapters to edited 
volumes on religious studies, origin, culture and colonialism.  Her scholarly interests include 
religious studies, hermeneutics and psychoanalysis.  In The Invention of World Religions: Or, 
How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism, Masuzawa addresses 
the problem of the unexamined assumption that religion is a universal phenomenon found at all 
times and in all places.10  She describes her work as follows: 
“The principal objective is a genealogy of a particular discursive practice, namely, ‘world 
religions’ as a category and as a conceptual framework initially developed in the European 
academy, which quickly became an effective means of differentiating, variegating, consolidating, 
and totalizing a large portion of the social, cultural, and political practices observable among the 
inhabitants of regions elsewhere in the world.”11 
 
Here we can begin to note the arc connecting discourse and theory to power and politics. 
According to Cavanaugh, what counts as religious or secular in any given age is a 
function of power configurations12 and this helps explain the lack of agreement on what is 
included/excluded from ‘religion.’  It is due to the constructed nature of the category: 
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“Religion is not simply an objective descriptor of certain kinds of practices that show up in every 
time and place.  It is a term that constructs and is constructed by different kinds of political 
configurations… 
 
[The concept of religion] is a development of the modern liberal state; the religious-secular 
distinction accompanies the invention of private-public, religion-politics, and church-state 
dichotomies.  The religious-secular distinction also accompanies the state’s monopoly over 
internal violence and its colonial expansion.”13 
 
Historicizing the concept of religion, Cavanaugh states that ‘religion’ as a concept is “part of the 
history of Western power,” but he is careful not to generalize or present the West as a 
monolith:14 
“The West has never been a monolithic reality, and what defines the West has always been 
contested both from within and without.  The West, however, is a modernizing ideal, a project 
pushed forward by certain interests both within and without countries identified as Oriental.  The 
production of religion took place in a context established by pressures, both external and internal, 
to modernize and Westernize.”15 
 
Let us take two examples from Cavanaugh’s historiography of the uses of ‘religion’ in 
Western political history to note the difference marking modern ‘religion.’  The first example is 
ancient Rome’s concept of religio.  The modern term ‘religion’: 
“is derived from the ancient Latin word religio, but religio was only one of a constellation of 
terms surrounding social obligations in ancient Rome, and when used it signified something quite 
different from religion in the modern sense.  Religio referred to a powerful requirement to perform 
some action.  Its most probable derivation is from re-ligare, to rebind or relink, that is, to 
reestablish a bond that has been severed.  To say religio mihi est—that something is ‘religio for 
me’—meant that it was something that carried a serious obligation for a person.  This included not 
only cultic observances—which were themselves sometimes referred to as religiones, such that 
there was a different religio or set of observances at each shrine—but also civic oaths and family 
rituals, things that modern Westerners normally consider to be secular.”16 
 
In ancient Rome, religio was not about theology but about customs, traditions, social order, civil 
obligations and family relations – spheres of activity that are now secularly adjudicated. 
 The second example is the medieval Christian understanding of religio.  Religio in 
Augustine is not opposed to some secular realm.  Any human act can have its false religio, or 
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type of idolatry.  God is epistemic; the overarching organizing logic is ‘enchanted,’ to use the 
term of the post-Enlightenment naturalists: 
“Augustine is aware that, in normal Latin usage, there is no realm of belief and practice called 
religion that can be separated out from merely mundane obligations like family and the oaths, 
cults, and obligations that bind Roman society together.  Politics, culture, family obligations, 
devotion to God or gods, civic duties—all are bound together in one complex web of social 
relations.  For Augustine, the right ordering of social relations must include worship of the true 
God; this is true religio.  But religio as a general category is found in all manner of social 
relations, both rightly and wrongly ordered.  For Augustine and the ancient world, religio is not a 
distinct realm of activity separate from a secular realm.”17 
 
Thomas Aquinas also used religio in the older sense, something akin to ‘rites’ and ‘piety.’18  In 
his Summa Theologiae, religio is one of the nine virtues of justice.  However, it is a moral, not a 
theological virtue, because religio’s object is rites and practices.  Faith, by contrast, is a 
theological virtue whose object is God.19 
 For the medieval Christian then, religio was not: a universal genus; a system of 
propositions and beliefs (rather, moral excellence was produced by disciplining body and soul); a 
purely interior impulse (because body and soul form a single unity); or an institutional force 
separable from secular forces.20  Religio “was not a separate sphere of concern and activity, but 
permeated all the institutions and activities of medieval Christendom.”21  Political reality was 
therefore embedded into such a universe of meaning without modern distinctions between 
political/religious and public/private spheres: 
“Medieval Christendom was a theopolitical whole.  This does not mean, of course, that there was 
no division of labor between kings and priests, nor that that division was not constantly contested.  
It does mean, however, that the end of religio was inseparable from the end of politics.”22 
 
 The second theme Smith, Masuzawa and Cavanaugh share regarding religion is that its 
invention is positioned within the Enlightenment and its inheritance.  Smith claims that the 
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academic study of religion is only possible from a post-Enlightenment perspective “in which 
man is defined as a world-creating being and culture is understood as a symbolic process of 
world-construction.”23  Elsewhere he goes further: 
“Simply put, the academic study of religion is a child of the Enlightenment.  This intellectual 
heritage is revealed in the notion of generic religion as opposed to historical, believing 
communities…religion was domesticated…religion was brought within the realm of common 
sense, of civil discourse and commerce…the Enlightenment impulse was one of tolerance and, as 
a necessary concomitant, one which refused to leave any human datum, including religion, beyond 
the pale of understanding, beyond the realm of reason.”24 
 
Masuzawa posits religion’s invention in the Enlightenment inheritance with reference to theory 
of history.  She cites the “underlying logic” present in the evolving variations of classifying 
religions: 
“Despite these incessant circumlocutions and the fine nuancing of the classificatory systems, there 
seems to be some underlying logic silently at work in all variations… that the great civilizations of 
the past and present divide into two: venerable East on the one hand and progressive West on the 
other.  They both have been called ‘historical,’ but implicitly in different senses.  In a word, the 
East preserves history, the West creates history.  In contradistinction from both East and West, the 
tertiary group of minor religions has been considered lacking in history, or at least lacking in 
written history, hence its designation as preliterate.  A corollary assumption is that the peoples of 
small-scale tribal societies may likely possess an unusually tenacious historical memory, but no 
historical consciousness.”25 
 
This theory of the variety of historical consciousness among the peoples of the world has clearly 
Hegelian teleological and evolutionary undertones.  In Hegel’s Reason in History, evolutionism 
is the first premise of universal history.  According to Hegel, the march of history was a 
teleological ascension from humanity’s infancy to its wise maturity.  Universal Reason was a 
driving force which, through dialectical correspondence, moved from stage to stage towards 
realization.  Civilizations and smaller-scale societies outside of Europe were akin to cannon 
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fodder for the march of history.26  Masuzawa’s above description fits with such a teleological 
theory of history. 
 Cavanaugh situates the invention of religion a bit earlier than Smith and Masuzawa (he 
begins with Renaissance humanism27), but also underscores the importance of Enlightenment 
thought.  The epistemic context introducing John Locke’s political thought was one which had, 
according to Talal Asad, laid the groundwork for “what later came to be called Natural Religion 
– in terms of beliefs (about a ‘supreme power’), practices (its ordered ‘worship’), and ethics (a 
code of conduct based on ‘rewards and punishments after this life’) – said to exist in all 
societies.”28  Cavanaugh points out that for Locke, religion was a state of mind.  Locke 
underscored a sharp distinction between inner and outer, a position completely opposed to the 
understandings of early Christendom, “where the state of the interior soul was inseparable from 
the bodily disciplines and rituals that both formed and expressed the dispositions of the soul.”29  
Locke maintained that the magistrate can’t settle between controversies among churches, and 
that true religion is a private matter.  One must distinguish between provinces and labors of 
church and civil government. 
 Furthermore, obedience to the commonwealth is not voluntary, and the commonwealth 
can use violence to secure civil interests.  Obedience to the church, on the other hand, is 
voluntary.  The church cannot use violence to advance true religion.  Again, this is a decisive 
rupture from medieval Christian understanding: 
“The idea that a ‘religious society’ has no say over how civil and worldly goods are handled 
would be entirely foreign not only to the craft guilds whose work revolved around the liturgy, but 
also to the monastic communities whose vows were not merely a dispossession of all concern for 
worldly goods, but a recognition that the religious life is intimately entwined with how one 
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interacts with such goods…The new religious-secular dichotomy fit into the modern state’s 
individualist anthropology, as typified by Locke.”30 
 
To cite Locke’s own words: 
“[T]he church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The 
boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable.  He jumbles heaven and earth together, the 
things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, end, 
business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other.”31 
 
Thus Smith, Masuzawa and Cavanaugh all argue in different ways that religion cannot be 
universal, since its Enlightenment heritage roots it in a particular discursive history and political 
moment. 
One of the Enlightenment’s preoccupations was with language.  Smith states that the 
“Enlightenment interest in language is a by-product of its preeminent concern for thought and 
thoughtfulness…unity and uniformity were revalued universalism; difference was stigmatized as 
irrational.  Their sometimes vision of an abstract, universal humanity required the imagination of 
the possibility of an equally abstract, universal language in which all would be transparent, in 
which decipherment would be superfluous…”32 
 
It is this development in language that accompanied European discourses of othering.  Smith 
claims that, despite the horrific human costs, the conquest of the Americas was primarily a 
linguistic event.33  Otherness is “is a political and linguistic project, a matter of rhetoric and 
judgment.”34  Othering, the third theme these historians of religion engage, found its most 
massive instituonalization in anthropology.  Smith characterizes the discipline as “cultural 
meditation on difference” and “a xenological endeavor” that is at bottom a project of language.35  
Difference being, more than anything, a political matter,36 othering mitigated by language plays 
as constitutive a role in the study of religion as it does in anthropology: 
“With respect to practice, the history of religions is, by and large, a philological endeavor chiefly 
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concerned with editing, translating and interpreting texts, the majority of which are perceived as 
participating in the dialectic of ‘near’ and ‘far.’  If this is the case, then our field may be 
redescribed as a child of the Renaissance.”37 
 
Classification of religions by varying criteria of difference are automatically political and involve 
hierarchy, because difference  is “seldom a comparison between entities judged to be 
equivalent…most frequently entails a hierarchy of prestige and the concomitant political ranking 
of superordinate and subordinate.”38 
Masuzawa likewise contends that the discourse on religion is at once a discourse of 
secularization and a discourse of othering.39  The nineteenth century saw a rise of new social 
sciences appropriate for the study of European societies.  These were political science, 
economics and sociology.  For the study of non-Europeans, the disciplines of anthropology (for 
small-scale societies) and Orientalism (for the great civilizations of the East) emerged.40  
Religion was very important to these developments because European society was becoming 
secularized.41  Meanwhile, religion was believed to hold sway over all of Europeans’ ‘others’: 
 “non-Europeans, Europeans of the premodern past, and among their own contemporary 
neighbors, the uncivilized and uneducated bucolic populace as well as the superstitious urban 
poor, all of whom were something of ‘savages within.’”42 
 
As languages and texts of East became available to scholars in the West, non-Europeans “no 
longer seemed to possess the power and the prerogative to represent their own legacy apart from 
this scholarship.”43  This also provided Europeans with occasion to contemplate their own 
identity, in the mirror of otherness.  It was “endless speculation on the differences and 
similarities between religions” that enabled these philological, political endeavors.44 
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The final theme shared by Smith, Masuzawa and Cavanaugh in their historicizing of the 
concept of ‘religion’ is the extent to which this category participates in and enables geopolitics.  
Smith claims that some traditions constitute ‘world religions’ while others do not due to 
geopolitical rankings; and again we note the attributing of various levels of history-making to 
different peoples: 
“A World Religion is a religion like ours; but it is, above all, a tradition which has achieved 
sufficient power and numbers to enter our history, either to form it, interact with it, or to thwart 
it....We recognize both the unity within and the diversity between the ‘great’ World Religions 
because they correspond to important geo-political entities with which we must deal.  All 
‘primitives’ by way of contrast may be simply lumped together as may the so-called ‘minor 
religions’ because they do not confront our history in any direct fashion.  They are invisible.”45 
 
Masuzawa confirms this contention.  She points out that ‘lesser’ traditions go by generic, lower-
case names (as in shamanism, animism, etc.).  Native American, Siberian and Aboriginal 
Australian religions are also problematically categorized: 
“This category in its entirety used to be uniformly called ‘primitive religions’ in the earlier days, 
but more recently it has been variously termed ‘primal,’ ‘preliterate,’ ‘tribal,’ or even ‘basic 
religions.’  The restless shifting of appellations may be a measure of the discomfort felt by 
contemporary scholars of religion in their effort not to appear condescending to those people who 
used to be referred to as savages.”46 
 
Cavanaugh connects the discourse on religion to geopolitics by focusing on the modern nation-
state and embedding the concept in the history of Western power. 
Specifically, Cavanaugh points to the church-state negotiations that led to the 
naturalization of the boundaries between religion and non-religion: 
“The very claim that the boundaries between religion and nonreligion are natural, eternal, fixed, 
and immutable is itself a part of the new configuration of power that comes about with the rise of 
the modern state… 
 
“The new state’s claim to a monopoly on violence, lawmaking, and public allegiance within a 
given territory depends upon either the absorption of the church into the state or the relegation of 
the church to an essentially private realm.  Key to this move is the contention that the church’s 
business is religion.  Religion must appear, therefore, not as what the church is left with once it 
has been stripped of earthly relevance, but as the timeless and essential human endeavor to which 
the church’s pursuits should always have been confined.”47 
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At the close of these complex, lengthy negotiations, the church came to possess jurisdiction over 
private conscience while the state came to control body disciplines.48   
Having briefly reviewed some themes from the history of the concept of ‘religion’ and 
the discourse on ‘world religions,’ I ask the question: what do these themes and this history 
reveal about contemporary universal human rights discourse?  In a way, universal human rights 
is an attempt to soften the contradictions between the Enlightenment vision of a universal 
humanity and the gaping inequality and violence generated by geopolitics.  Masuzawa states: 
“The advent of ‘world religions’ as a dominant discourse is generally understood to mark an 
explicit turn away from the nineteenth-century obsession with the primitive and the original…By 
converting from the evolutionary, pseudotemporal, hierarchical order to a geographic, 
pseudosptial, decentralized order of representation, the emergent world religions discourse appears 
to have liberated itself from Eurocentrism of a certain kind, since it acknowledges the actual 
plurality of cultures and of civilizing processes.”49 
 
This characterization of the ethical-discursive shift between the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries captures some of the spirit of the universal human rights moment.  If the Enlightenment 
“vision of an abstract, universal humanity required the imagination of the possibility of an 
equally abstract, universal language in which all would be transparent, in which decipherment 
would be superfluous,”50 then human rights aims to be that universal language.  But not without 
complications and tensions posed by the themes brought to light by Smith, Masuzawa and 
Cavanaugh.  Universal human rights language affirms universal humanity while affirming the 
discretionary powers of the state – and this arrangement is intercepted by vectors of the 
inventedness of the concept of religion, Enlightenment values, othering and geopolitics.  The 
way in which freedom of religion is curtailed by the discretionary powers of the states parties to 
various human rights conventions confirms that these complications exist.  What follows is an 
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investigation of the twin of ‘religion,’ which forms the conceptual environment in which 
practices of human rights, world religion and freedom of religion take place.  This twin 
disciplines the subjectivities of agents who perform these practices.  I now turn to the secular. 
 
The Secular 
The critical insights of Smith, Masuzawa and Cavanaugh on the denotations, 
connotations and political history of ‘religion’ and the ‘world religions’ discourse are only half 
the story.  The other half is the secular.  In Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity, Talal Asad examines the secular and secularism from a number of discursive 
problems.51  He investigates the concept of secularism from anthropology, because this discipline 
allows “the comparison of embedded concepts (representations) between societies differently 
located in time or space,” focusing not on “their origin (Western or non-Western), but the forms 
of life that articulate them, the powers they release or disable.”52  Asad posits ‘the secular’ as 
enabling and the various types of knowledge, action and desire through new institutional and 
discursive spaces.  I will focus on four particular aspects of the secular that are especially 
relevant to my critical examination of universal human rights.  These are: secularism in relation 
to the modern discourse on (privatized) religion; secularism and the undermining of the political 
action of religion; secularism and the modern nation-state (and state power); and secularism in 
relation to the morally autonomous subject of liberal modernity and universal human rights. 
 Asad defines ‘the secular’ as constituted by a variety of concepts, practices, and 
sensibilities.53  It is a concept that “brings together certain behaviors, knowledges and normative 
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responses in modern life.”54  One such sensibility pertains to the discourse on religion.  Asad 
looks at university syllabi for ‘Anthropology of Religion’ courses and finds the following 
common tropes: 
“myth, magic, witchcraft, the use of hallucinogens, ritual as psychotherapy, possession, and taboo.  
Together, these familiar themes suggest that ‘religion’, whose object is the sacred, stands in the 
domain of the nonrational.”55 
 
Heavy reliance on the myth trope entails a number of conceptual binaries, such as: “belief and 
knowledge, reason and imagination, history and fiction, symbol and allegory, natural and 
supernatural, sacred and profane.”56  This state of religious studies, in which religion is likened 
to myth, developed historically in the high culture of early modern Europe.  There, notions of 
myth represented “a cultivated capacity for delicate feeling – especially for sympathy – and an 
ability to be moved by the pathetic in art and literature.”57 
Mythology was a compulsory part of upper-class education.  In political theories, it 
served as a characteristic of primitive peoples: 
“Mythology is on the side of the primitive, the inferior races, the peoples of nature, the language 
of origins, childhood, savagery, madness – always the other, as the excluded figure.”58 
 
In the natural religion frameworks espoused by much Enlightenment thought, myth was 
considered the apprehension of truth directly, such that religious faith was not needed.59  This 
was part of the Enlightenment emphasis on universal reason and the profanation – or unmasking 
– of pretended power (i.e. doctrinal religious truth-claims).60  Like Cavanaugh, Asad maintains 
that the sacred/profane binary affirmed during this time had no place in premodern 
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epistemology.61  Rather, concepts were reoriented and redefined.  For example, the concept of 
‘inspiration’ was secularized and modernized, transforming it: 
“from an authorized reorientation of life toward a telos, into a psychology of artistry whose source 
is obscure – and therefore [it] becomes the object of speculation (belief/knowledge).”62 
 
 Secularism is one of modernity’s principles.  Asad defines modernity as: 
“a project – or rather, a series of interlinked projects – that certain people in power seek to 
achieve.  The project aims at institutionalizing a number of (sometimes conflicting, often 
evolving) principles: constitutionalism, moral autonomy, democracy, human rights, civil equality, 
industry, consumerism, freedom of the market – and secularism.  It employs proliferating 
technologies (of production, warfare, travel, entertainment, medicine) that generate new 
experiences of space and time, of cruelty and health, of consumption and knowledge.”63 
 
It is clear from Asad’s definition of modernity that secularism is at once discursive and 
institutional, of subjective experience and political power, and is a modern organizing logic that 
itself generates new experiences. 
On the power of secularism to transform discourse, Asad shows how conceptual 
categories like ‘religion’ and the ‘social’ are not timeless and universal but historically situated 
and changing.  These concepts had very different grammars in the premodern and modern 
English contexts: 
“We should not say that the English nation was shaped or influenced by religion: we should see 
the established church…as its necessary condition.  Nor, given that it was a necessary condition of 
the nation-state, should we speak of the social location of religion in the eighteenth century being 
different from the one it came to occupy in the late nineteenth and beyond.  Rather, the very 
essence of religion was differently defined, that’s to say, in each of the two historical moments 
different conditions of ‘religion’s’ existence were in play.  What we now retrospectively call the 
social, that all-inclusive secular space that we distinguish conceptually from variables like 
‘religion’, ‘state’, ‘national economy’, and so forth, and on which the latter can be constructed, 
reformed, and plotted, didn’t exist prior to the nineteenth century.”64 
 
This point is especially valuable for understanding the universal human right of freedom of 
religion, which operationalizes the modern concept of religion.  Concepts like ‘religion’ and the 
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‘social’ can only facilitate and organize practices “according to the historical formations in 
which they occur.”65 
Secularism is not the universally rational epistemological ground that humanity arrived at 
during the Enlightenment, but builds on a historically particular conception of the world and its 
problems: 
“In the context of early modern Europe these problems were perceived as the need to control the 
increasingly mobile poor in city and countryside, to govern mutually hostile Christian sects within 
a sovereign territory, and to regulate the commercial, military, and colonizing expansion of Europe 
overseas.”66 
 
While the institutions that affected the emergence of the secular included urban poverty, 
religious warfare and colonial economics, the concepts and values that informed the secular turn 
in the early modern European context included Renaissance humanism, Enlightenment 
naturalism and Hegel’s philosophy of history.67  This history explains how the secular has come 
to be understood as: 
“the ground from which theological discourse was generated (as a form of false consciousness) 
and from which it gradually emancipated itself in its march to freedom.  On that ground humans 
appear as the self-conscious makers of History (in which calendrical time provides a measure and 
direction for human events), and as the unshakable foundation of universally valid knowledge 
about nature and society.”68 
 
In addition to affecting the discourse on religion, the secular also undermines the political 
action of religion.  The first way is by way of the law/morality distinction.  The modern state 
depends on a strict secular distinction between law and morality, corresponding to the public and 
private spheres respectively.  In today’s liberal states,  
“The secularist concedes that religious beliefs and sentiments might be acceptable at a personal 
and private level, but insists that organized religion, being founded on authority and constraint, has 
always posed a danger to the freedom of the self as well as to the freedom of others.”69 
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When taken together with the increasing scope of the state’s power, which includes the 
juridifcation of all interpersonal relations, religion’s moral suasion in public culture is extremely 
curtailed: 
“In that context, far from becoming a source of moral values that can enrich public debate, 
deprivatized religion (where religion has already been defined essentially as a matter of belief) 
becomes a site of conflict over nonnegotiable rights – for example the parent’s right to determine 
his or her child’s upbringing, or the pregnant woman’s right to dispose of her fetus.”70 
 
 Asad makes the point that all social activity requires the consent of the law.71  Religion 
has two options with regard to the modern state’s law/morality dichotomy: it can either accept 
the space of thoroughly privatized belief and worship, or else it can engage public talk that 
makes no demands on life.72  The scope of the state’s regulatory powers further exacerbates the 
requirement to depoliticize religion: 
“Because the modern nation-state seeks to regulate all aspects of individual life – even the most 
intimate, such as birth and death – no one, whether religious or otherwise, can avoid encountering 
its ambitious powers…all social activity requires the consent of the law…The way social spaces 
are defined, ordered, and regulated makes them all equally ‘political’.”73 
 
For this reason it is difficult for religious duties – which are themselves performed through social 
relations – to avoid confronting the state and its monopoly over law. 
The law/morality distinction characteristic of modern liberal states is very different from 
premodern/traditional articulations of the shari’a.74  Wael Hallaq, professor of Islamic law at 
Columbia University, is considered by many scholars (i.e. Mohammad Hassan Khalil, David S. 
Powers, Anver Emon and Khalid Blankinship) to be the foremost authority in the English 
language of Sunni Islamic law.  Hallaq has authored over seventy works on Islamic legal theory 
and history, including books, chapter contributions, scholarly articles and encyclopedia entries.  
His work has been widely translated and well-received.  In The Impossible State: Islam, Politics 
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and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, Hallaq shows that premodern shari’a “was regulated not 
only by technical Shari’i rules but also by pervasive Shari’i ethic.”75  The shari’a is best 
understood as “a system that in its day was at once moral, legal, cultural, and deeply 
psychological.”76  As such, filtering Islamic commitments through the law/morality dichotomy 
fails to capture the paradigmatic character of the faith.77  Hallaq defines the shari’a as: 
“a colossal project of building a moral-legal empire whose foundational and structural impulse is 
summed up in the ever-continuing attempt to discover God’s moral will…the dialectic between 
the sociological and the metaphysical, between the Community as a worldly society and its 
persistent attempts to locate itself in a particular moral cosmology.  But this realism about the 
world was always placed in a metaphysical context, just as this metaphysics was constantly teased 
out in the realism of mundane existence…There can be no Islam without a moral-legal system that 
is anchored in a metaphysic; there can be no such moral system without or outside divine 
sovereignty…”78 
 
Just as ‘religion’ and the ‘social’ cannot be taken as universal categories, so too ‘law’ and 
‘morality’ must be qualified and specified. 
Hallaq explains that Islamic governance – those aspects of the shari’a that pertain to 
issues of political administration – has been historically understood and practiced under the 
auspices of the overarching Islamic moral framework: 
“Islamic governance (that which stands parallel to what we call ‘state’ today) rests on moral, legal, 
political, social, and metaphysical foundations that are dramatically different from those sustaining 
the modern state.  In Islam, it is the Community (Umma) that displace the nation of the modern 
state.  The Community is both abstract and concrete, but in either case it is governed by the same 
moral rules… 
 
“Whereas the nation-state is the end of all ends, knows only itself, and therefore is metaphysically 
the ultimate foundation of sovereign will, the Community and its individual members are a means 
to a greater end.  This implies that the Community itself neither possesses sovereignty nor does it 
have…an autonomous political or legal will…[but it] does have the power of decision…But this 
power is an interpretative one, bounded…by general moral principles that transcend the 
Community’s control.”79 
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In light of the paradigmatic character of historical shari’a, it becomes impossible to speak of the 
authority of ‘Islamic law’ as independent from ‘Islamic morals,’ or even as separate from the 
revelation or prophetic example.  Nor was premodern Islamic law under the authority of either an 
executive authority or a court.  The executive produced only a minute amount of law, pertaining 
mostly to constitutions or bureaucratic administration.80  The courts had for their “ultimate 
reference” the authority of independent (i.e. private) legal experts: 
“the Shari’a-anchored, Shari’a-minded, and socially embedded muftis and jurists…[I]t was the 
fatwas rather than court decisions that were collected and published…Once edited, the fatwas 
became part and parcel of legal doctrine.”81 
 
The community itself produced these legal experts organically.82  Their work was delineated by 
Qur’anic and prophetic norms and values.83 
 Another important aspect of historical shari’a is its legal pluralism.  The model of Islamic 
law was a corporate one, consisting of various schools.  In these jurisprudential schools, or 
maddhahib: 
“...the opinions are reasoned on the basis of a shared set of principles that in fact give the school 
its identity as a particular ‘legal’ method or way of thinking about the moral law…there is no 
single legal stipulation that has monopoly or exclusivity, as law is designed by the modern state 
(which is also to say that in this system it would have been impossible for the legislative to be 
‘unruly’ and potentially ‘tyrannical,’ as the American framers had feared..)  Islamic law is one of 
legal pluralism, not only because it acknowledges local custom and takes it into serious account 
but also because it offers an array of opinions on one and the same set of facts.”84 
 
For this reason the legal corpus of any particular school did not necessarily have to be codified 
throughout the jurisdiction of a political executive.  The shari’a had a local character, and legists 
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incorporated local custom (urf) as a matter of legal methodology.85  The shari’a also legislated 
areas that cut across the public/private distinction, i.e. it legislated mu’amalat, or contractual 
relations, as well as ‘ibadat, or ritual worship practices.86 
 The implications of a political/legal understanding that bypasses the law/morality divide 
are serious.  Hallaq states that “Islamic governance was productive of subjectivities that were 
paradigmatically Shar’i based.”87  Where the liberal state assumes its subjects to be morally 
autonomous and self-inventing (within the confines of its law), the shari’a assumes the opposite: 
“If morality indistinguishably located itself within the habitat of ‘law,’ it was because the subject 
of this ‘law,’ in its individual and collective forms, was unqualifiedly assumed to be a moral agent.  
Otherwise, the Shari’a’s overall injunctions would have had no meaning within the contexts of 
social relations and would have been no more than a figment of the jurists’ imagination.”88 
 
This helps explain Asad’s claim that the Muslim Umma (or community of believers) is not 
synonymous with either ‘society’ or ‘nation’: 
“The Islamic umma in the classical theological view is thus not an imagined community on a par 
with the Arab nation waiting to be politically unified but a theologically defined space enabling 
Muslims to practice the disciplines of din in the world…[it] presupposes individuals who are self-
governing but not autonomous…[and] is ideologically not ‘a society’ onto which state, economy, 
and religion can be mapped.  It is neither limited nor sovereign…”89 
 
 A telling illustration of the tensions inhering in grafting ‘law’ conceptions from one 
historical tradition onto another comes from colonial Egypt’s reduction of shari’a to ‘personal 
status’ or ‘family’ law.  Asad states: 
“It is often assumed that colonial governments were reluctant to interfere with family law because 
it was the heart of religious doctrine and practice.  I argue, on the contrary, that the shari’a thus 
defined is precisely a secular formula for privatizing ‘religion’ and preparing the ground for the 
self-governing subject.”90 
 
In nineteenth century Egypt during the tanzimat progressive legal reforms, neither the Arabic 
word for society (mujtama’) nor the phenomenon to which it refers existed.  This is because 
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‘society’ is constituted by autonomous individuals.  The theological concept of umma, on the 
other hand: 
“has the sense of a collective body of Muslims bound together by their faith in God and the 
Prophet – a faith that is embodied in prescribed forms of behavior.  It is therefore quite different 
from the idea of a society made up of equal citizens governing themselves individually (through 
conscience) and collectively (through the electorate).”91 
 
Colonial Egypt saw the emergence of the family as a legal category and, therefore, as an 
administrative object.92  The secular, as a field of power with both institutional and discursive 
aspects, was central to this development.  The legal formation of the family confirmed the idea of 
individual morality by establishing for it a private sphere.  The shari’a curtailed into ‘family law’ 
was now understood as the law of personal status, or qanun al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya: 
“In this way it becomes the expression of a secular formula, defining a place in which ‘religion’ is 
allowed to make its public appearance through state law.”93 
 
Institutionally, the secular forces of state and market benefitted from the reinscription of 
Egyptian legal subjects through family law.  Forced labor, military conscription, economic 
decline of petty merchants and artisans due to the influx of foreign capital, and land reform were 
some of the channels through which ‘the family’ as a legal category was operationalized.94 
 Asad suggests that it is the state’s political power, the market’s freedom of exchange and 
the moral authority of the family that helped usher in secular modernity at the turn of the 
twentieth century in Egypt: 
“Central to this schema is the distinction between law (which the state embodied, produced, and 
administered) and morality (which is the concern ideally of the responsible person generated and 
sustained by the family), the two being mediated by the freedom of public exchange – a space that 
was restructured in Egypt by the penetration of European capital and the adoption of European law 
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of contract, a space in which debates about Islamic reasoning and national progress, as well as 
about individual autonomy, could now take place publicly.”95 
 
This led to another important aspect of Asad’s thought, pertaining as I frame it here to the 
relation between secularism and the undermining of religion’s political action: that the neutrality 
of the public sphere is a myth. 
 Asad states that the public sphere “is a space necessarily (not just contingently) 
articulated by power.”96  This has to do with the difference between the freedom to speak and the 
freedom to be heard.  If one’s speech has no effect on the political world or its practical 
decisions, then the liberal virtue of free public debate is not being fulfilled.97  The obstacles in 
the public sphere to free speech are not necessarily to be found in formal codes of law or 
exercises of state power, but are more subtle: 
“They are also intrinsic to the time and space it takes to build and demonstrate a particular 
argument, to understand a particular experience – and more broadly, to become particular 
speaking and listening subjects.”98 
 
The modern secular definition of religion as an essentially private experience informs the 
subject-formation of those who inhabit the public culture.99  This in turn provides the limits and 
possibilities of what can be articulated in that public sphere: 
“The public sphere is not an empty space for carrying out debates.  It is constituted by the 
sensibilities – memories and aspirations, fears and hopes – of speakers and listeners…Thus the 
introduction of new discourses may result in the disruption of established assumptions structuring 
debates in the public sphere.  More strongly: they may have to disrupt existing assumptions to be 
heard.  Far from having to prove to existing authority that it is no threat to dominant values, a 
religion that enters political debate on its own terms may on the contrary have to threaten the 
authority of existing assumptions.”100 
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Religions that enter the public sphere with an acceptance of the liberal division between law and 
morality are commended; but organized religion, being founded on authority and constraint, 
continually poses a threat to the mutual freedom enshrined in the public sphere.101 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the increasing scope of the state’s monopoly over 
law problematizes religion’s contribution to the public culture.  Not all values are negotiable.102  
Asad urges that: 
“that ‘the secular’ should not be thought of as the space in which real human life gradually 
emancipates itself from the controlling power of ‘religion’ and thus achieves the latter’s 
relocation.  It is this assumption that allows us to think of religion as ‘infecting’ the secular 
domain or as replicating within it the structure of theological concepts.”103 
 
Through the nation-state’s demarcation and regulation of spaces, religious (and other) spaces 
have to be continually redefined in the law “because the reproduction of secular life within and 
beyond the nation-state continually affects the discursive clarity of that space.”104  For a 
‘religion’ like Islam that espouses a direct relation between religious duties and social 
relations,105 the secular public space with its promise of free debate – mitigated by the limits of 
the state’s ever-increasing legal scope – may prove inadequate.106   
 Another important aspect of secularism that contextualizes the universal human right of 
freedom of religion is secularism’s relation to the modern nation-state and state power.  As 
previously mentioned with regard to ‘religion,’ the ‘social,’ ‘law’ and ‘morality,’ conceptual and 
epistemological categories are not timeless and universal but are historically constructed and 
contextually valued and relevant.  Asad’s examination of the categories of human nature, 
normality, agency, space and time are relevant for understanding the relation of secularism to the 
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modern state.  The renegotiation of law and morality among early secularists in nineteenth 
century liberal society led to the idea that individual moral autonomy constitutes human agency: 
“A critical rearticulation was being negotiated between state law and personal morality.  This shift 
presupposed the new idea of society as a total population of individuals enjoying not only 
subjective rights and immunities, and endowed with moral agency, but also possessing the 
capacity to elect their political representatives – a shift that occurred all at once in Revolutionary 
France (excluding women and domestics), and gradually in nineteenth-century England…quite 
different from the medieval conception of a social body of Christian souls each of whom is 
endowed with equal dignity – members at once of the City of God and of divinely created human 
society.  The discursive move in the nineteenth century from thinking of a fixed ‘human nature’ to 
regarding humans in terms of a constituted ‘normality’ facilitated the secular idea of moral 
progress defined and directed by autonomous human agency.”107 
 
The historical situatedness of liberal agency unsettles the grammar of human agency at work in 
universal human rights discourse.  It implies that references to the rights associated with 
‘religion’ have prerequisitely subscribed to truncated, depoliticized, privatized accounts of 
religion.  While this may make perfect sense in the organic development of early modern 
European theory and practice, it may be an imposition on traditions outside that trajectory – 
traditions who have mapped their own histories and discursive developments. 
 Asad’s unsettling of concepts extends to epistemological categories as well.  Asad shows 
that secularism as a sensibility and field of power organizes (through the modern state) 
experiences of space and time.  National politics organize space through ideas of exclusive 
boundaries while critics speak of a borderless world.  However, the idea of complex space is 
better suited for capturing alternative conceptions of space: 
“Unlike the modern, secular world of nation-states, medieval Christendom and Islam recognized a 
multiplicity of overlapping bonds and identities.  People were not always expected to subject 
themselves to one sovereign authority, nor were they themselves sovereign moral subjects.”108 
 
Experiences of time are also subject to national organization.  Instead of secular homogenous 
time, Asad urges that we think of heterogenous time and simultaneous temporalities: 
“because the temporalities of many tradition-rooted practices (that is, the time each embodied 
practice requires to complete and to perfect itself, the past into which it reaches, that it 
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reencounters, reimagines, and extends) cannot be translated into the homogenous time of national 
politics.  The body’s memories, feelings, and desires necessarily escape the rational/instrumental 
orientation of such politics [of the nation-state]…”109 
 
Only if political identities (i.e. ‘Europe’) are articulated in terms of complex time and complex 
space can multiple ways of life (as opposed to multiple identities) hope to exist.110 
 The secular space of early modernity was animated by a number of values: nature as 
manipulable;111 the political as sacralized;112 philosophical profanation and the rise of theories of 
universal reason;113 and the secular as the epistemological domain in which history exists.114  It is 
possible to find vestiges of these trajectories in institutions and discourses of today’s modern 
nation-states.  Asad identifies liberal democracy as expressing: 
“the two secular myths that are, notoriously, at odds with each other: the Enlightenment myth of 
politics as a discourse of public reason whose bond with knowledge enables the elite to direct the 
education of mankind, and the revolutionary myth of universal suffrage, a politics of large 
numbers in which the representation of ‘collective will’ is sought by quantifying the opinion and 
fantasy of individual citizen-electors… 
 
“the formation of these secular projects…embrace a distinctive politics (democratic, anticlerical), 
they presuppose a different kind of morality (based on the sacredness of individual conscience and 
individual right), and they regard suffering as entirely subjective and accidental (as bodily damage 
to be medically treated, or as corrective punishment for crime, or simply as the unfinished 
business of universal empowerment).”115 
 
In addition to these liberal values, the modern nation-state also embodies secularism in how it 
prioritizes citizenship.  Asad cites in agreement Charles Taylor’s ideas about secularism: 
“the modern state has to make citizenship the primary principle of identity…it must transcend the 
different identities built on class, gender, and religion, replacing conflicting perspectives by 
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unifying experience.  In an important sense, this transcendent mediation is secularism.  Secularism 
is not simply an intellectual answer to a question about enduring social peace and toleration.  It is 
an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends 
particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and 
religion.”116 
 
The modern nation-state also generates its own categories, such as equality, majority and 
minority.  These concepts are “statistical concept[s] of representativeness [which] emerged in 
close connection with the construction of the welfare state…and the centralization of national 
statistics.”117 
 Secularism also establishes the state’s claim to a legitimate monopoly on violence.  The 
liberal project is akin to making a garden in a jungle that is continually encroaching,118 and as 
such requires a substantial amount of (legitimate) violence.  This is because of liberalism’s myth, 
or “imaginary construction:” 
“to assert human rights precisely because they are not built into the structure of the universe.  The 
frightening truth concealed by the liberal myth is, therefore, that liberal principles go against the 
grain of human and social nature.  Liberalism is not a matter of clearing away a few accidental 
obstacles and allowing humanity to unfold its natural essence.”119 
 
Liberal violence is therefore transparent, and is “the violence of universalizing reason itself.”120  
In such a discourse, religious violence is necessarily gratuitous.121  The modern state’s monopoly 
over violence means not only that it has the force of legitimate violence, but also that it has the 
power to define other types of violence as illegitimate: 
“Violence required by the cultivation of enlightenment is therefore distinguished from the violence 
of the dark jungle.  The former is to be seen as an expression of law, the latter of transgression.”122 
 
The secular state doesn’t eliminate violence, since its aim is to regulate violence.123 
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 Returning to Asad’s example of colonial Egypt, we can observe the relation between the 
secular state’s increasing power and violence through how it secured liberal governance in 
political, moral and theological realms.  Asad states: 
“the law had to acquire new substance and new functions and to employ new kinds of violence.  
For colonial punishment – the institution of a police force and a prison system – was central to the 
modernization and secularization of law in Egypt.”124 
 
Outside of the historical specificities of the colonial Egyptian example, the modern state employs 
a calculus of cruelty that treats pain as quantifiable “in accordance with the proportionality of 
means to ends.”125  Universal human rights discourse also subscribes to this logic, but given the 
ambitions of state power, restraints can be rendered meaningless without violating the letter of 
the norm.  Pain as quantifiable and justified with relation of the proportion of means to ends: 
“is the principle supported by the Geneva Convention.  The principle states that the human 
destruction inflicted should not outweigh the strategic advantage gained.  Only necessary 
punishment of noncombatants should be used.  But given the aim of ultimate victory the notion of 
‘military necessity’ can be extended indefinitely.  Any measure that is intended as a contribution 
to that aim, no matter how much suffering it creates, may be justified in terms of ‘military 
necessity’.  The standard of accessibility in such cases is set by public opinion, and that standard 
varies as the latter moves in response to contingent circumstances (for example, who the enemy is, 
how the war is going).”126 
 
The modern state’s monopoly over law and violence, combined with the strict separation of law 
and morality, enables the state to be the sole force maintaining the law’s authority.127 
 The final point about secularism relevant to the present thesis – that the secular is a field 
of power with institutional and discursive aspects forming a historically particular value system 
couching ‘universal’ human rights – is secularism’s shaping of the morally autonomous 
individualist subject.  In the inviolable distinction between public and private realms, private 
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reason constitutes the right to difference and “the immunity from the force of public reason.”128  
Since law is the purview of the public realm and morality a private matter, the individual is 
subject to political restraints by the state publicly and enjoys moral autonomy in private affairs.  
But ‘agency’ as a category is not universal or essential.  Asad states: 
“agency is not a natural category…successive uses of this concept (their different grammars) have 
opened up or closed very different possibilities for acting and being.  The secular, with its focus on 
empowerment and history-making, is clearly one of those possibilities.”129 
 
Secular agency assumes an “essential freedom” and “natural sovereignty” for the human 
subject.130  Asad states that this leads to romanticizing resistance, such that the subject is 
assumed to move in a particular direction of opposing power and eliminating pain/maximizing 
pleasure.131 
Agency is a complex term embedded in semantic and institutional networks that define 
particular ways of relating to people, things and oneself.132  In this scheme, ‘empowerment’ 
“becomes a metaphysical quality defining secular human agency, its objective as well as 
precondition.”133  The modern conscience, says Asad, is a secular conscience that subsumes 
moralized religion.134  A humanitarian calculus of pleasure and pain serves as a cross-cultural 
judge of ideas and practices.135 
At this point I ask: How do Asad’s critical insights on the secular complicate the 
universal human right of freedom of religion?  Universal human rights assume a morally 
autonomous, self-sovereign subject-citizen of the state.  Her freedom of religion is afforded 
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within this secular philosophical anthropology, and only to the extent that religion is principally 
a matter of belief.  Given Hallaq’s characterization of paradigmatic premodern shari’a as an 
indivisibly moral-legal matrix whose subject is a moral agent, the secularity of human rights 
detracts from its universality claims.  Given the political powers exercised by states and markets, 
human rights become “floating signifiers” that can be connected and disconnected to different 
subjects and groups/classes of subjects according to the interests of market activity and state 
power (recall Smith and Masuzawa on geopolitics).136  The autonomous individual is itself a 
statistical object, to be targeted by electoral politics and modern market culture alike.137 
 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights “implicitly accepts the fact that the 
universal character of the rights-bearing person is made the responsibility of sovereign states.”138  
This creates a curious circularity such that the suffering a human undergoes as a citizen becomes 
distinguishable from the suffering s/he undergoes as a human.139  The ‘legitimate’ violence of the 
nation-state does not count as human rights violations: 
“The use of excessive force against civilians through aerial bombardment is regarded differently 
from the use of violence perpetrated by particular officials against individual victims.  It is not a 
matter of human rights abuse but of collateral damage…Financial pressures can have effects that 
are more far-reaching than many military adventures.  But the devastation these pressures can 
cause…cannot be addressed as human rights violations.”140 
 
Asad cites examples in which International Monetary Fund or United States policies cause 
destructive violence in other states, but this violence is “presented as the promotion of economic 
restructuring necessary for development.”141 
 The essentially national context of universal human rights is a point that was made 
notably by Hannah Arendt in On Revolution.  She stated that human rights depend essentially on 
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being the citizen of a nation-state.142  In this same work, Arendt places secularism at the core of 
liberatory politics.143  Secularization is the attempt to find other versions of the authority and 
sanction provided by the ‘absolute’ of religion.  Revolution seeks not just liberty but 
secularity.144  There is a connotation, or subtext, inherited from the French and American 
Revolutions with their rights-proclamations, that freedom comes from rejecting tradition.145  The 
sensibility in universal human rights partially equates law with justice, such that “the authority of 
norms corresponds to the political force that supports them as law.”146 
 For these reasons, human rights law, despite its tremendous good, also becomes: 
“a mode of converting and regulating people, making them at once freer and more governable in 
this world.  The employment of cost-benefit analysis derived from neoliberal economics has the 
advantage of defining ‘freedom’ quantitatively (‘objectively’) for the consuming subject in terms 
of behavior.  It also provides a pragmatic principle for deciding when and to what extent the 
government of a population requires the restriction or abrogation of particular individual 
‘freedoms.’”147 
 
Asad criticizes the sacredness of the human subject connoted by human rights discourse, 
claiming that human beings are only ‘sacred’ in an abstract sense, through abstract participation 
in popular sovereignty.  Real humans are subject to the violence of their states.148 
 The secular, to review, is a field of power with discursive and institutional aspects.  It 
intersects with universal human rights through a number of vectors: in its (negative) discourse on 
religion, undermining the political action of religion and advocacy of the morally autonomous 
subject.  The secular as a constitutive principle of human rights philosophy, and the modern, 
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144 Ibid., 75-77; Arendt, 108-109 and 159-160. 
145 Asad (2003), 145. 
146 Ibid., 138. 
147 Ibid., 157. 
148 Ibid., 144. 
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limiting rendition of ‘religion’ at work in the freedom of religion, generate specific questions for 
Muslims today.  As Muslims perform conceptual translation across their faith tradition and 
universal human rights, they produce a variety of positions.  In the next chapter, I reflect on 
arguments in favor of human rights made by five influential contemporary Muslim scholars in 
the Western public intellectual space.  These thinkers adopt a working model of Islam as a 
religion in the modern sense indicated in this chapter. 
According to Asad, modernity brings “a new kind of subjectivity, one that is appropriate 
to ethical autonomy and aesthetic self-invention – a concept of ‘the subject’ that has a new 
grammar.”149  But universalizing this grammar is problematic, because different traditions 
(traditions in the sense argued by MacIntyre150) produce and perpetuate different ideas of what it 
means to be ‘human.’  Human rights is only one such language.151  Multiple interpretive lenses 
do not recognize and espouse the secular assumptions and category of religion presented in this 
chapter.  There is other Muslim scholarship on human rights that does not fit into the secular 
discourse on religion (as less rational, less developed, etc.), the strict separation of religion from 
politics and law from morality, or the moral autonomy and self-sovereignty of the individual.  In 
chapter five, I examine the human rights-related arguments of five influential contemporary 
Western Muslim scholars, thematically contrasting their arguments with their modern-religion 
counterparts from chapter four. 
Before comparing contemporary Muslim engagements with human rights, I identify an 
alternative conceptualization of Islam – one which avoids the reductive, secular implications of 
‘religion.’  In order to understand the philosophical bases of the variety of Muslim thought on the 
                                                          
149 Ibid., 225. 
150 See chapter 1 above, “Introduction: The Rationality of Traditions.” 
151 Asad (2003), 140.  Asad asks, how can human rights’ universality be defended?  “For when nature is interpreted 
positivistically in terms of statistical norms, then different norms of behavior and sentiment can claim to be equally 
natural…a crippling relativism.” Ibid., 58. 
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relation between Islam and universal human rights, I propose that the Qur’anic term that 
identifies Islam, din, join the analysis.  Examining the prior philosophical commitments and 
theorizing of divergent arguments about human rights – and not just their positive content – can 
not only enrich our understanding of how to make human rights more universal, it can also lead 
to appreciation for the contribution Muslim perspectives can make to public intellectual debate.  
For this I turn to a textual analysis of din in the Qur’an. 
 
Din 
 The Qur’an is the continually relevant founding text of Islam (i.e. its ‘holy book’).  Its 
transhistorical, transcultural relevance for Muslims can be understood by gleaning how the 
historical Islamic tradition is like a perpetually renegotiated elaboration of the Qur’anic 
worldview.152  To take an example from Islamic jurisprudence of the Qur’an’s continual 
primacy, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, former professor of law at the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia and author of sixteen books and over one-hundred scholarly articles on 
Islamic law, states: 
“It [the Qur’an] may be defined as the book containing the speech of God revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad in Arabic and transmitted to us by continuous testimony, or tawatur.  It is a proof of 
the prophecy of Muhammad, the most authoritative guide for Muslims, and the first source of the 
Shari’ah. The ulema are unanimous on this, and some even say that it is the only source and that 
all other sources are explanatory to the Qur’an.”153 
 
Islamic philosophy also centers the Qur’an.  Seyyed Hossein Nasr, professor of Islamic 
studies at George Washington University, has authored fifty books and five hundred scholarly 
                                                          
152 I am not suggesting, here or elsewhere, that Islam – its history, cultural manifestations, or interpretive debates 
– are in any way monolithic.  In other words, specific interpretations over the true meanings of the Qur’an are not 
transhistorical or transcultural, but the relevance of and reverence for the book as a founding text considered 
divine speech for all humanity transcends time, place and history as a principal Muslim belief.  The tremendous 
intellectual and material diversity of Islam is united under the broad proclamation of faith that enters one into the 
community of believers (that there is only one God and that Muhammad was the messenger of God).  The 
perpetual relevance of the Qur’an is integral to this. 
153 See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence.  Islamic Texts Society, 1991: 22. 
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articles on comparative religion, traditionalist metaphysics, Islamic sciences, the environment 
and Sufism.  Of the centrality of the Qur’an to the tradition of Islamic philosophy, Nasr states: 
“If seen…from its own perspective and in the light of the whole of the Islamic philosophical 
tradition which has had a twelve-century-long continuous history and is still alive today, it 
becomes abundantly clear that Islamic philosophy, like everything else Islamic, is deeply rooted in 
the Qur’an and Hadith.  Islamic philosophy is Islamic not only by virtue of the fact that it was 
cultivated in the Islamic world and by Muslims but because it derives its principles, inspiration 
and many of the questions with which it has been concerned from the sources of Islamic revelation 
despite the claims of its opponents to the contrary…[it is] a type of philosophy in which a revealed 
book is accepted as the supreme source of knowledge not only of religious law but of the very 
nature of existence and beyond existence of the very source of existence…[The Islamic 
philosophers] almost unanimously accepted revelation as a source of ultimate knowledge.”154 
 
In his elaboration of traditions, MacIntyre also admits the distinctly important role that sacred 
texts play in religious traditions.  He states that sources of authority deemed sacred will not be 
repudiated in the same dialectical process of reevaluation as the non-sacred: 
“Where a person or a text is assigned an authority which derives from what is taken to be their 
relationship to the divine, that sacred authority will be thereby in the course of this process exempt 
from repudiation, although its utterances may certainly be subject to reinterpretation.”155 
 
 The Qur’an as continually central to Islamic intellectual and lived traditions performs a 
constitutive function in Islam’s worldview.  The word ‘worldview’ has a complex and, at times, 
controversial history.  According to David Naugle, professor of philosophy at Dallas Baptist 
University and author of several works on Christianity and worldview, worldviews are “the 
silent, yet motive forces that shape the conflicted dynamics of human life.”156  While I do not 
                                                          
154 See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Qur’an and Hadith as source and inspiration of Islamic Philosophy,” in History of 
Islamic Philosophy, Part I.  Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds.  Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2001: 27-
28. 
155 MacIntyre (1988), 355.  See chapter 1, “Introduction: The Rationality of Traditions,” for my full treatment of 
MacIntyre’s argument, and why I frame my investigation into human rights’ universality claims vis-à-vis secular 
concepts pertaining to religion using MacIntyre’s thesis on the rationality (and incommensurability) of traditions. 
156 See David Naugle.  “Clashing Civilizations, Culture Wars, and the Academy: The Illuminating Role of 
‘Worldview’.”  Lecture delivered at Christian Leadership Ministries SMU Luncheon Lecture Series, September 30, 
2003: 3.  Available at: http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/Clashing%20Civ,%20Cult%20Wars,%20Wv-lec.pdf.  
Accessed June 24, 2016. 
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agree with all of Naugle’s thought,157 I cite him here because his work Worldview: History of a 
Concept has been well-received for its historically and philosophically fair treatment of the 
concept.158 
 Naugle traces the varying grammars of ‘worldview’ (weltanschauung in its original 
German) from Kant through German idealism and realism (in Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, 
Hegel, Goethe and others).159  By the nineteenth century, worldview’s definition “as a basic 
outlook on life had become more or less fixed, and it soon became a popular companion word 
used alongside philosophy.”160  The word entered into American philosophy soon after, and was 
also appropriated by various Dutch, Scottish and American theologians “as a way of explaining 
Christianity as a comprehensive, holistic philosophy of life.”161 
 Before arriving at his particular appropriation of the term for contemporary Christians, 
Naugle identifies the differences between the various articulations and uses of worldview among 
modern Western philosophers: 
“G. W. F. Hegel understood defined it as different and recurrent views of life, forms of 
consciousness, and world outlooks.  Søren Kierkegaard, who preferred the term lifeview, 
understood it to express a particular understanding of the meaning of life and its purpose.  
Wilhelm Dilthey spoke about worldviews as explications of the enigmas of life, answers to the 
questions that comprise the riddle of the universe.  Friedrich Nietzsche said that worldviews were 
nothing but reifications, fictive ways of seeing and knowing things from a particular perspective.  
Edmund Husserl argued that a worldview was a value system, an acquired wisdom, an infused 
consciousness, leading to an ideal humanity.  Martin Heidegger said that worldviews were 
interpretations of natural things, a view or sense of life that shapes human affairs.  For Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, it was a fusion of a form of life and a language game that he preferred to call a world 
picture.  For postmodernists, they are, a la Nietzsche, reified metanarratives that need to be 
deconstructed.”162 
                                                          
157 Naugle accepts the truth of theses of impending clash – both Samuel Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations thesis 
and Huntington’s student, James Kurth’s clash-within-Western-civilization between secularist and Judeo-Christian 
outlooks thesis. 
158 See David. K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept.  Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2002.  See reviews by: Dale Canon, “David Naugle on Worldviews.”  Tradition & Discovery: The Polanyi 
Society Periodical, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2006-2007): 27-31; and Brent G. Kyle, “Book Review: Worldview: The History of a 
Concept.”  Direction: A Mennonite Brethren Forum, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2004): 123-125. 
159 Naugle (2003), 3. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 




Naugle’s own use of worldview is as “a vision of life rooted in and expressed through the human 
heart,” where the heart, according to Biblical teaching, is the seat of the intellect, i.e. of ideas, 
sensibilities and choices.163  For Naugle, a person’s worldview is her presuppositional basis of 
life from which arguments are constructed and action taken.  All knowledge is therefore 
perspectival.164  Epistemic self-dispossession is impossible, as thinking “is always a function of 
the whole person.”165 
In what follows, I speak of the Islamic or Qur’anic worldview in the manner of Naugle’s 
appropriation for ‘the Christian worldview’: 
“Though it sustains a variety of definitions and nuances, at the end of the day, it [a worldview] 
conveys a person’s deepest conceptions and convictions about the basic make up of reality and the 
nature of life itself.”166 
 
Alparslan Acikgenc, professor of philosophy and history at Yildiz Technical University and 
author of several books and articles on the history, epistemology and sociology of science, and 
religion and science, defines worldview as an overarching mental organizing schema, “the only 
framework within which the human mind can fully operate in order to attain knowledge.”167  
From this perspective, all human conduct is ultimately traceable to a worldview.  The Qur’anic 
text encompasses and espouses a worldview in this sense.  In the previous section I suggested 
that the modern concept ‘religion’ can have a secularizing and truncating effect on the life of 
religion.  In what follows I explore the Qur’anic worldview (in its broadest sense) through a 
textual and semantic analysis and propose that din can be a more fitting concept for theorizing 
about Islam and human rights. 
                                                          
163 Ibid., 5. 
164 Ibid., 9. 
165 Ibid., 12. 
166 Ibid., 18. 
167 Alparslan Acikgenc, Islamic Science: Towards a Definition.  Kuala Lampur: International Institute of Islamic 
Thought and Civilization, 1996: 9. 
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 The Qur’an refers to the Islamic religion as din.  To understand what din implies for 
Islamic self-understanding, I begin with its etymology.  Arabic morphology, or word structure, is 
highly systematic, and Arab grammarians developed sophisticated analyses of it beginning in the 
late eight and early ninth centuries.168  In its derivational or lexical morphology (i.e. how words 
are formed, as opposed to its inflectional morphology, which deals with how words interact with 
syntax), Arabic: 
“exhibits rigorous and elegant logic…It consists primarily of a system of consonant roots which 
interlock with patterns of vowels…to form words, or word stems…In Arabic, this root-pattern 
process has evolved extensively and very productively in order to cover a vast array of meanings 
associated with each semantic field…”169 
 
All of the words and word stems derived from the root are directly related in meaning to that 
root.  For my purpose here, the fullest possible meaning of din can only emerge when the entire 
family of words derived from its root are considered.  For this I cite Syed Muhammad Naquib al-
Attas’ etymological summary of the term. 
Al-Attas is a prominent contemporary Muslim philosopher who has authored twenty-
seven works on Sufism, Islamic cosmology, metaphysics, philosophy and Malay language and 
literature.  He has founded, chaired and reformed several institutions of higher education in 
Malaysia, and has guest-lectured internationally.  According to al-Attas, the many uses of din in 
the Qur’an are as follow: 
“The primary significations of the term din can be reduced to four: (1) indebtedness; (2) 
submissiveness; (3) judicious power; (4) natural inclination or tendency…The verb dana which 
derives from din conveys the meaning of being indebted…In the state in which one finds oneself 
being in debt, that is to say, a da’in it follows that one subjects oneself, in the sense of yielding and 
obeying, to law and ordinances governing debts, and also, in a way, to the creditor, who is 
likewise designated as a da’in.  There is also conveyed in the situation described the fact that one 
in debt is under obligation, or dayn.  Being in debt and under obligation naturally involves 
judgment: daynunah, and conviction: idanah, as the case may be.  All the above significations 
including their contraries inherent in dana are practicable possibilities only in organized societies 
involved in commercial life in towns and cities, denoted by mudun or mada’in.  A town or city, a 
madinah, has a judge, ruler, or governor, a dayyan.  Thus already here, in the various applications 
                                                          
168 See Karin C. Ryding, A Reference Grammar of Modern Standard Arabic.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005: 44. 
169 Ibid., 45-46. 
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of the verb dana alone, we see rising before our mind’s eye a picture of civilized living; of societal 
life of law and order and justice and authority.  It is, conceptually at least, connected intimately 
with another verb maddana which means: to build or to found cities: to civilize, to refine and to 
humanize; from which is derived another term: tamaddun, meaning civilization and refinement in 
social culture.”170 
 
From this passage it becomes clear that, while Islamic belief necessarily encompasses the private 
space of an individual believer’s conscience in her relationship with God and subsequent 
agentive pietistic motivation, din is primarily contractual, social, civil, economic and political in 
its meaning.  In other words, Islam-as-din is not a religion in the disembodied, private-sphere-
only sense.  As such, not all Muslim interpretations of the universal human right to freedom of 
religion will filter through the private/public dichotomy required by the modern grammar of 
‘religion.’171 
Islam-as-din is much closer to medieval Christian self-understanding (what Cavanaugh 
called the “theopolitical whole”172) than to religion in the modern sense.  As Asad argues 
elsewhere, reflecting on the religion theory of the iconic anthropologist Clifford Geertz: 
“It is part of my basic argument that socially identifiable forms, pre-conditions and effects of what 
was categorized as religion in the medieval epoch were quite different from those so categorized 
in modern society.  Religious power was differently distributed, and had a different thrust.  There 
were different ways in which it created and worked through institutions, different selves which it 
shaped and responded to, and different categories of knowledge which it authorized and made 
available.  A consequence is that there cannot be a definition of religion which is universally 
viable because and to the extent that the effects of these processes are historically produced, 
reproduced and transformed… 
 
“[Geertz makes] the bland suggestion that religion is ultimately a matter of having a positive 
attitude to the problem of disorder, of affirming simply that in some sense or other, the world as a 
whole is explicable, justifiable, bearable.  This modest view of religion (which would have 
horrified the early Church Fathers or medieval churchmen) is a product of Geertz’s recurrent 
desire to define religion in universal terms…”173 
 
To understand the significance-giving extensions of Islam-as-din, I will explicate the 
single-most representative, or paradigmatic, concept of the Islamic/Qur’anic worldview.  That is 
                                                          
170 Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: an Exposition of the Fundamental 
Elements of the Worldview of Islam.  Kuala Lampur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 
1995: 44. 
171 See ‘Religion’ and ‘The Secular’ sections above. 
172 See my discussion of William Cavanaugh’s work in ‘Religion’ section above. 
173 Asad (1983), 238 and 246. 
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the concept of the oneness of God, or tawhid.  Islam’s strict monotheistic principle forms the 
underlying unity within the diversity of Islamic doctrines and discourse.  Toshihiko Izutsu (d. 
1993) was professor of cultural and linguistic studies at Keio University in Japan.  Considered an 
intellectual giant by many, he taught in Iran and Canada, was fluent in over thirty languages, and 
published the first direct Japanese translation of the Qur’an.  His areas of specialization included 
philosophy, linguistics and comparative metaphysics.  Izutsu’s work God and Man in the 
Qur’an: Semantics of the Qur’anic Weltanschauung demonstrates, in addition to the strictness 
and centrality of monotheism for the Islamic creed, the saturation of language with meaning – 
and the problems this can pose for translatability.174    Vocabularies and individual terms are not 
merely isolated linguistic significations but convey the broader conceptual worldview of those 
who live and use them.  Izutsu does this through a semantic study of Qur’anic terminology, a 
work which he describes as: 
“an analytic study of the key terms of a language with a view to arriving eventually at a conceptual 
grasp of the weltanschauung or world-view of the people who use that language as a tool not only 
of speaking and thinking, but, more important still, of conceptualizing and interpreting the world 
that surrounds them…a study of the nature and structure of the world-view of a nation at this or 
that significant period of its history, conducted by means of a methodological analysis of the 
major cultural concepts the nation has produced for itself and crystallized into the key-words of its 
language.”175 
 
The ontological significations of language cannot be emphasized enough.  In the Islamic 
tradition, the Qur’an and prophetic way represent two sacred sources of knowledge, inspiration 
and guidance for proper conduct.  A metaphor proposed by Seyyed Hossein Nasr illustrates the 
nurturing role played by these two sacred texts in the lifeblood of Islamic sciences: 
                                                          
174 Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Qur’an: Semantics of the Qur’anic Weltanschauung.  Kuala Lampur: 
Islamic Book Trust, 2002.  According to one commentator, Izutsu’s use of weltanschauung in the title of this work 
gives a clue to his understanding of semantics, “for it is semantics as sprachliche Weltanschauungslehre, as 
developed by Johann Leo Weisgerber, to which Izutsu subscribes.  This type of semantics has much in common 
with the ‘ethnolinguistics’ associated with the names of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf…a theory of the 
interrelations between linguistic and cultural patterns.”  See Harry B. Partin, “Review: Semantics of the Qur’an: A 
Consideration of Izutsu’s Studies.”  History of Religions, Vol. 9, No. 4 (May 1970): 358-362; 358. 
175 Izutsu, 3. 
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“The Holy Quran and Hadith…are like the roots and the trunk of the tree of the Islamic tradition.  
The arts and sciences, social institutions and the like are the branches of the tree, some located 
closer to the trunk and others farther away but all a part of its organism and nourished ultimately 
by the roots.”176 
 
 Izutsu shows that there exist in any given language complex webs of interconnectedness, 
such that the meaning of a single term depends upon the meanings of many other terms within its 
(multiple, overlapping) conceptual webs.  These networks of meaning exist within the broader 
system of relations a language maintains, and within them, nothing is casual.  Every combination 
points back to some aspect of the worldview.  The key point here is the contextual nature of 
word-meanings (contexts can be not only textual – i.e., the Qur’an – but also cultural/historical, 
and here change, not permanence, is the name of the game).  In this case, the Qur’anic 
vocabulary in its entirety is a large conceptual system, which consists of so many overlapping 
smaller conceptual networks, or ‘semantic fields’.  The concept of tawhid, or Divine Oneness, 
enters into the Qur’anic semantic system as the highest ranking organizing principle, imbuing 
every single term with a significance connected to itself.177 
Izutsu demonstrates this through an investigation of a number of Qur’anic ‘focus-words.’  
A focus-word is “a particularly important key-word which indicates and delimits a relatively 
independent and distinctive…‘semantic field’…within the larger whole of the vocabulary.”178   
‘Allah’, the Qur’anic proper name of God which is the content of the principle of tawhid, is “the 
highest focus-word in the Qur’anic vocabulary, reigning over the entire domain.”179  This 
includes reign over a number of dichotomies vital to religious life and thought, such as: the 
unseen and the visible, the present world and the hereafter, the Garden and the Hell Fire; as well 
as doctrinal and eschatological concepts required for belief, i.e. creation, destiny, the Last Day, 
                                                          
176 Seyyed Hossein Nasr.  Islamic Life and Thought.  Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981: 1. 
177 Izutsu states: “not all words in a vocabulary are of equal value in forming the basic structure of the ontological 
conception underlying the vocabulary…”  Izutsu, 17. 
178 Ibid., 22. 
179 Ibid., 24. 
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the Day of Judgment, resurrection, etc. 
The covenant between human and God plays a central role,180  and is the starting point of 
the Islamic concept of religion, or din.  As Naquib Al-Attas explains, the religious vision and 
metaphysics (shuhud) is based on God as Al-Haqq, or ‘The Real’.  Only God’s is Existence 
(wujud), while all others are existent (mawjud).  God is One (Al-Ahad; Al-Wahid), while all 
others are multiplicity (kathrah).  Islam admits of no dualism, since one of the two elements 
involved (i.e. God) is independent and self-subsistent, while the other dependent and relative.  
Nor does Islam admit of a dichotomy between sacred and profane, given the concept of the Unity 
of Creation.  The prophethood is another vital part of Islamic metaphysics, weaving in and out of 
many doctrinal semantic fields (such as divine guidance and mercy, the Book, evidence against 
disbelievers, etc.).  Eschatological concepts pertaining to Islam’s account of the end of earthly 
time and Divine Judgment also comprise an essential part of the Islamic worldview in its 
broadest outlines.181 
 Izutsu elaborates the four major types of relation between God and human according to 
the Qur’an.  These are: 
1. Ontological: God as source and creator, human as representative and creature. 
2. Communicative: From God to human, the verbal form is revelation, and the non-verbal 
form is signs (ayat).  From human to God, the verbal form is prayer (du’a), and the 
non-verbal, ritual worship (salat). 
3. Lord-servant: The Divine attribute rabb signifies God’s majesty, sovereignty and 
absolute power, while the human being is slave, ‘abd: humble, modest and obedient. 
                                                          
180 Izutsu refers to this as the absolute slavehood of man before the absolute sovereignty of God.  Ibid., 78, 96 and 
246-248.  While Izutsu uses the term “man” for human being, I have updated his terminology here for ease of 
readability, rendering “man” into “human” or “human being.” 
181 Al-Attas (1995), 75-78. 
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4. Ethical: Two possibilities.  On the one hand, God’s goodness, mercy, forgiveness and 
benevolence and human’s thankfulness (shukr) and fear of God (taqwa).  On the other 
hand, God’s wrath and severe justice, and human’s disbelief (kufr).182 
These aspects of God’s relation to the human being are supplemented with other concepts 
vital to the Islamic worldview, corresponding in Izutsu’s schema to important ‘semantic fields’ 
surrounding key ‘focus words.’  The concept of creation ex nihilo, to take an important example, 
imbues believers with the consciousness of creatureliness, which in turn cultivates the essential 
virtues of shukr and taqwa and wards away kufr.  Human destiny as in the hands of God is 
another important example.  The Qur’anic semantics reorient this concept from its previous 
grammar in pre-Islamic Arabia to one consistent with the implications of tawhid.  The pre-
Islamic Arabs had no notion of a hereafter, believing instead that human existence on earth was 
in the hands of the “tyrannical sway” of a “powerful master:” dahr, or time.183  Dahr was 
understood as unpredictable, blind, and capricious, causing all manner of suffering and misery to 
all types of people from across social groups.  It was understood more along the lines of 
Machiavelli’s Fortuna than the monotheistic God of Islam.184 
The Qur’anic semantics reconfigured the concept of human destiny completely.  All 
human life comes under God’s omnipotent will and control.  The God of Islam makes concrete 
promises about the consequences of human actions, and God’s promises, according to the 
Qur’an, always come true.  Death and the afterlife in the semantics of the Qur’an are intimately 
                                                          
182 Izutsu, 78. 
183 Ibid, 131-134.  The pre-Islamic Arabian notion of time-as-destiny was also known by several other names, such 
as zaman, ‘asr, ayyam, and ‘awd.  But the underlying conception was always the same. 
184 For Machiavelli, Fortuna controls half of our actions, and princely greatness consists half in the prince’s great 
ability/half in receiving favor from Fortuna.  These points form the basis of Machiavelli’s metaphorical 
recommendation to be violent and audacious (rather than cautious) when dealing with ‘her.’ See Niccolo 
Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter 25 (“What Fortune Can Affect in Human Affairs and How to Withstand Her”) in 
Quentin Skinner and Russel Price, eds.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
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connected to the aforementioned concepts (creation and human destiny), through the highest 
ranking focus word “God.”  This is true of all the other focus words which constitute the basic 
metaphysical worldview of the Islamic faith (i.e. signs, human faculties, warnings/glad tidings, 
belief/disbelief, divine guidance, the way, worship, revelation, the realms of existence, mercy, 
and justice, etc.).185  Tawhid enjoys – conceptually, practically, spiritually, legally, discursively, 
institutionally, etc. – a defining position in the Islamic tradition. 
 In light of the claims made by Smith, Masuzawa and Cavanaugh about the modern 
origins of the concept of ‘religion,’ din appears as something distinct.  An understanding of 
Islam as din is incommensurate with Islam as a (privatized, disembodied) religion.  It is 
consistent to follow the modern definition of religion to the conclusion that religion can be 
strictly separated from politics and economics, and that the secular state rightfully legislates the 
outermost limits and possibilities of social relations.  However, when an alternative definition of 
Islam is taken, i.e. Islam as din, it is theoretically unfeasible to accept these conclusions.  Tawhid 
reigns over the domain of life and thought and becomes the primary and ultimate source of 
legality and morality in an interconnected way.  This does not preclude obedience to ‘secular’ 
‘political’ authority;186 but it does preclude the metaphysical pretensions of the modern state in 
                                                          
185 See Izutsu chapters 5, 6 and 7.  I will not elaborate on these concepts in order to focus on tawhid and its 
relation to Islam as din (distinct from ‘religion’ in the modern sense).  The illustrations above – pertaining to the 
four relations between God and the human, creation, and human destiny – should suffice to make the point that 
tawhid pervades the Islamic worldview and reigns over its metaphysical framework. 
186 Those who accept the Qur’an’s authority are obligated, by Chapter 4 (‘The Women’), verse 59, to obey the 
authority of God, the Prophet, and “those from among you who have been entrusted with authority.” (All English 
translations of the Qur’an are from Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, Gibraltar: Dar-al-Andalus, 1980).  
In the first centuries of Islam, this verse was interpreted as a sanction of the spiritual authority of pious people and 
the military authority of regionally appointed forces.  See for example Asma Afsaruddin, “Obedience to Political 
Authority: An Evolutionary Concept,” in M. A. Muqtedar Khan ed., Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates 
and Philosophical Perspectives.  Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006: 37-60.  Afsaruddin examines Qur’an 4:59 in light 
of several “semantic expansions” of the verse that have occurred throughout Islamic history.  She argues against 
modernist and Orientalist accounts of obedience to political authority in Islam as conducive to despotism.  
Additionally, it should be noted that the Qur’an posits a dialectic interaction between contingent political 
authority, which can be just or unjust, and Divine authority, which is paramount.  The story of Moses being sent to 
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its monopoly over law, violence and the power over life and death.187  Tawhid is the necessary 
sieve through which the justness/unjustness of contingent socio-political realities are to be 
filtered.  According to this interpretation, the Qur’anic worldview could not admit of Islam as a 
(sole) matter of (disembodied) conscience. 
 
 It should now be appreciable that Muslim engagements with universal human rights that 
operationalize an Islam-as-din perspective will produce different theory than those who espouse 
the modern concept of ‘religion.’  All of the engagements generate reasoned arguments 
pertaining to human rights norms in the language of the Islamic tradition, i.e. they all interpret 
the imperatives in the sacred sources from within the Qur’anic worldview (in its broadest sense), 
and translate those imperatives into the social, political, economic, etc. questions of our time.  
However, despite this shared rootedness in the Qur’an and the general Islamic worldview, 
Muslim thinkers are producing a variety of human rights arguments (the subject of the next two 
chapters).  It is my argument in this thesis that human rights is not universal on account of the 
discourse’s secular foundation, and that this can be seen through a survey of Muslim 
engagements with the subject.  Though I have sampled only a small survey (five thinkers from 
each position, and this in order to treat their arguments in some detail), the scholars divide rather 
consistently across the ‘religion’/din divide.  That is, thinkers who espouse a modern definition 
of religion advocate human rights, while thinkers who see Islam as din challenge them. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Pharaoh is a potent example: “And exalt not yourselves against God: for, verily, I come unto you with a manifest 
authority [from Him];” (44:19); “And in [the story of Pharaoh and] Moses, too, [We left the same message: for] 
when We sent him unto Pharaoh with [Our] manifest authority,” (51:38). 
187 See Wael Hallaq on premodern paradigmatic shari’a and the essential characteristics of the modern state, p. 91-
94 and 103 above. 
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 In this chapter I have demonstrated that the universal human right to freedom of religion 
employs a modern definition of ‘religion,’ one that is secular.  Religion in the modern sense is a 
political category, insofar as it delineates the limits of religion vis-à-vis the state’s authority and 
power.  It is a psycho-social category, as it forms subjectivities and norms governing social 
relations according to the presumed moral autonomy of each individual.  The modern concept of 
religion also has institutional aspects, to the extent that it mitigates what rights the family and 
organized religion can legitimately exercise over subject-citizens of a state.  In all these 
mediations, we can read that the philosophical anthropology, or theory of the human being, at 
work in universal human rights is distinctly secular. 
The secular, as Talal Asad has persuasively argued, is a field of power with discursive 
and institutional aspects.  Our modern grammars of ‘agency’ and the ‘social,’ for example, are 
not universal, natural or essential.  Rather, they are – like all configurations of power – situated 
within particular histories, and – like all knowledge – intimately connected to a particular 
worldview.   
Asad has indicated that the liberal public sphere – important for my purposes because it is 
where debates over human rights norms take place – is constituted by power.188  Certain 
arguments enjoy the force of norms, while other arguments are unfavorable, unpopular, 
villainized, and even prohibited.  Smith, Masuzawa and Cavanaugh are able to stand at a critical 
historical distance from the colonial past and the nineteenth century’s epistemic shifts to 
pronounce the connections between the invention of religion and the world religions discourse 
on the one hand, with Enlightenment values, discourses of othering and geopolitics on the other.  
But what about today?  What discursive and political power does the concept ‘religion’ inscribe 
today?  It would not be hard to imagine, according to liberal democratic principles, secular and 
                                                          
188 See my discussion of Talal Asad in ‘The Secular’ above. 
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religious arguments today possessing unequal citizenship in the society of public debate.189  It is 
not difficult to be struck by the relative homogeneity of agenda-setting in human rights activism, 
despite the diversity of religious identities represented.  For this reason, I have found it necessary 
to draw an alternative conceptualization of Islam (din) from its central textual source (the 
Qur’an), one that would bypass the power and secularity inscribed in ‘religion’ and allow 
dissenting Muslim political voices to participate in the project of human rights while challenging 
it.  If the discourse can bear such an insult, it may be universal.  If it cannot, then perhaps it is 
not. 
In this chapter I have not taken one position against another – whether Islam is a religion 
in the modern sense or is din – but have tried to unsettle the category ‘religion’ itself in order to 
challenge the universality claims of human rights.  There are other ideas about what it means to 
be human, the scope of political authority, the place of morality in law and what Plato theorized 
as the vision of the good.190  Only once we accept that alternative philosophical frameworks can 
legitimately discuss human rights – not alternative cultural or religious terminologies that 
nonetheless concede to the liberal semantic/logic implicit in secular human rights – can the 
universal potential of human rights be critically gauged.  In the next two chapters, I apply the 
theoretical dislocations of this chapter to contemporary Muslim political arguments about human 
rights. 
                                                          
189 See chapter 2, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” for a discussion of Habermas and Rawls on 
the legitimacy of religious arguments in the public sphere. 
190 See Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought.  Expanded Ed., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004: chapters 1 and 2. 
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Chapter 4: Muslim Approaches to Human Rights I – Islam as Religion in the Modern 
Sense 
Many Muslim thinkers today mediate the relationship between Islam and universal 
human rights by posing Islam as a religion in the modern sense of the term.  This involves 
defining Islam primarily as a set of beliefs, the proper domain of which is the individual’s private 
conscience.  In this way, the modern sense of religion is a disembodied concept, detached from 
the premodern emphasis (as for example in premodern Christianity) on habitus, disciplinary 
practices and the authority of the Church orders.1  In the modern rendition, the aspect of 
communal control of religion is, at best, a secondary feature, addressed as the aggregate of 
individuals’ contributions and often subsumed under identity politics.  The religious individual 
is, at bottom, making a morally autonomous choice.  Thinkers who characterize Islam as a 
religion in the modern sense call for epistemological reform of the Islamic tradition, pertaining to 
how – and by whom – religious sources are to be interpreted. 
This approach to Islam and human rights prescribes a notably modern distinction between 
the public and private spheres, where religion’s proper place is the latter.  The state, as such, 
must not interfere in people’s private religious beliefs, and people in turn must not coerce any 
aspect of the public sphere to accord with religion.  To be religiously ‘neutral,’ the state must be 
secular.  These thinkers argue that the secular democratic state is the best, most rational political 
configuration for Muslim societies, and the one best suited for the free, full practice of their faith.  
In such a scheme the universal human right of freedom of religion that is embodied in liberal 
democracies sufficiently addresses the rights of religious individuals.  In the tension between 
                                                          
1 See Cavanaugh, 62-69.  See ‘Religion’ section above for my Cavanaugh’s discussion of premodern religio. 
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national sovereignty and supranational norms, this approach takes a cosmopolitan approach to 
international public law, stressing the authority of supranational norms.2 
 In this chapter I will analyze the arguments of five prominent contemporary Muslim 
scholars participating in the Western public intellectual debate.  Abdolkarim Saroush, Abdullahi 
An-Na’im, Fatima Mernissi, Jerusha Tanner Lamptey and Abdulaziz Sachedina advocate 
universal human rights, particularly with regard to secular democracy, religious pluralism and 
women’s rights.  Their arguments involve positing Islam as religion in the modern sense of the 
term.  For each of the thinkers, there is an intimate connection between reconfiguring traditional 
Islamic epistemology and emancipatory politics – and both are mediated by universal human 
rights. 
 
The Expansion and Contraction of Knowledge 
Abdolkarim Saroush is a former professor of philosophy at Tehran University (Iran) and 
is considered the foremost thinker of Iran’s religious intellectual movement.  He has published 
over twenty books on Western, Persian and Islamic philosophy, ethics and science, and has 
guest-lectured in prestigious universities around the world.  In Reason, Freedom, and 
Democracy in Islam, Abdolkarim Saroush expresses the desirability of secularizing the Muslim 
world without necessarily profaning its culture.  This shows Saroush’s desire to secularize along 
the European experience of separation of church and state, as a necessary and novel 
development to premodern institutionalizations of the shari’a that admitted of no such 
                                                          
2 See chapter 2 above, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” in which I present Peter Danchin’s 
characterization of cosmopolitanism, liberal anti-pluralism, and supranational norms on the one hand, and 
traditional national sovereignty on the other, in the debate over the authority of public international law. 
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dichotomy.3  His major contribution is the proposal to reform Islamic epistemology by 
distinguishing between perfect religion and necessarily imperfect human knowledge about 
religion.  In this scheme, religious knowledge is: 
“…like other forms of knowledge, subject to all the attributes of knowledge.  It is human, fallible, 
evolving, and most important of all, it is constantly in the process of exchange with other forms of 
knowledge.  As such, its inevitable transformations mirror the transformation of science and other 
domains of human knowledge… subject to change, exchange, contraction, and expansion.”4 
 
This is Saroush’s theory of the expansion and contraction of religious knowledge.  Saroush 
promotes the use of extrareligious concepts (such as human rights, democracy and liberty), 
which he says are “authentic and autonomously significant,” and can “even affect the 
understanding of religion itself.”5  He characterizes the major epistemological difference 
between the traditional and modern viewpoints as follows.  In traditional thinking, things have 
their natural places within the natural order, and this is the best ordering.  Things tend back 
towards their natural places – remedies restore things back to their natural states – making 
humans like passive objects.  Modern thinking, on the other hand, is architectural.  It changes the 
ordering of things to improve it.  The scientific worldview leads to ambition, which allows 
humankind to reshape the world in its own image.  The human is an active subject.  He illustrates 
the distinction between premodern and modern epistemology with the following example: 
“Modern surgery not only removes and replaces organs, but it stands ready to discuss a better 
design and order for the human body.  The intervention is no longer purely medical but 
architectural…Modern humankind has assumed the role of an aggressive and active agent in the 
                                                          
3 For a characterization of premodern shari’a, see Hallaq, 48-69.  See also p. 86-89 and 98 above.  According to 
Hallaq, the shari’a in its premodern configurations was “a colossal project of building a moral-legal empire whose 
foundational and structural impulse is summed up in the ever-continuing attempt to discover God’s moral will…the 
dialectic between the sociological and the metaphysical, between the Community as a worldly society and its 
persistent attempts to locate itself in a particular moral cosmology.  But this realism about the world was always 
placed in a metaphysical context, just as this metaphysics was constantly teased out in the realism of mundane 
existence.” (Hallaq, 51) 
4 See Mahmoud and Ahmad Sadri.  Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of ‘Abdolkarim 
Saroush.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 16. 
5 Ibid, 22. 
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world, whereas traditional humankind perceived itself as a guest in a ready-made house, in which 
the occupant had no opportunity or right to object or to change anything.”6 
 
 Though Saroush states that his task is merely to describe and not evaluate the process 
from tradition to modernity, his own position clearly favors a secular modernity strengthened by 
science.  He maintains that the “story of secularism is the story of nonreligious reason; a reason 
which is neither religious nor antireligious.”7  Saroush claims that the proof of material science’s 
accurate reflection of reality lies in its mastery of manipulating nature,8 being the very “mirror of 
reality and a guide to action.”9  Humanity should not neglect such a marvelous tool, which has 
“splashed novel colors over the worn-out mat of our existence.”10  Rejecting science betrays a 
narrow-mindedness reminiscent of the Dark Ages.  Rather, we should accommodate science, 
“because the values that encourage science are the same values that encourage development.  
Nature-conquering, ambitious, truth-seeking…science has given skepticism a higher status than 
the ancients’ certitude…mutinous and ambitious…because of its alliance with technology, it has 
become self-augmenting and self-developing, so that it cannot survive except through the medium 
of highly competitive and cooperative communities that are not only truth-seeking but skeptical, 
ambitious, and arrogant…Skepticism, tolerance, competition, and ambition should be revered as 
the four heavenly streams that keep the meadows of science and the orchards of development alive 
and green.”11 
 
Moral values adhere to Saroush’s epistemology, wherein he seems to adopt the liberal premise of 
the evolutionary advance of universal reason in history.  Taking Hegel’s Reason in History as a 
paradigmatic example, evolutionism seems to become the first premise of universal history.  
According to Hegel, the march of history was a teleological ascension from humanity’s infancy 
to its wise maturity.12  Universal Reason was a driving force which, through dialectical 
correspondence, moved from stage to stage towards the final goal.  Saroush, consistent with 
Hegel’s notion of reason in history, posits traditional religious humanity as timid, fatalist 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 55. 
7 Ibid, 68. 
8 He asks, “Can a totally subjective and instrumental pseudo-epistemology…be so successful in practice?”  Ibid, 51. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 52. 
12 See G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right.  Transl. S. W. Dyde.  Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001, p. 266-272. 
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subjects of religious despotism, and secular moderns as rationally active and self-ruling agents.  
The secularization of ethics brought about the demystification of the natural law of cause and 
effect, and a rearrangement of ethics such that spiritual perfection was redirected towards earthly 
happiness and traditional ‘sins’ (i.e. cupidity, ambition, materialism) became fuel for progress.13  
According to Saroush, this had great implications for human happiness: 
“…modern utilitarianism turned this wild beast of accidental and irrational happiness…into an 
obedient, domesticated animal.  Ethical axioms were evaluated in terms of their ability to ensure 
public happiness, pleasure, and welfare.  Rational calculation dispelled the chaos, insecurity, and 
lack of causality that dominated the world of ethics and happiness and kept the world in confusion 
and sorrows.”14 
 
The picture painted by Saroush of the premodern world is very bleak.  Human beings 
were duty-bound, mired in religious and other obligations.  But modern humanity became a class 
of liberated rights-bearers.  Whereas world-flight was considered virtuous before, world-mastery 
became the new virtue.  This transformation in values “removed the fetters from the hands and 
feet of humanity and prepared it to enter into the fields of development.”15  Here we come to 
Saroush’s strong endorsement of modern science.  While he criticizes positivism and claims that 
science is not synonymous with it,16 he fails to give an accurate description of what modern 
science, minus positivism, would actually be.  What we can take away from Saroush is that 
modern science is an instrument of acquiring truth, as are history and religion: 
“To paraphrase the late Iqbal Lahori, religion has now found two new rivals: human science and 
history.  In other words, there are three sources of discovery of the truth now available to human 
beings.  The difficult task for contemporary humanity is to reconcile these three sources.”17 
 
It is possible to argue that, historically, Islamic epistemology has always included 
correspondence with living history and specialized fields of inquiry (i.e. sciences).18  The 
                                                          
13 Saroush, in Sadri, 41. 
14 Ibid, 41-42. 
15 Ibid, 43. 
16 He states, “Positivism was rooted in two tenets: the denial of the historicity of science and reason and the belief 
in the possibility of unmediated, that is, non-theory-laden and naked observation… Positivism should be defeated, 
but not at the expense of overthrowing science and reason.”  Ibid, 50. 
17 Ibid, 71. 
120 
 
difference between the premodern norm and what Saroush is proposing would be whether tawhid 
constitutes the first articulated premise of every line of inquiry or not.19  Saroush is restricting the 
‘truth value’ of tawhid as a philosophical premise to the body of religious knowledge – separate 
from history and the physical sciences.  According to Saroush, in the move from traditional 
thought to modern, “the essences of things” gradually “gained autonomy from God…God was 
no longer the creator of essences but the agent of their realization.”20  The implications of this 
metaphysical move for epistemology and science cannot be understated, and are worth quoting at 
length: 
“One must not underestimate the disenchantment that follows from the introduction of such 
concepts as ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ into the worldview of believers.  If we assume an essence for 
something, we can not help but remove it from the universe of religion since it can not have two 
essences at once.  Water, for instance, has a given essence.  Thus we cannot have a religious 
water…and an irreligious one.  The same would apply to justice, government, science, philosophy, 
and so on.  It is as impossible to imagine an Islamic or Christian philosophy or sociology, as it is 
to conceive of an essentially religious government.”21 
 
 For Saroush, then, there can be no ‘Islamic political theory’ per se.  Only political theory, 
and religious knowledge of Islam.  To this end, among the highest benefits of secularism was its 
“‘scientification’ and rationalization of social and political thought and deliberation,” without 
which “humanity would have lingered in the traditional world…”22  An important premise in 
Saroush’s theory of the contraction and expansion of religious knowledge is that all truths are 
commensurate.  This means that the truth value of a political theory will be evident when the 
judgment of history pronounces so, and may incidentally be confirmed by religious knowledge.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 See for example Ziauddin Sardar, How Do You Know?  Reading Ziauddin Sardar on Islam, Science and Cultural 
Relations.  Introduced and edited by Ehsan Masood.  London: Pluto Press, 2006.  Particularly chapter 7, “Muslims 
and Philosophy of Science.”  For a more historically detailed account of medieval Sunni epistemology, see Osman 
Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in Islamic Philosophies of Science.  Cambridge: Islamic Texts 
Society, 1998. 
19 See chapter 3 above, “Religion, the Secular and Din,” for an exposition of the meaning of tawhid (Divine unity).  
20 Saroush, in Sadri, 65. 
21 Ibid, 66. 
22 Ibid, 57. 
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If there is contradiction – and there can’t be contradiction between two truths as all truths are 
commensurate – then either the religious or scientific knowledge must be reformed. 
 Saroush’s epistemological postulates lead him to constitutional democratic – though not 
necessarily liberal – politics, and a full endorsement of the mediating role of universal human 
rights.  He aims to establish the validity of a political system for Muslim majority states that 
enjoys the freedoms of modern democratic governments, while not ignoring the existence of God 
in the way secular liberal societies do.  Such a project would involve reconciling the people’s 
satisfaction with God’s approval, balancing religious and nonreligious spheres of life, and 
acknowledging the due of both human beings and religion.  As such, a religious government’s 
democratic worth would be measured by its partaking in collective wisdom and its respect for 
human rights.23 
Religious democracy would entail, says Saroush, the coalescence of reason (‘aql) and 
revelation (shar’).  Scholars must balance knowledge of religion with other knowledge, 
particularly since many values are integral to nonreligious systems.  Upholding rationality is a 
religious obligation, and must take the form of collective, public participation and experience – 
hence the need for democratic methods.  Religion is to serve as the guide and arbiter of 
problems, while collective reason is to dictate the understanding of religion.  The discourse on 
human rights, in such a context, would be among the necessary and intrinsically valuable extra-
religious discourses.24 
In this scheme, Saroush seemingly promotes the idea of a universal rationality, 
independent of religion or any other tradition.  He states that “justice, as a value, can not be 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 122-126. 
24 Ibid. p. 126-129. 
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religious.  It is religion that has to be just.”25  This statement, the promotion of an extrareligious 
value as the criteria for gaging religious understanding, can also be interpreted as a cosmopolitan 
endorsement of supranational norms above and beyond national sovereignty (in this case, the 
sovereignty of the religious community, or umma).  The promotion of a religion must be 
rationalized so that “epistemological pluralism – the centerpiece of democratic action” – can be 
realized.26  For Muslim societies, democracy and liberalism must be delinked so that democracy 
can be adopted without the baggage of the liberal rebellion against religion and metaphysics.  In 
fact, according to Saroush, Islam lends itself to democracy, by way of common ground in areas 
of tolerance for other viewpoints and their advocates, and the inalienable freedom of faith. 
As further testimony of the Islamic tolerance, or even imperative, for democracy, Saroush 
underlines the private essence of faith, though it may be expressed publicly.  His vision in this 
regard is as follows: 
“Like wild flowers in nature, faith will grow and flourish wherever it wishes and in whatever 
fragrance and color it pleases.  The faithful community is more like a wild grove than a manicured 
garden.  It owes the fragrance of its faith to this wild, independent spirit.  To harness this spirit is 
to strangle it.  It is in this sense that a religious society, based upon free faith, dynamic 
understanding, and individual presence before God, cannot be but democratic.”27 
 
To balance out the religious and nonreligious, the scales of religious democracy would be 
calibrated by the contraction and expansion of religious knowledge (in the spheres of 
jurisprudence, law, theology, etc.) along with changing historical needs.  This is because: 
“Religious jurisprudence, however divine and ahistorical its origins, inevitably becomes historical 
and assumes a worldly application…[we must] establish independent moral standards (such as 
public interest and justice) in interpreting religious law…”28 
 
Religion will continue, however, to enrich reason and democratic potential with values, moral 
precepts, and checks and balances. 
                                                          
25 Ibid. p. 131. 
26 Ibid. p. 133. 
27 Ibid. p. 143. 




The Secular State and Shari’a 
 In contrast to Saroush’s endorsement of a ‘religious democracy’ for Muslims is Abdullahi 
an-Na’im’s emphatic advocacy for secular democracy as the best, most rational and only 
religious freedom-enabling political system.  An-Na’im is professor of law at Emory University, 
and has authored and edited dozens of works on Islam, African politics, human rights and family 
law.  In Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a, An-Na’im calls on 
Muslims to take up the desirability – from an Islamic point of view – of a secular state that is 
neutral regarding religion and non-religion and which adheres to a constitution that protects 
human rights.29  The methodological supports of his argument are “an eclectic set of sources: 
sociology of religion, Islamic history, his own conception of Islamic theology, liberal political 
philosophy, political science and the lived experience of Muslims and non-Muslims sharing the 
same political space over the last few hundred years.”30  These include arguments made by 
contemporary reformers and polling data.  Resonating with Saroush’s argument to secularize 
Muslim societies without profaning their culture, An-Na’im describes his proposal in the 
following terms: 
“My call for the state, and not society, to be secular is intended to enhance and promote genuine 
religious observance, to affirm, nurture, and regulate the role of Islam in the public life of the 
community.  Conversely, I will argue that the claim of a so-called Islamic state to coercively 
enforce Shari’a repudiates the foundational role of Islam in the socialization of children and the 
sanctification of social institutions and relationships.”31 
 
                                                          
29 Abdullahi An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a.  Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
30 Mohammad Fadel.  “Islamic Politics and Secular Politics – Can They Coexist?”  Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 
25, No. 1, (2009-2010): 187-204; 192. 
31 An-Na’im (2008), 1. 
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Like Saroush’s arguments in favor of the free flourishing of faith versus its suffocation in the 
manicured garden of institutionalized religion,32 An-Na’im’s proposal highlights the necessity of 
an unrestricted environment for the free operation of faith.  An-Na’im’s proposal implies four 
fundamental assumptions: 
1. The modern state is given.  Its monopoly over law and enforcement is given.  Its 
regulatory power over religious institutions is given; 
2. The state by definition cannot formally acknowledge different classes of people or favor 
one religion over others; its equal application of the rule of law is given; 
3. A secular state allows shari’a to operate as an institution; the shari’a can be represented 
as a codified body of positive law within institutionalized limits and still retain the 
original concept or true meaning of shari’a; and  
4. If allowed to operate at the state level, historical shari’a will violate basic liberal values, 
“such as male guardianship of women (qiwama), sovereignty over non-Muslims 
(dhimma) and wars of expansion (jihad) which are irreconcilable with the requirements 
of constitutionalism, human rights and citizenship.”33 
This last point is the reason why an ‘Islamic’ ‘state’ could never be.  The contradiction is 
presented as the incommensurability of qiwama, dhimma, and military jihad on the one hand, 
with constitutionalism, human rights and citizenship on the other.  In so positing, An-Na’im’s 
account takes the modern state’s toolkit for granted: formal equality amongst citizens, monopoly 
over law and force, and regulatory oversight into religious institutions.  The conclusions of these 
premises for An-Nai’m’s proposal for ‘negotiating the future of shari’a’ are that Islamic sources 
must be reformed to accommodate endorsement of the secular state, constitutionalism and 
                                                          
32 See p. 122 above. 
33 An-Na’im (2008), 39. 
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human rights norms.  An-Na’im expressly wishes to include non-Muslims in the negotiations 
about the future of shari’a.34 
 According to An-Na’im, since politics is the realm of interests, the state must be 
protected from capture by factional interest groups.  Islamic political parties that respect 
constitutionalism, human rights and citizenship will advance policies in line with those norms.  
He distinguishes between the shari’a (in its essence?) and the political interpretations of the 
shari’a which, in factional politics, will vie with each other for domination over the others.  In 
this way An-Na’im is providing a rationale for streamlining Islamic political life through the 
institutionalized avenues of what is called, in liberal contexts, political participation.  His 
discussion of shari’a focuses on “the public role of Shari’a, not matters of religious doctrine and 
ritual practice in the private, personal domain.”35  Shari’a being simply “the religious law of 
Islam,”36 its public role can and must be channeled through institutionalization and regulation by 
the state, which is for An-Na’im a neutral, rational, self-correcting apparatus.37  In this way, An-
Na’im promotes a modern conceptualization of Islam as religion, such that religion is a set of 
private beliefs, separate from politics except through the avenues sanctioned by the state (i.e. 
‘political participation’).  His posting of a neutral state authority to oversee the institutions of 
religion implies that religion represents socially disembodied doctrines rather than the interplay 
of creedal doctrines with the lived historical experiences of believers. 
An-Na’im holds that the shari’a must be observed voluntarily in order to enjoy a 
foundational role in influencing ethical norms and values.  Through democratic participation, 
                                                          
34 Tariq Ramadan also argues for the inclusion of non-Muslim scholars and experts in his Islamic epistemological 
reform proposal.  See Radical Reform:  Islamic Ethics and Liberation.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.  
Particularly chapters 8, “The Context (al-Waqi’) as a Source of Law,” 9, “The Growing Complexity of the Real,” and 
10, “Elaborating an Applied Islamic Ethics.” 
35 An-Na’im (2008), vii. 
36 Ibid, 1. 
37 For an alternative understanding of shari’a, see chapter 3, specifically Hallaq’s account. 
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public policy can become imbued with the moral standpoint nurtured by shari’a observance.  
Shari’a principles, therefore, “cannot be enacted and enforced by the state as public law and 
public policy” because “the outcome will necessarily be the political will of the state and not the 
religious law of Islam.”38  In other words, the institutional separation of Islam and the state (as 
opposed to Islam and politics) is needed because the state must regulate religion in order to 
maintain its own neutrality above the sea of competing forces.  An-Na’im relies for his proposal 
on a modernist definition of law, one that allows division between its ethical-moral philosophy 
and the translation of such principles into positive content.  He claims that all historical attempts 
at codifying shari’a in which the state favors one madhhab, or jurisprudential school, over others, 
failed miserably.39  An-Na’im’s argument presumes that premodern usul al-fiqh (principles of 
jurisprudence) developed by the madhhahib (plural of madhhab) did not assign a role to 
extrareligious knowledge.  It also characterizes the shari’a primarily by its institutional forms and 
outward manifestations – a privileging of positive law.  This modernist emphasis on shari’a’s 
legalism does not define the shari’a as a complicated moral-legal network, rooted in a 
metaphysic while produced in the community of faith, deeply psychological and wholly 
independent of political power.40 
An-Nai’m proposes that the secular state is necessary for all Muslims, even where they 
constitute the majority.  Given that all state laws and constitutions are based on some 
foundational understanding of the human being, the social contract, rights and duties, etc., An-
Na’im condemns the shari’a’s inability to be fair across the diversity of citizens (again, pointing 
                                                          
38 An-Na’im (2008), 1. 
39 Ibid, 16-17.  An-Na’im claims that the Ottoman experiment in Majalla, in which Hanafi jurisprudence was 
codified in conjunction with elements outside the Hanafi range, was the earliest and most politically authoritative 
example of a success story.  Success was due to the eclectic nature of the sources of law. 
40 This is how Hallaq has characterized premodern shari’a; see chapter 3, ‘Separation of Powers – Rule of Law or 
Rule of State?’ in The Impossible State. 
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to principles of qawama and dhimma).41  His line of reasoning characterizes the modern state as 
neutral.  An-Na’im accepts that maintaining neutrality in the state is a difficult task, but he has 
confidence in the mechanisms of a constitutional democracy to self-correct and mediate this 
tension.  When appropriated and exercised by the citizenry with conviction and rigor, democratic 
participation will help check the interests of those who administer the state.  One example An-
Na’im poses to illustrate the shari’a’s incompatibility with the vehicle of the state is as follows: 
“To establish authoritatively that the state will not and cannot enforce any religious view of 
charging or paying interest on loans (riba) is to ensure the freedom of all citizens to choose to 
practice or avoid interest banking as a matter of personal religious belief.”42 
 
More so, people wishing to avoid it can establish their own systems, under regulatory oversight 
and public scrutiny. 
 Upon closer examination of this claim, there appears a strong endorsement of the 
public/private distinction that relegates religion to the latter.  It restricts religious conviction from 
having any legitimately authoritative transformative power in the public realm, and therefore 
belongs to the modern conception of religion.  In other words, if the system of interest banking in 
its totality (beyond personal participation or avoidance) has results which are serious violations 
of individual and communal religious obligation, Muslims (or any other citizen groupings) may 
frame their decision to partake or eschew interest banking in religious arguments.  But they may 
                                                          
41 For a contrasting view, see Azizah Al-Hibri, “Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy.”  Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1992).  Al-Hibri claims that there is no contradiction 
between a democracy in a Muslim-majority state and having the Qur’an as it’s constitutional basis: Societies 
“historically coalesce around some basic sets of deep values and beliefs that define them as a group.  These sets of 
shared values and beliefs are usually memorialized in a most basic document, like the Constitution of the United 
States or the Magna Carta.  As time passes these documents are reinterpreted and supplemented to highlight an 
issue or resolve a problem.  But through all the decades, the essential character of these documents remains the 
same and best reflects the values of the society that created it…The case is no different in Islam.  The Qur’an is the 
core of the Muslim constitution…Since the Qur’an provides mostly general laws, a Muslim legislature needs to 
promulgate a multitude of laws in the process of governance, just as the U.S. legislature.  And, just as the U.S. 
legislature sometimes discovers, some of these promulgated laws may be ‘unconstitutional’, i.e. they may run 
contrary to the Qur’an.  The Muslims who would have the power of ‘judicial review’ in the Muslim state would be 
those of a judicial majlis shura…Other mujtahids outside the majlis, like their American counterparts, i.e. the 
constitutional scholars, can contribute to the discussion.” (17-18) 
42 An-Na’im (2008), 35. 
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not religiously organize any coercion around their criticism of the institution or its role in 
national and global economies.  The state that decides to economically operate under the terms of 
neoliberal economics – presumably on the decision of the majority of its constituents who share 
(i.e. participate) in the political decision-making process – is presumed neutral.  The rival bids of 
politics to dominate the state structure, according to An-Na’im, represent its built-in self-
correcting mechanism, maintaining its delicate and elusive neutrality. 
Whether interest banking as a whole, systemically, violates certain individual and 
communal Muslim obligations, and whether Muslims may frame their opposition to the 
institution in a religious perspective, is not specifically taken up by An-Na’im.  The only answer 
that can be inferred is that religion’s role will be institutionalized – regulated, limited and 
bureaucratized – by a neutral and self-correcting state that will heed to articulations of justice, 
fairness and equality. 
On the idea of the shari’a at the state level, An-Na’im states that neither shari’a nor fiqh 
(jurisprudence) can form the basis, since both are articulations of human understanding.  The 
implication here is that constitutional law and process, also products of human understanding, 
are protected from the inadequacies of religious thought.  In this way, An-Na’im resounds 
Saroush’s praise for scientific, rational thought.  His argument seems “to assume the existence of 
an intermediate set of state institutions that do not reflect perfectly normative liberal doctrines 
regarding constitutionalism, citizenship and human rights, but nevertheless create enough space 
for genuinely competitive and pluralistic politics.”43  This seems to enact a neutralist approach to 
                                                          
43 Fadel, 195. 
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liberalism, which posits the liberal order as a hospitable, empty box in which any culture, 
tradition, way of life, worldview, etc. is welcome to pursue its dream.44 
In a subsequent work, An-Na’im devotes considerable attention to Muslim participation 
in American democratic politics.45  Muslims must reform their understanding of the relationship 
between their overlapping identities as Muslims and American citizens.  In order to secure 
benefits and advance their priorities, American Muslims must move beyond minority politics to 
take full advantage of the politics of equal citizenship.  He states: 
“To American Muslims, then, here is my charge: Recognize that it is possible to engage in 
deliberate integration into the social, political, and cultural life of the United States at large, rather 
than retreating into helpless and passive assimilation.”46 
 
An-Na’im enjoins fellow American Muslim citizens to become proactive agents of social 
change.  This involves reconfiguring the relationship between shari’a and American law.  
Because legal pluralism would not offer a viable arrangement,47 the solution is instead to be 
sought in normative pluralism.  In such an arrangement, various normative systems are neither 
oppositionally posited nor hierarchically arranged, such that “state law and religious norms are 
two different and separate types of normative systems; we should not create confusion by 
labeling all of them ‘law’…Normally they operate in different spheres…”48  What this would 
mean for American Muslims, as for all other religious adherents, is that “believers should be free 
to live by their own understanding of Sharia, as long as that understanding is practiced 
                                                          
44 See chapter 2 above, ‘Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,’ for Galeotti’s work on the neutralist 
and perfectionist approaches to liberal toleration. 
45 Chapter 1, “Identity and Citizenship: Beyond Minority Politics” and chapter 5, “What is an American Muslim?  
Looking Forward” in unpublished manuscript, shared by Samira Haj. 
46 Ibid, 22. 
47 An-Na’im proposes that the problems with legal pluralism are twofold: “communal autonomy through legal 
pluralism does not work for those who lack an institutionalized hierarchical organization that can speak on their 
behalf.  This risk is particularly relevant to the case of American Muslims, because of their internal religious 
diversity and lack of centralized hierarchical religious leadership.”  Secondly, legal pluralism “does not distinguish 
between a binding, authoritative system that one cannot opt out of – which is the case with the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state - and a religious or cultural normative system, which one may or may not choose to comply 
with.” Ibid., 39. 
48 Ibid., 40. 
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voluntarily in the communities, including community-based mediation and arbitration of 
disputes, without invoking the coercive authority of the state.”49  For An-Na’im, this specifically 
involves revamping ijtihad, which is jurisprudential reasoning independent of direct precedent, 
to broaden the pool of people who can perform it by relaxing the traditionally accepted 
qualifications required to do so. 
 The epistemological reform proposed by An-Na’im in this and other works is not 
tangential but central to his secular democratic and human rights-focused politics.  In “Islam and 
International Law: Toward a Positive Mutual Engagement to Realize Shared Ideals,” An-Na’im 
states that his purpose “is to affirm and promote the legitimacy and efficacy of international law 
as the indispensable means for realizing universal ideals of peace, development, and the 
protection of human rights, everywhere.”50  Because every Islamic position is necessarily 
contingent – contextual, interpretative – Muslims “can fully engage international law as an 
integral aspect of the context and experience of those societies.”51  Elsewhere, An-Na’im 
contends that since human rights reflect “the positive and normative side of what globalization 
offers,” Muslims should utilize its norms to gage their social and political realities as well as 
focus their activism.52 
In yet another earlier work, An-Na’im directly indicates that human rights reform among 
Muslims must begin with a reinterpretation of the shari’a.53  The basic problem areas he 
identifies Muslims face with regard to human rights, as indicated in Islam and the Secular State, 
                                                          
49 Ibid., 42. 
50 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Lama Abu Odeh.  “Islam and International Law: Toward a Positive Mutual 
Engagement to Realize Shared Ideals.”  Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International 
Law), Vol. 98 (MARCH 31-APRIL 3, 2004): 159-168; 160. 
51 Ibid, 164. 
52 Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Problems of Dependency: Human Rights Organizations in the Arab World.”  Middle East 
Report, no. 214, Spring 2000: 20-23 and 46-47; 22. 
53 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Text-Human Rights in the Muslim World,” in Patrick Hayden, ed., The Philosophy of 
Human Rights.  St. Paul: Paragon House, 2001. 
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are equality and nondiscrimination across gender and religion.  He identifies the shari’a as 
reflecting specific historical interpretations of Islam’s scriptural imperatives.54  A modern shari’a 
can and must therefore be developed, one that is in line with human rights.  He bases his 
proposal for a reform methodology on the thought of Mohamed Taha, the twentieth-century 
Sudanese religious scholar whose thesis in The Second Message of Islam claimed a new Qur’anic 
exegesis that would characterize Meccan verses as timeless and Medinan verses as historically 
specific and therefore abrogated in the present day.  (Taha was executed by the Sudanese 
government in 1985 on charges of apostasy.)  An-Na’im calls for an interpretation of primary 
sources within their historical contexts.  In so doing, modern Muslims can reconfigure emphases 
within sources.55  He calls for ijtihad to be expanded in scope to allow certain Qur’anic verses to 
be enacted over others, despite the categorical nature of all verses. 
For An-Na’im, the community of Islam must conduct epistemological reform – 
particularly through new understandings of the practice of ijtihad – to arrive at norms that are 
consistent with human rights, particularly secular constitutional democracy and women’s rights.  
He frames this reform as reform of the shari’a.  An-Na’im also advocates for secular 
constitutional democracy to be the choice political arrangement among Muslim-majority states.  
In his argument for why this is optimal – that is, only such a state would allow the freedom of 
faith necessary for meaningful belief and practice – he puts forward Islam as a religion in the 
modern sense of the term, specifically in the sense of strictly separating the religious life from 
the authority of the state, subjecting the former to the tutelage of the latter, while trusting the 
state to be fair and neutral and provide adequate institutional channels for redress. 
 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 319-323. 
55 Ibid., 331. 
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Democracy and Women’s Rights at the Hands of Male Elites 
 The late feminist writer and sociologist Fatima Mernissi addressed issues of democracy 
in the Muslim world and Muslim women’s rights with a strong advocacy of human rights.  
Mernissi taught at Mohammed V University (Morocco) and published over a dozen works on 
gender, Islamic feminism and democracy.  Like Abdullahi An-Na’im, Fatima Mernissi positively 
values human rights as a normative model for reforming Muslim attitudes toward democracy and 
women’s rights.  Like Abdolkarim Saroush, Mernissi employs a modernist historical approach to 
characterize the progressive advances scientific modernity has made over traditional 
worldviews.56  She distinguishes between textual Islam – namely the Qur’an and the life of the 
Prophet of Islam – and the Islamic tradition, which she describes as having been co-opted by a 
male elite for fifteen centuries.57  Mernissi characterizes the Islamic religious heritage as one of 
censorship.58  In a subsequent work, she speaks of the historical struggle between the pen and the 
sword as epic: 
“…that is, the struggle between, on the one hand, the intellectuals, the qadis (judges) thirsting for 
justice, the Sufis thirsting for freedom, and the poets who tried to express their individuality; and, 
on the other hand, the caliphs and their shari’a, their very authoritarian reading of divine law.”59 
 
This is part of the broader characterization in Mernissi’s thought of the imams as despotic and 
self-interested.  She goes as far as to claim that:  
“Islam is probably the only monotheistic religion in which scholarly exploration is systematically 
discouraged, if not forbidden, since rational analysis would not serve the purposes of the 
despots.”60  
                                                          
56 My analysis of Mernissi’s thought and its relationship to positing Islam as a religion in the modern sense of the 
term is noticeably more detailed than my treatment of Saroush and An-Na’im.  This is because unlike the other two 
thinkers discussed thusfar in this chapter, Mernissi addresses the issues of women’s rights in Islam at great length.  
For this reason, I believe the discrepancy is qualified.   
57 Mernissi states that women’s rights are problematic for some Muslim men, not because of the Qur’an and 
Sunna (example, way) of the Prophet Muhammad, but because of the interests of a male elite.  See Fatima 
Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam.  Reading: Perseus 
Books, 1991: viii. 
58 Ibid., 16. 
59 Fatima Mernissi.  Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World.  Translated by Mary Jo Lakeland.  Reading: 




 Without providing specific historical examples, Mernissi goes on to speak of the Islamic 
tradition as mired in fifteen centuries of rejecting foreign ideas.61  With the banning of the 
Mu’tazila in the tenth century, two roads emerged for Muslims: the violence and killing 
espoused by the Kharijites, or the advocacy of rational thought represented by the Mu’tazila.62  
The general disdain for reason (‘aql) explains, according to Mernissi, the anti-modern spirit of 
Islam, which tends away from change and toward stagnation.63 
 In this way, Mernissi espouses a modernist historical approach, much like Saroush.64  
This entails positing a sharp epistemological distinction between premodern and modern ways of 
thinking and viewing the world and the human being’s position in it.  Mernissi states that after 
the hijab (the ordaining of the veil during the Prophet’s lifetime) cut short a brief burst of 
freedom and democracy, fifteen centuries would go by before the West would force Islam to 
“reopen the question of the rights of the individual and of women.”65  Such stagnation also 
affected ‘the Arabs,’ who until now thought only of boundaries and their own uniqueness.  But 
now, “they are simply trying to see what the other is.”66  Where traditional Islam emphasized 
obedience, Muslims today must dig up the virtue of reason.67  Much like Saroush, Mernissi 
seems to rely on notions of universal history and its stages, which lines up uncannily with 
Western history: 
“The majority of the colonized countries – that is, the non-Western countries – never experienced 
that phase of history so indispensable to the development of the scientific spirit, during which the 
state and its institutions became the means of transmitting the ideas of tolerance and respect for the 
individual…[resulting in] a virtual cutoff of the Third World from the advances of humanism in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
60 Ibid., 24. 
61 Ibid., 26-27. 
62 Ibid., 32. 
63 Ibid., 95. 
64 See p. 116-122 above. 
65 Mernissi (1991), 188. 
66 Mernissi (1992), 14. 
67 Ibid., 19. 
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the last centuries in both its aspects: the scientific aspect (promoting the use of government 
resources to invest in scientific research and encourage freedom to explore and invent), and the 
political aspect (establishing representative democracy, with citizens’ exercise of the right to vote 
and to participate in political decision-making).”68 
 
Mernissi’s negative characterization of Islamic tradition – as distinct from Islamic textual 
sources – is also at work in her analysis of women’s rights in Islam.  While women enjoyed a 
critical voice in the early Muslim community during the lifetime of the Prophet, they were soon 
to be forced into silent obedience.69  Women in Islam have been the traditional victims, says 
Mernissi, of re-establishing equilibrium during uncertain political times, mostly through shutting 
them out of public participation.70  She elaborates on the traditional place of women in Islam:  
“The traditional enthronement of woman – of her who incarnates the very principle of inequality, 
the basic element of the hierarchy, the alif, the beginning of being, who only exists in terms of a 
relationship of submission to authority – has forced the Muslim in a few decades to face up to 
what Westerners took centuries to digest (and which they still have difficulty doing): democracy 
and the equality of the sexes.”71 
 
These oppressions are caused by male supremacy, specifically through male elites co-opting the 
scholarly tradition and religious texts.  Men have used the sacred to legitimize their sexual and 
political privileges.72  And since male supremacy “can only exist and be consolidated if the 
public/private division is maintained as an almost sacred matter,”73 the hijab became a central 
mission of, and potent symbol for, male elitism. 
Mernissi’s valuation of the hijab in Islam is wholly negative.  She refers to the hijab as: 
the attempt to veil women, an almost phobic attitude towards women stemming from positioning 
the Divine as at odds with the feminine;74 a clung-to solution to complex socio-political 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 46. 
69 Ibid., 2.  Also Mernissi (1991), 35-36. 
70 Mernissi (1992), 9. 
71 Mernissi (1991), 23. 
72 Ibid., 147. 
73 Ibid., 111. 
74 Ibid., 81. 
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problems;75 shutting women out of the world76 and even separating them from God;77 
confinement;78 a retreat from initial equality promised by the Qur’an and the Prophet;79 the 
opposite of internal control and the veiling of a woman’s sovereign will;80 representing the 
triumph of the Medinese Hypocrites who harassed the household of the Prophet;81 marginalizing 
and mutilating;82 a metaphor for much-needed boundaries required by modernity-fearing 
Muslims;83 and sending women back to the kitchen.84 
One way to explain Mernissi’s assessment of the hijab is to contextualize it in her purely 
political definition of ‘Muslim.’  She states categorically: 
“I define being a Muslim as belonging to a theocratic state.  What the individual thinks is 
secondary to this definition…Being Muslim is a civil matter, a national identity, a passport, a 
family code of laws, a code of public rights.”85 
 
While this characterization may seem to oppose the modern conception of religion in that it 
points to the civil, the political and the state (i.e. the public), in fact it reinforces the secular 
modern distinction between public and private spheres.  It is a distinction that already 
presupposes the modern state’s authority over the public, and the private sphere as the proper 
location of disembodied religion.  Mernissi’s rendering minimizes the metaphysical, other-
worldly and spiritual dimensions of Islam (what Seyyed Hossein Nasr has referred to as the 
‘cultic’ aspect of Islam, as distinct from its historical aspect86) in favor of physical reality, 
                                                          
75 Ibid., 92-93. 
76 Ibid., 99. 
77 Ibid., 101. 
78 Ibid., 164. 
79 Ibid., 179. 
80 Ibid., 185. 
81 Ibid., 187. 
82 She asks: “How did the tradition succeed in transforming the Muslim woman into that submissive, marginal 
creature who buries herself and only goes out into the world timidly and huddled in her veils?  Why does the 
Muslim man need such a mutilated companion?”  Ibid., 194. 
83 Mernissi (1992), 8. 
84 Ibid., 165. 
85 Mernissi (1991), 20-21. 
86 See chapter 3 above, “Religion, the Secular and Din.” 
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historical developments and material conditions.  Within material considerations, such a 
conceptualization also privileges the political over other realms.  Mernissi refers to the Prophet 
of Islam as a genius,87 a decision some would characterize as undermining the miraculous nature 
of prophethood.88  She sums up the mission of Islam in a similar fashion, when she refers to “the 
genius of Islam as the most clever expression of Arab nationalism…”89  Muhammad is said to 
have been laying the groundwork for an Arab nationalist ideology,90 and he even changed his 
mind about the qibla (direction of prayer) as a political strategy.91   
 Mernissi’s prioritizing of the political aspect of Islam and Muslim identity over the 
spiritual and metaphysical aspects leads her to a trenchant critique of the present dilemmas faced 
by Muslims.92  She states that among Muslims/Arabs in modern times, religion serves as a refuge 
from fear of modern temporality,93 and Muslims take to invoking their ancestors as an escapism 
                                                          
87 Mernissi (1991), 139. 
88 See Ramadan Al-Buti, Jurisprudence of the Prophet’s Biography and a Brief History of the Orthodox Caliphate.  
Transl. Nancy Roberts.  Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 2007: 54-62.  Al-Buti states that the British colonization of Egypt 
created a discursive imperative for modernization and Westernization that penetrated the discipline of Prophetic 
biography.  This included the drive to separate religion and science, subjecting the former to the latter.  As a result, 
the “subjective method of writing history” appeared, replacing previous standards of measuring narrations and 
their transmissions with new criteria.  He states: “In reliance upon this method, such writers began setting aside 
everything in the biography of the Prophet…that might conflict with the known and familiar by belonging to the 
realm of the miraculous and supernatural.  At the same time, they began promoting the image of the Prophet…as a 
man possessed of the qualities of genius, greatness, heroism, and the like, thereby distracting their readers from 
reflection on those qualities which might open them to the unfamiliar, including the prophecy, revelation, and 
mission which made up the primary components of his persona.” (59) 
89 Mernissi (1991), 66. 
90 Ibid., 67. 
91 Ibid., 67-68 and 70.  Mernissi poses the change in the qibla, or direction of ritual prayer, to Muhammad’s 
political strategy.  Muslims traditionally consider this an act of divine revelation, not a political decision on the part 
of the Prophet.  (The early community of Muslims under Muhammad’s leadership initially prayed towards 
Jerusalem.  However, in year 13 of his prophetic mission, after emigrating from Mecca to Medina, and in the midst 
of political tensions with the Medinese Jews, verses 143-144 of the Qur’an were revealed, changing the qibla from 
Jerusalem to Mecca.) 
92 In both The Veil and the Male Elite (1991) and Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World (1992), Mernissi 
uses “Arab” and “Muslim” almost interchangeably.  She does not qualify this equivocation – a problematic 
omission, since not all Arabs are Muslim, and not all Muslims are Arab. 
93 Mernissi (1991), 18. 
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from a frightening and confusing postcolonial present.94  The experience of colonialism has 
feminized states, that is, it has veiled and obliterated them, rendering them non-existent.95  It is in 
this context, and this anxiety about borders and the other, that veiling women is thought of as a 
solution to complex socio-political problems.96 
Mernissi identifies the cause of all this confusion and backwardness as the “exile of ‘aql” 
since the banning of the Mu’tazila.97  For this reason today, only violence poses a credible 
challenge to Muslim (political) leadership.98  She claims that contemporary Muslims reject 
humanism on ethnocentric and xenophobic grounds,99 in the broader context of “muzzling” 
reason, judgment and imagination.100  Muslims take comfort in their cultural past in the face of 
colonization and its after-effects.101  This leads Mernissi to a binary vision of contemporary 
Muslim political regimes: it’s either democracy or Saudi Arabia.102  For her, there are only two 
types of government: those that are for and those that are against democracy.  Furthermore, 
Mernissi presents and criticizes only one reason for rejecting democracy, and that is that 
democracy is viewed as contrary to cultural identity.103 
For Mernissi, the desirability of democracy is given.  She does not qualify it because it is 
obvious.  She does, however, elaborate on the benefits of freedom of thought, which only 
democracy would fully enable.  She asks: 
                                                          
94 Ibid., 19. 
95 Ibid., 21. 
96 Ibid., 99. 
97 The Mu’tazila were a rationalist political faction in Basra and Baghdad during the 8th-10th centuries.  They were 
ostracized and criminalized by the majoritarian Muslim leadership during that time due to their theological 
divergences. 
98 Mernissi (1992), 34 and 37. 
99 Ibid., 41. 
100 Ibid., 150. 
101 Ibid., 42. 
102 Ibid., 52. 
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“How is the principle of the equality of all believers (whatever their sex and ethnic or social 
origin) to be transformed into a practical political system which gives everyone the right to 
participate in the choice of the leader of the community?”104 
 
Much like Saroush and An-Na’im, Mernissi believes Islam would thrive in a secular state: 
“As both Christianity and Judaism have done, Islam can not only survive but thrive in a secular 
state.  Once dissociated from coercive power, it will witness a renewal of spirituality.  Christianity 
and Judaism strongly rooted in people’s hearts are what I have seen in the United States, France, 
and Germany.  In those countries the secular state has not killed religion; rather, it has put a break 
on the state’s manipulation of religion.”105 
 
And here we find the conclusion of Mernissi’s endorsement of the modern definition of 
religion.  Freedom of private thought and belief, politically granted and protected by a neutral 
state, enables the agency of the sovereign self.  Mernissi maintains that the individual is a 
sovereign will, upon whom violence is illegitimate and supervision superfluous.106  She advances 
a notably liberal definition of agency that consists of moral autonomy and history-making107 
when she locates the continued richness of the Islamic heritage: 
“It expresses the hope of the faithful and offers them two essential things: a sense of identity and 
the power to struggle.”108 
 
Mernissi’s use of the concept of freedom is essential to her critique of Muslim crises today as 
well as her endorsement of democracy and human rights.  Her definition of freedom, however, 
belongs to a philosophical anthropology that can arguably be interpreted as at odds with certain 
aspects of Islamic tradition (according to her detractors but also in her own admission; see 
below). 
Specifically, Mernissi defines freedom as the balancing of restrictions placed on ahwa 
(plural of hawa, which she defines as individual desires and passions) and rahma (mercy) in the 
                                                          
104 Mernissi (1991), 43. 
105 Mernissi (1992), 65. 
106 Mernissi (1991), 185. 
107 See chapter 2 above, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” for my discussion of the moral 
autonomy approach to universal human rights. 
108 Mernissi (1992), 59. 
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community.109  The negative valuation of individual egoism must not continue to translate into a 
ban on free thought.110  The exchange of peace and equality for the surrender of individualism 
was achieved early on in Islam, but today the advances of democracy should not be kept from the 
Muslim communities.111  For this reason, Arab women want modernity because they want to be 
free.112  She concludes her work on Islam and democracy with an interpretation of the twelfth-
century Sufi Farid ad-Din Attar’s poem The Conference of the Birds.113 
In this tale, a group of birds are enticed by the hoopoe to journey in search of their true 
king, the Simorgh.  The birds embark on the arduous journey, traversing seven valleys and 
inclement conditions.  Along the way, the birds attempt to give up one by one due to their 
spiritual weaknesses, and are counseled back onto the journey by the hoopoe.  For example, the 
finch gave the excuse of being weaker in body and courage than the others, to which the hoopoe 
answered, “You teasing little bird, this humble ostentation is absurd!  If all of us are destined for 
the fire, then you too must ascend the burning pyre.”114  When another bird complains of her 
indecision, the hoopoe replies that this problem afflicts all: “If all of us could boast a spotless 
mind, why should the prophets mingle with mankind?”115  And the same goes on for birds who 
suffer from love of Self, ostentation, and many other spiritual maladies.  The hoopoe always 
responds with enjoinders to disengage the false ownership exercised by the Self, and submit 
wholeheartedly at the Simorgh’s throne.  At the close of their tremendous journey, the birds 
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113 Farid ad-Din Attar, The Conference of the Birds.  Translated with an introduction by Afkham Darbandi and Dick 
Davis.  London: Penguin Books, 1984. 
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discover the Simorgh in a brilliant shining light, reflecting their own likenesses.  Having 
discarded their selves for love of the king, they find themselves in Him and Him in themselves. 
On closer examinations of Mernissi’s take on this classic Sufi poem, the interpretive lens 
turns out to be more of liberal individualism than of traditional Sufi themes, such as polishing the 
mirror of the heart (i.e. removing stains of its earthly attachments) and self-annihilation in the 
Beloved (i.e. the Divine).116  She states: 
“Farid al-din Attar, my favorite of the Sufis, dreamed nine centuries ago of a marvelous planet 
inhabited by fabulous birds that were much like us – who wanted to find themselves, who wanted 
to travel, but were afraid.  Their desire for knowledge, however, was so strong that it transformed 
their lives.”117 
 
On the level of the text’s narrative, the birds are in search of the king, not of themselves.  They 
were indeed afraid of the journey, but when each bird struggled against and shed its particular 
weakness, its individual fault, it was able to soar toward the completion of the journey.  There, 
the birds find their own collective image reflected, but shining brilliantly and blindingly.  This is 
part of the poem’s wordplay, where the King is Simorgh, a mythic Persian bird comparable to the 
Western motif of the Phoenix, but si morgh in Persian also means ‘thirty birds.’  They find 
‘themselves’ in the Divine/the Divine in themselves only insofar as thy first lose their ‘selves’ 
through difficult striving against their lower faculties.  Mernissi’s conclusion in this work is 
entitled ‘The Simorgh is Us!’  She offers this final rejoinder: 
“Today the cry for pluralism no longer has to hide behind metaphysical allegories.  We can bring a 
new world into being through all the scientific advances that allow us to communicate, to engage 
in unlimited dialogue, to create that global mirror in which all cultures can shine in their 
uniqueness.”118 
 
While students of Sufi thought might read in Attar’s Conference that what shines 
brilliantly in the poem’s conclusion is Divine light, upon the surface of the polished mirrors of 
the birds’ hearts, Mernissi reads a celebration of the global mirror that can reflect cultural 
                                                          
116 Mernissi (1992), 171-174. 
117 Ibid., 171. 
118 Ibid., 174. 
141 
 
diversity.  This interpretation is consistent with her full endorsement of the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights.  Mernissi ventures that if Islam had elaborated a system of fundamental 
principles rather than remaining trapped in empiricism and casuistry, it would have arrived as 
something like the UDHR.119  She applauds the document’s support for freedom of thought, but 
this support has the effect of conjuring up the forbidden in the minds of Muslims.  Mernissi 
claims that the best translation for the UDHR’s use of freedom is shirk.120  Tawhid, or divine 
unity, being the central tenet of the Qur’anic worldview,121 shirk is the most cardinal of all 
Islamic sins, as it means the assigning of partners to God. 
 Mernissi’s translation of the UDHR’s use of ‘freedom’ into shirk is questionable and 
value-laden.  She claims that both democracy and human rights are true parts of Muslim 
tradition,122 but chooses a term that is not etymologically linked to ‘freedom’ for her translation.  
The Arabic word that would normally translate the ‘freedom’ connoted in the UDHR is ikhtiyar.  
Ikhtiyar is choice, emanating from the cognate khayr which means good and the verb form khara 
meaning to choose.123  By contrast, shirk, meaning polytheism and idolatry, comes from the 
cognate verb sharika meaning to partner or share.124  Nowhere in the significations of the shirk 
or sharika can any word implying freedom be found.  Her decision to translate UDHR freedom 
into the term that conjures for Muslims violation of the central tenet of their creed is not so much 
a controversial lexical choice or even a metaphor, but is an expression of her position on the 
shari’a. 
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 Mernissi treats the shari’a not as a moral-legal matrix representing the interplay between 
metaphysical principles and material development,125 but as despotic, authoritarian, male-elite 
controlled juristic accretions (i.e. ‘the tradition’).  It is purely historical in its substance.  She 
considers the shari’a accountable for Islam’s anti-individuality.126  Since the injunction to veil is 
reified in traditional jurisprudence, the shari’a opposes the individual’s will.127  The Muslim 
anxiety about democracy is explained by the contrast between democracy allowing people to 
choose their own path, and the shari’a restricting people to a prescribed path.128  Endorsing a 
non-restrictive role for religion is congruent with positing religion as a private matter of 
individual conscience, un-coercive and socially and politically non-interfering.  
 
Muslima Theology as Corrective for Intolerance 
In Never Wholly Other: A Muslima Theology of Religious Pluralism, Jerusha Tanner 
Lamptey, professor of Islam at Union Theological Seminary, proposes a new theological scheme 
for interpreting Islamic sources to arrive at imperatives that are just toward women and non-
Muslims.  In her proposal of holistic, thematic exegesis of the Qur’an, she maintains a foothold 
in religion in the traditional (premodern) sense.  Her discussions of religious difference, 
however, posit Islam as a religion in the modern sense of the term, where ‘world religions’ are 
understood as so many species of the genus of ‘religion.’  Lamptey’s scheme is premised upon a 
critique of traditional Islam, which, like Mernissi, she characterizes as oppressive of women: 
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“Muslim women – whether silent, silenced, or unheard – have generally suffered from an 
interpretive ‘voicelessness’ within Islamic history; the Islamic interpretive tradition has 
historically been dominated and controlled by men.”129 
 
This view is widespread among contemporary Muslim thinkers advocating for epistemological 
reform.130  For example, Loyola University professor of theology and director of its Islamic 
World Studies Program Marcia Hermansen posits contemporary Muslim women theologians as 
“breaking new ground” when they interpret the religious tradition.131  She states: 
“When contemporary Muslim women engage in scriptural interpretation and theology they are 
breaking new ground in a number of areas, not only as females, but also as interpreters of the 
religious tradition in the context of significant contemporary challenges.  Their sources cannot be 
limited to pre-modern theologies of ʿilm alkalām and ʿaqīda, which tended to be scholastic in 
argumentation and to address matters that are no longer compelling or relevant to most 
Muslims.”132 
 
Ednan Aslan, professor of Islam at the University of Vienna (Austria) similarly claims that while 
women enjoyed freedom and equality with men in religious and political areas of life during the 
lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, they were subsequently excluded from religious discourse 
and robbed of their social responsibility.133  He asks: 
“How did a male-dominated theology, wherein women were robbed of their common sense, 
disenfranchised from their social responsibility, and reduced to a self-denying and masochistic 
experience of naive religiosity come to dominate?”134 
 
Muna Tatari, professor of Islamic theology at the University of Paderborn (Germany) attributes a 
portion of Muslim women’s awakening in twentieth century movements to “the recognition that 
the traditional disciplines of Islamic learning (ethics, law, theology, philosophy, and mysticism) 
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were more or less male-dominated and therefore shaped by patriarchy.”135  These few brief 
examples do not exhaust the widespread notion that Islamic tradition – and religion in general – 
are oppressive of women, such that new methods and new positive content must be developed if 
women are to have equality in religious communities. 
 In Never Wholly Other, Lamptey proposes epistemological reform at the theological level 
to redress two distinct but inter-related wrongs: women’s suffering at the hands of patriarchal 
religious tradition, and theological and practical devaluation of non-Muslims under a 
hermeneutic that is difference-centered.  She draws on three bodies of literature to craft a 
Muslima theology: contemporary Muslima theologians, specifically Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas 
and Riffat Hassan; feminist theologians from other religious traditions, such as Rosemary 
Ruether, Rita Gross and Jeannine Hill Fletcher; and the semantic Qur’anic analysis of Toshihiko 
Izutsu.136 
 Lamptey begins her schema with a holistic, thematic view of the Qur’an.137  This textual 
holism is a tafsir al-Quran bil-Quran, or an internal hermeneutic so that verses of the Qur’an are 
understood and explained in lieu of other Qur’anic verses.138  Lamptey cautions that both 
interpretive extremes – monovalency on the one hand and complete relativism on the other – 
must be avoided, lest the universal message of the Qur’an be lost.139  Such an intratextual 
approach would serve as a system of checks and balances against unjust conclusions.  For 
example, Lamptey cites the gender dualism that has taken root in the Islamic tradition, by which 
biological/sexual difference is extended to gender.  This is problematic on several levels: 
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“First, it depicts one trait (biology) as determinative of all aspects – moral, social, ontological – of 
a specific group.  Second, it not only conceives of the groups – men and women – as wholly 
distinct but more specifically also depicts the groups as being in opposition.  Thus in this 
patriarchal conception that emphasizes difference only, men are the central human subjects, and 
women are everything that men are not.  Difference is pervasive and situated in a static 
hierarchy.”140 
 
Asma Barlas, professor of politics at Ithaca College and director of its Center for the Study of 
Culture, Race and Ethnicity, similarly contends that the Qur’anic spiritual equality of men and 
women has not been extended historically to social relations.141  Lamptey states: 
“Thus while women may be created with equal capacity for righteousness and may be held equally 
responsible before God, they are not equal in the context of human-to-human encounters.”142 
 
Barlas poses the sexual difference between women and men as lateral, that is, non-hierarchical.  
Values are not assigned in such a difference.143  This points to the importance of relationality, so 
that capacity and responsibility are only actualized and can only have meaning in the relations a 
person has with others, oneself and God.144 
 However, sameness-only accounts that gloss over important epistemic differences should 
not replace difference-only valuations, for neither will suffice.145 At this point Lamptey draws on 
the rich theorizing of feminist theologians emanating from other religious traditions.  Lamptey 
aims to apply the approach developed to address sexual difference to the question of religious 
difference and pluralism.  The feminist theologian thinkers Lamptey draws upon contend that 
there should be no hierarchy among religions, and this democratic evaluation of religious 
difference should be nuanced in its acceptance of diversity.146  The link between the rights of 
women and non-Muslims is that both groups suffer marginalization and oppression at the hands 
of the universalization of particular norms within the Islamic tradition. 
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According to feminist scholar and Catholic theologian Rosemary Ruether, feminist 
theology is “an approach that aims to apply feminist critiques and reconstructions of gender to 
theological discussions.”147  The specific problems Ruether deals with include: 
“…exclusive male language for God, the view that males are more like God than females, that 
only males can represent God as leaders in church and society, or that women are created by God 
to be subordinate to males and thus sin by rejecting subordination.”148 
 
Theological symbols like these must be understood as socially constructed, not eternal or 
unchangeable, according to Ruether.149  She maintains that human understanding and experience 
always brackets interpretation, echoing Saroush’s concerns about the fallible and time-bound 
aspect of religious knowledge.150  Not only the interpreter’s subjectivity, but also the 
contextualizing social mediations and vicissitudes of power influence which interpretations are 
produced (and which foreclosed) and how canon and orthodoxy are established.151  For these 
reasons, the Muslima theologians Lamptey draws upon, specifically Wadud and Barlas, 
emphasize situatedness and context. 
Ruether argues that the Judeo-Christian heritage doesn’t enjoy an automatically 
privileged position with God, truth, and authentic humanity.  She seems to posit a perennial 
philosophical approach (although she does not name it as such), in which all religions have an 
equal portion of, or equal access to truth.152  Other feminist theologians, like Marjorie Hewitt 
Suchocki and Rita Gross, state that ethics, not metaphysics or religious doctrines, should be the 
criteria governing a pluralism and diversity approach to interfaith relations.153  This posits ethics 
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as universal, or at least universally discernable.  Religions are particular in comparison, and 
ethics are neutral (in the liberal sense154). 
Building on the arguments of these feminists, Lamptey wishes to replace oppressive 
truth-claims about sexual or religious superiority with her belief in the egalitarianism of women 
and men and the equal worth of different religions.  After all, religious identities are themselves 
porous, shifting and boundary-dissolving.155  The borders between religions are themselves 
imposed theoretical constructions.156  A truly pluralist approach to religious diversity, one which 
benefits from rich feminist theorizing on relationality and mutuality, wouldn’t privilege one 
religion over another.  In espousing this Muslima theology of religious and sexual difference, 
Lamptey advances a modern definition of religion.157  A democratic evaluation across religious 
traditions is only possible when one accepts that there is such a thing as religion in the modern 
sense, such that ‘religion’ is a genus to which belong all the various species of ‘world religions.’ 
 
Fitra as Universal, Intuitive Reasoning 
 Abdulaziz Sachedina is professor and chair of Islamic Studies at George Mason 
University.  He is fluent in nine languages and has written several works on Islam and political 
authority.  Sachedina gives a sophisticated and engaging treatment of Islam and human rights in 
Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights.158  Like Lamptey, he relies principally on the Qur’an 
to craft an Islamic system of universal toleration and respect for human rights.  Sachedina does 
not endorse the purely instrumental and pragmatic human rights approach, for such an approach 
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will not gain currency among Muslim societies for whom religion must play a public and 
justificatory role.  Rather, he develops a strong critique of historical Islamic juridical tradition (as 
do Saroush, An-Na’im and Mernissi).  In aiming to bypass the tradition as antiquated accretions, 
Sachedina poses the need for fresh and updated Qur’an-based interpretations that are both 
faithful to the holy book’s original intent and consistent with modern human rights and 
democratic norms.  He does so by enlisting a number of Qur’anic themes, which I will now 
elaborate.  Through all of these themes one can find Sachedina’s strong critique of traditional 
understandings, which he holds are historical, politically-motivated and outdated. 
 The principal Qur’anic theme Sachedina employs in developing what he deems a 
“minimalist Islamic universalism”159 is fitra.  Sachedina defines fitra as intuitive reasoning in the 
sense of conscience.  This faculty leads to a universal ethical cognition that is an inherent moral 
capacity in all humans.  It is universal, not particular, and as such can be understood as prior to 
religious affiliations as well as social, political and cultural conditions.  In speaking of the 
lexicography of the term, Sachedina points out that: 
“Evidently, there is agreement among classical Arabic lexicographers that the essential meaning of 
the word fitra signifies something natural, native, innate, original, or another quality or property 
with which humans are created by God.  As a connotative signification of the word, some 
lexicographers take the word to mean the ‘faculty of knowing God,’ with which God has created 
human beings.  In other words, fitra is the source of natural religion.”160 
 
Since the implication of God-consciousness is connotative and secondary to the term, an 
unequivocal equality can be argued across Muslim/non-Muslim divides.  In other words, fitra 
leads to an understanding that all human beings are equally moral agents, with equal say in 
religion (or non-religion) and are bearers of the rights to equal protection and treatment.  
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Disbelievers don’t suffer from a lack of moral worth according to Sachedina’s interpretation of 
fitra.161 
 This, however, is not how traditional jurists interpreted fitra.  Sachedina points to a 
theological unsoundness as responsible for traditional intolerance against non-Muslims.  The 
Ash’ari theological school espoused a “predeterminist political theology”162 such that acts were 
good or bad not according to universally discernable laws of reason, but by divine will alone.  
Such a theological position severely limited human moral accountability and capacity, according 
to Sachedina: 
“…the Ash’arite denial of human moral agency meant a radical change in the approach to morality 
as it applied to humans as human. The vindication of the absolute divine will over the intellect 
capable of cognizing good and evil led to the denial that ethical values could be discerned by 
unaided reason... 
 
According to the Ash’arite theologians, there was neither a natural constitution endowed with 
moral cognition nor natural law to function as the basis of ethics that directed human purposive 
existence.”163 
 
For Sachedina, the victory of Sunni Ash’ari theology over Mu’tazili and Shi’i strands more 
consistent with moral autonomy is a major factor in the problem Islam has had with human 
rights.  The corrective, therefore, is in forging a new theology that draws on Mu’tazili and Shi’i 
positions regarding ethical responsibility, natural law and moral autonomy to be consistent with 
norms of human rights and democracy. 
 In his project to develop an Islamic system of universal human rights justification, 
Sachedina also operationalizes the Qur’anic theme of the functional secularity of the public 
sphere.  The basis of this concept is the Islamic tenet of no compulsion in religion, which can 
serve today as doctrinal validation for the institutionalization of ethical consensus on public 
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values needed in multifaith societies.164  Sachedina reassures that he is not implanting a foreign 
understanding of secularity (i.e. the separation of church and state) onto Islamic terms, but is 
drawing on the indigenous Islamic concept itself: 
“Let me make it clear from the outset that, being fully aware of the problems of cross-cultural 
translation and terminology, I am not imposing a functional secularity on the Islamic tradition; 
rather, the organically Islamic idea of separate jurisdictions (nitaq sulta), and not the separation of 
church and state, is what is acknowledged in the sacred law of Islam, the Shari’a, and it is on this 
that my proposal is built.”165 
 
Like Saroush and An-Na’im, Sachedina emphasizes the difference between religious 
reflection and practice in Islam.166   This difference is rooted in the Islamic distinction between 
acts of ibada, or ritual worship, and those of mu’amala, pertaining to interhuman interaction and 
transactions.  According to Sachedina, since the human-God relationship is free from 
institutional or seminarian interference (i.e. an essentially private matter), all the laws regulating 
it “transcend adjudication by human courts.”167  The counterpart to this is that human courts have 
jurisdiction and enforcement with regard to inter-human relationships: 
“More pertinently, it is in this area of the law that reforms affecting social issues have taken place 
through the reinterpretation of religious sources.  Hence, the theoretical immutability of the sacred 
law does not extend to this area.”168 
 
The distinction between ibada and mu’amala can be a source of liberty, pluralism and human 
rights,169 as well as civil religion.170  This, says Sachedina, provides an authentically Islamic 
congruence with the modern nation-state and democracy. 
 Democratic arrangements have established a workable framework for multi-faith 
societies, through the governance by pluralistic politics, not shared beliefs.171  The shari’a should 
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therefore be updated to accept democratic governance.172  In his endorsement of democracy, 
Sachedina posits the modern state as somewhat universal, as can be seen in his observation that 
the “modern concept of citizenship is conspicuously absent in the traditional sources of 
Islam.”173  He also characterizes human rights in this way: 
“My thesis thus far has contended that religion and human rights norms are two solvents of human 
life, two interlocking sources and systems of values that have existed side by side in all human 
communities, regardless of time, place, and culture.”174 
 
Islamic sources that can be channeled for religious toleration, democracy and human rights 
include: the creation story, particularly in its positing of a single parentage for all humankind;175 
the amana, or trust, taken up by humanity that indicates moral responsibility across religious 
divides;176 fitra as universal intuitive reasoning, in which intuitive precepts lead, through reason, 
to moral action;177 the idea of human dignity, or karama, that universally imbues human beings 
with an intrinsic value;178 and historical traditions of religiously-based pluralism.179 
 The historical Islamic politico-juridical tradition is authoritarian in comparison to the 
democratic potential of such textual sources.  Sachedina states: 
“Like all other world religions, at one time or another, Islam has succumbed to the political 
ambitions of Muslim rulers; in doing so, it has sacrificed its core values of interfaith tolerance and 
coexistence…an alliance between an exclusive and hegemonic theology perpetrated by the court 
theologians and political power…”180 
 
This is but one of the points in Sachedina’s staunch critique of traditional Islam.   
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 According to Sachedina, the Islamic juridical tradition is an outdated set of historical 
accretions.  It is the result of concessions to political authoritarianism, and needs to be updated 
through fresh interpretations of the holy texts to arrive at an indigenously generated acceptance 
of citizenship and equal rights in national contexts.181  As it stands, the juridical tradition is “a 
formidable obstacle to a number of articles of great consequence for the protection of individual 
rights that are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”182  This is particularly 
problematic with regard to the rights of women and non-Muslims.  Sachedina states that the 
shari’a doesn’t have equal citizenship measures.  Rather, 
“It simply divides the populace into Muslim members, with full privileges, and non-Muslim 
minorities, with protected status under its divinely ordained system.”183 
 
The new constitution in Iraq serves as an example of how “patriarchal traditionalism” persists 
through the “inherited juristic law,” enforcing discrimination against women.184 
 Women suffer second-class status not only in the formulations of positive shari’i law, but 
also because of deeper structures in the religious scholarship: 
“…not only are the classical formulations discriminatory against women and in need of reform, 
there are epistemological obstructions in these formulations to bringing woman’s status as a full 
person into accord with the articles of various international conventions.”185 
 
The same is also true for traditional treatments of non-Muslims.186  Sachedina seeks out a natural 
law tradition in the ethical sources of Islam in order to overcome the relativity of historical Islam 
in the fields of these inequalities.187  He finds that the Qur’an acknowledges a unity transcending 
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religious difference, connecting private and public spiritual frameworks.188  In this way, a 
universal ethical discourse exists across religious divides, such that: 
“No human endowed with reason can fail to understand this moral language…The Qur’an allows 
nonbelievers to be ‘other’ in the sphere of ethics, where the natural knowledge of good and evil 
makes injustice in any form inexcusable.  No matter how religions might divide people, ethical 
discourse focuses on human relationships in building an ideal public order.”189 
 
Plurality in faith and law among humans is a fact acknowledged in the Qur’an.190  This 
can be seen in the fact that both humans in general and Muslims in particular are addressed in 
it.191  Given the fact that the textual sources of Islam promote religious pluralism and toleration, 
Sachedina identifies the cause of the present oppressive condition as the Islamic tradition’s 
failure to separate ethics from jurisprudence.  The Islamic tradition derails democracy – 
particularly across gender and religious differences – because it has failed to separate religion 
from ethics;192 in this formulation, Sachedina is identifying historical Islamic tradition primarily 
with its legalistic disciplines.  The ethical aspect of Islam can easily foster an inclusive 
universality to accept the UDHR.  But the tradition never forged ethics independent of God’s 
law.193  By tradition here, Sachedina is referring to the Ash’ari theological school, which early on 
rose to prominence over Mu’tazila and Shi’i theological positions that did allow for moral 
autonomy. 
In fact, much of Sachedina’s critique of ‘Islamic tradition’ is aimed directly at Ash’ari 
theology.  According to Alasdair MacIntyre, the theological problem of human free will vs. 
divine determinism is one of the three philosophical problems ineliminable to theism.194  In this 
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debate, the Ash’ari position tipped over to the side of divine determinism, especially in response 
to Mu’tazila formulations.  The Ash’ari denied the moral autonomy of individuals, since the 
rightness/wrongness of acts was understood to be unknowable outside of revelation.195  Instead 
of moral autonomy, they emphasized God’s absolute will and humanity’s responsibility to 
submit.  They did not therefore recognize any independent moral law outside of revelation: 
“There was no standard of good and evil, however minimal, available to all rational creatures.  
The notion of God as an unlimited and arbitrary power implied reduction of all moral laws to 
inscrutable manifestations of divine omnipotence.”196 
 
There was, therefore, no natural law concept in the Ash’ari school: 
“…the Ash’arite denial of human moral agency meant a radical change in the approach to morality 
as it applied to humans as human. The vindication of the absolute divine will over the intellect 
capable of cognizing good and evil led to the denial that ethical values could be discerned by 
unaided reason…According to the Ash’arite theologians, there was neither a natural constitution 
endowed with moral cognition nor natural law to function as the basis of ethics that directed 
human purposive existence.”197 
 
For Sachedina, this system facilitated an “absolutist political theology” when the jurists 
succumbed to the political pressures of absolutist rulers.  He states: 
“Like all other world religions, at one time or another, Islam has succumbed to the political 
ambitions of Muslim rulers; in doing so, it has sacrificed its core values of interfaith tolerance and 
coexistence…an alliance between an exclusive and hegemonic theology perpetrated by the court 
theologians and political power…”198 
 
Sachedina even goes so far as to credit Ash’ari theology with partial culpability for 
contemporary political jihadism: 
“This traditional, majoritarian Sunni position lacks any inclusive doctrine of human moral worth 
and denies inherent human dignity outside the faith’s communal boundaries.  It is not far-fetched 
to suggest that religious extremism in the Muslim world today can be traced back to this 
hegemonic theology, which does not hesitate to treat dissenting groups within the larger 
community (like the Shi’ites, for example) as less than human and, hence, worth killing.”199 
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By contrast, the Mu’tazila and Shi’i understood reason as a divine gift, acknowledging human 
moral agency and espousing a truly universal view.200 
Sachedina’s critique of Islamic tradition is also versed in the language of a critique of the 
historical shari’a, with implications for his reform proposal.  The shari’a must not continue to act 
like a comprehensive system: 
“The search for a human rights foundation must begin without presenting the historical Islamic 
juridical heritage as a comprehensive system that is to be maximally applied in the promulgation 
of universal morality derived from Islamic revelation.”201 
 
Sachedina’s work is replete with calls for historical deconstruction of the Islamic tradition,202 and 
a teasing out of Islam’s universal ethical dimensions from its particularly Islamic message.  This 
is the same need for which Sachedina criticizes the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.  
This document, drafted by “Muslim apologists,” is missing references to theological-
metaphysical sources for an all-inclusive scheme.203  It mistakenly assumes that historical Islam 
can be universalized.204  For these failings of traditional Islam, Muslims today must not continue 
to espouse: 
“…an uncritical approach to the juridical decisions made by learned scholars in the past…by 
extending the immutability of the Qur’an to the rulings given by Muslim jurists in the area of 
interhuman relations, including the treatment of women, the community seems to be saying that it 
has inherited a perfect system that does not need any revision in the decisions that were made by 
the founding jurists.”205 
 
Rather, the only way out of Islam’s present “epistemological crisis” and “crisis of irrelevance”206 
is to seek out an Islamic rendition of natural law, and from it to create a universally coherent 
idiom for Islam and human rights.  To do so, Muslims must embark on the following two-step 
epistemological reform: 
                                                          
200 Ibid., 106. 
201 Ibid., 92. 
202 See ibid., 120, 123, 127, 129, 131 and 135. 
203 Ibid., 63. 
204 Ibid., 90. 
205 Ibid., 130. 
206 Ibid., 88-89 and 121, and 128 and 140-141, respectively. 
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“The first hermeneutical move of necessity involved deconstructing the contextual aspects of the 
classical juridical heritage of Muslims, by looking at the way religion and politics in Islam 
interacted to distort the original universal intent of the relevant texts for exclusivist political 
reasons.  The second move involved providing a fresh interpretation that is consonant with the 
inclusive intent of the religious discourse and relevant to modern discourse on human dignity and 
justice.”207 
 
After all, the fallible human dimension of fiqh (jurisprudence) is not to be confused with the 
sacredness and immutability of the Qur’an.  Mirroring Saroush and Lamptey on this point, 
Sachedina wishes to contextualize and historicize the normative essentialism classical fiqh 
attached to human relations.208  He also submits that there is consonance between the truths of 
revelation and reason.209  It is not religion per se, but the interpretation of it that needs to be 
updated through fresh interpretations in line with human rights norms.210 
 In contrast to the traditional as particular and authoritarian, Sachedina presents the 
modern as universal and politically neutral (read universally rational).  For example, Sachedina, 
exactly like Saroush, claims that Muslim culture focuses on responsibilities rather than rights.211  
This pits traditional (authoritarian) Islam directly against modern (liberatory) rights-based 
politics.  As another example, the modern state is supposed to be universal and ahistorical.  
Sachedina claims that, under certain conditions: 
“…the Qur’an gives the state, as the representative of society, the power to control ‘discord on 
earth,’ a general state of lawlessness created by taking up arms against the established Islamic 
order.”212 
 
Given Wael Hallaq’s argument in The Impossible State, Sachedina can be criticized here for 
anachronistically transposing the political form of the modern state onto earlier configurations.  
Hallaq identifies particular form properties with the modern state, which would not be found in 
                                                          
207 Ibid., 111. 
208 Ibid., 42. 
209 Ibid., 44.  Recall Saroush’s postulate that all truths are commensurate; see p. 120 above. 
210 Sachedina, 56.  
211 Ibid., 12, 85-86, 108 and 149. 
212 Ibid., 74 and 109, emphasis added. 
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premodern Islamic rule.213  There is no reason to believe that premodern Islamic ruling regimes 
saw themselves, and were seen by the people, as representatives of society; they were likely 
framed as vicegerents of God, or something else.  Medieval Sunni thought shows tremendous 
variety in justifications for political rule.214  What one finds is “competing visions rather than 
agreement on religious and temporal powers.”215  The imamate (a shorthand term for the political 
structure embodied in the person of the caliph) was understood variably by scholars, as “a social 
utility (maslaha)…necessary for survival, social welfare, and cooperation.”216  Sachedina’s 
picture of a theologian-jurist establishment as the handmaiden of political absolutism is 
challenged by scholarship that points to the:  
“…domestic and external challenges that forced the ulema to rally behind the caliphate or any 
authority that respected religious law in instances of civil war, sectarian division, or rebellion or 
during outbreaks of violence…”217 
 
 To recapitulate, Sachedina’s overall scheme is as follows.  Muslims today must cast off 
the fetters of the inherited historical Islamic juristic tradition and the Ash’ari theological 
determinism upon which it is based.  Muslims must update their understanding of the Islamic 
texts in light of the sociological contexts of multi-ethnic, multi-faith nation-states to facilitate 
citizenship, equality, toleration and other human rights norms.  To do so, they should borrow 
elements from the Mu’tazila and Shi’i theological positions on human moral autonomy and the 
role of reason unaided by revelation (such as the capabilities approach218).  With these elements, 
Muslims today should develop an Islamic natural law trajectory.  This should be easy, because 
                                                          
213 See Hallaq (2013).  See chapter 3 for my discussion of Hallaq’s argument. 
214 See Hayrettin Yucesoy, “Justification of Political Authority in Medieval Sunni Thought,” in Asma Afsaruddin, ed.  
Islam, The State, and Political Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns.  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011. 
215 Ibid., 10. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid., 12. 
218 Sachedina, 135-137. 
158 
 
the Qur’an offers two types of guidance, “a universal moral guidance that touches all humans 
qua humans, and a particular scriptural guidance that is given to a specific faith community.”219 
Since human rights assumes natural law,220 this will lead to consistency between Islamic 
premises and human rights norms.  In fact, according to Sachedina, it is already the case that: 
“The Islamic universal discourse conceives of a spiritually and morally autonomous individual 
capable of attaining salvation outside the nexus of the community-oriented Shari’a, with its 
emphasis on an integrated system of law and morality…Islamic universal discourse sought to 
define itself by legitimizing individual autonomy within its religiously based collective order by 
leaving individuals free to negotiate their spiritual destiny without state interference, while 
requiring them to abide by the public order that involved the play of reciprocity and autonomy 
upon which a regime of rights is based.”221 
 
In Sachedina’s analysis, the Qur’an itself seems to pose a modern definition of religion: 
“…even when the Qur’an speaks about the entire nature having submitted to God’s will, when it 
comes to humankind the revelation advances the freedom of human choice, for God permits the 
human to accept or reject the act of submission that God demands.  This leaves human beings free 
to negotiate their religious affiliation in any given faith community, or none at all.  But it does not 
permit them to deny the existence of the moral sensibilities necessary for them to undertake to 
perform their moral duties in relation to other human beings.  Such a denial is construed by the 
Qur’an as the denial of the order of nature (hukm takwıni).”222 
 
This passage shows that universal morality doesn’t depend on revelation, and that while people 
are free to accept or deny revelation, they can’t escape moral interactions with other people.223  
This is a modern definition of ‘religion,’ as explained in chapter three.  Universal human rights 
grants freedom of religion in the sense that religion is essentially a private matter of internal 
belief.  It is a disembodied and non-public/non-coercive rendering, because it simultaneously 
establishes an independent, secular code for regulating the public sphere and the limits of 
toleration. 
 While Sachedina poses religion in the modern sense of the term, he also poses, like 
Mernissi, a political definition of religion.  He states: 
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“Let me reiterate that the purpose of divine revelation is to provide norms and values that will 
guide humankind toward constructing a viable system of governance…In order to reach its final 
end, humanity will have to utilize all its divinely-conferred abilities and potentialities to assume 
the critical responsibility of exercising authority in order to establish a just political order.”224 
 
Interpersonal relationships are emphasized in the Qur’an in order to facilitate an inclusive public 
order.225  The role of religion is to foster norms for peaceful interfaith/multiethnic relations.226  
While the purpose of creation is moral and spiritual perfection, the purpose of religion is more 
political.227  Echoing Saroush, freedom of religion is itself religiously necessary in Islam.228  
Islam and human rights, then, are like long-lost cousins who must meet again in the reunion of 
theological and epistemological reform. 
While I will critically evaluate the works I present in chapters four and five (Muslim 
Approaches to Human Rights I and II, respectively) in the conclusion, a glaring omission in 
Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights must be pointed out here.  That is that Sachedina 
makes no mention of the Maturidi theological school.  He posits the Ash’ari and Mu’tazila 
schools, along with Shi’i theology in general, as the sole actors in fourteen hundred years of 
Islamic traditional kalaam.  The Sunni Maturidi theological school, formalized and codified 
between 1000 and 1200 CE, has held a middle-way position (between the Ash’ari and the 
Mu’tazila) on unaided human reason (specifically that it can discern major sins without 
revelation).  It is followed in all regions where Hanafi jurisprudence is the majority shari’a 
methodology, which represent a sizable portion of Sunni Muslim communities even today (i.e. 
Turkey, Tatrstan, Bashortostan, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Levant, Afghanistan, Central 
Asia, northwest China and south Asia). 
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Sachedina also elides without qualification between theologians and jurists – even though 
these two groups belonged to distinct disciplines each with its own scientific methodologies – 
and treats the shari’a and ‘Muslim culture’ ahistorically, as monolithic.  For example, in his 
lengthy discussion of women as equal rights bearers, Sachedina credits “the culture” with 
preserving entrenched prejudicial attitudes towards women.229 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have reviewed the works of five contemporary Muslim thinkers whose 
engagements with human rights call for major epistemological reforms of the Islamic tradition.  
Abdolkarim Saroush, Abdullahi An-Na’im, Fatima Mernissi, Jerusha Tanner Lamptey and 
Abdulaziz Sachedina all espouse the need to bring contemporary Islam in line with universal 
human rights norms, including democracy and equality for women non-Muslims.  They find 
fault with the inherited Islamic tradition, in its theological premises (Sachedina and Lamptey) 
and epistemological methodologies (Saroush, An-Na’im and Mernissi).  These thinkers advocate 
historical deconstruction of the Islamic tradition, so that ethical principles can be separated from 
positive legal and normative content.  They all believe that human rights norms, democracy and 
gender equality are espoused in the original intentions of Islam’s sacred texts (Sachedina and 
Mernissi). 
 The thinkers examined in this chapter posit Islam as a religion in the modern sense of the 
term, such that they undermine communal and traditional interpretive authority over religious 
significations in favor of individual freedom to interpret (specifically An-Na’im, in his calls for 
expansion and relaxation of ijtihad).  They also promote the internal nature of religious belief, 
                                                          
229 Ibid., 144.  Like Mernissi, An-Na’im, and Lamptey, Sachedina speaks of women’s oppression in Islam as given.  
He does not provide concrete historical or sociological trends sanctioned by Islamic doctrine.  Nor does he cite 
scholarship denigrating women.  It is rather treated as a fact so obvious, that it needs no evidentiary backing. 
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disentangling it from public or political power.  In this way, Islam is disembodied conviction.  
These reformists also frame their advocacy of religious pluralism in terms that understand 
‘religion’ as a general genus of which ‘Islam’ is a species (particularly Lamptey and Sachedina).  
This characterization is most congruent with universal human rights’ structure of freedom of 
religion.  They all hold universal human rights as the answer to the social and political – but also 




Chapter 5: Muslim Approaches to Human Rights II – Islam as Din 
 
 In this chapter I will analyze the arguments of those Muslim theorists who wish to 
mediate the relationship between Islam and universal human rights using a conceptual alternative 
to the modern category of ‘religion.’  This involves finding the modern sense of religion – a 
private, socially disembodied set of beliefs that doesn’t interfere with politics, economics, etc. 
and makes no demands on the public sphere – inadequate for addressing Muslim life.  Rather, 
Islam is articulated with emphases on the inseparability of belief and practice, the communal 
nature, social embeddedness and reciprocity of rights and obligations, and the overarching moral 
law that holds private and public matters accountable.  I will label the various articulations of 
Islam as distinct from religion in the modern sense as din.1 
These thinkers advocate the continued perpetuation and renewal of the Islamic tradition – 
which includes premodern epistemology, jurisprudential methods and themes (though not 
necessarily the positive content of that jurisprudence), and esoteric practice.  They advocate the 
penetrating nature of belief into the public sphere: being the space of interpersonal transactions, 
contracts and the interest of the public good, it ought to be governed by religious precepts of 
social and economic justice, the rights of families, neighbors, the poor, animals, land, etc.  
Individual rights, by virtue of being human alone, do not form the basis of a din-centered 
approach.  Rather, such a rights-scheme is structured around the Islamic tradition’s historical 
institution of al-maqasid ash-shari’a, or the higher intents of the law, and an other-worldly 
criterion for gain and loss.2 
                                                          
1 See chapter 3 for the meaning of din in the Islamic tradition generally, and in the Qur’anic semantics specifically. 
2 See chapter 3 for Hallaq’s treatment of premodern shari’a. 
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 The approach that posits Islam as din rather than as religion in the modern sense of the 
term is congruent with William Cavanaugh’s claim about the modern invention of religion.3  
Cavanaugh argues that religion was invented as a category in modern times in order to establish 
the exclusion of religion from the public sphere without appearing to violate freedom of religion.  
According to the new concept, says Cavanaugh: 
“Religion is ‘inward’; it is essentially about beliefs that cannot be settled publicly to the 
satisfaction of all by any rational method.”4 
 
A purely inward understanding of religion poses challenges for a dini understanding.  The Arabic 
cognate of din signifies, at a basic etymological level: debt, debtor, creditor and the laws and 
ordinances governing debt.  From this root, din further linguistically implies: judicious power, 
judgment and obligations and obedience to such; organized society and commercial life; town or 
city and governance; civilized life, social order, law, order, justice and authority.5  Rendered as 
din, Islam doesn’t easily accommodate the privatization implied by the modern term ‘religion.’ 
When Islam is posed as din, the universal human right of freedom of religion (which 
relies on a modern definition of religion) falls short of addressing many needs of Muslim life.  
Other human rights may subsequently clash with certain Islamic articulations because the 
justificatory grounds of each are different.6  In the tension between national sovereignty and 
supranational norms, the approach of Islam-as-din takes a more traditional understanding of 
sovereignty than the cosmopolitanism of the Islam-as-religion thinkers, albeit in a 
corporate/communal rather than strictly national configuration.7  The thinkers I review in this 
                                                          
3 See chapter 3 above, “Religion, the Secular and Din.”  See also Cavanaugh (2009). 
4 Sachedina, 126. 
5 See chapter 3 above for Al-Attas’ discussion of the root-cognate semantic field of ‘din.’ 
6 See chapter 2, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” for my discussion of the neutrality claims of 
universal human rights theorists with regard to the discourse’s philosophical anthropology. 
7 See chapter 2, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” for Peter Danchin’s analysis of the tension 
between national sovereignty and supranational norms, or private (national) law and public international law.  Also 
see below for Sherman Jackson’s understanding of the madhaahib (Islamic jurisprudential schools) as corporate 
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chapter espouse a more positive relationship to historical shari’a than the thinkers of the previous 
chapter.  From a dini point of view, the present group of thinkers privilege the Islamic traditional 
law in the lives of individuals and communities with only practical and national-legal 
considerations of good citizenship toward secular political authority.8 
In this chapter I will analyze arguments by Naquib Al-Attas, Sherman Jackson, Saba 
Mahmood, Katherine Bullock, Abdalhakim Murad and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.  Their 
engagements of rights do not proceed along the universal human rights framework, but rather, in 
discussing rights-related concepts like democracy, women’s status and modern consciousness, 
these thinkers posit Islam as a comprehensive action-enabling belief system, as private as it is 
public and focused on an other-worldly temporality (i.e. not religion in the modern sense of the 
term).  The philosophical anthropology enabled by an Islam-as-din perspective differs markedly 
from the one advanced by the thinkers in the previous chapter.  The Muslim subject is first and 
foremost God’s slave; her moral autonomy is not articulated.  The present group of thinkers does 
not propose radical epistemological reform like the thinkers discussed in the previous chapter.  
Instead, they advocate the renewed perpetuation of traditional Islamic jurisprudential 
methodology and theological categories, with refinement based on textual sources and traditional 
precedents as practically necessitated.  These thinkers take a more critical attitude than the 
previous set of thinkers discussed toward liberal politics and assumptions of the human being, 
the modern state and feminist women’s rights frameworks. 
I will present the thinkers of an Islam-as-din approach to human rights in a thematic 
order, so that each of them can be read in conversation with one thinker from the previous 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
models.  See also chapter 3 for Wael Hallaq on the local character of premodern shari’a (and its regional authority), 
and its independence from centralized political authority. 
8 This differs from the arguments of Saroush, An-Na’im and Sachedina, who espouse (in different ways) that 
constitutional democracies have their own logic independent of religion, and that state-related matters can/must 
only be handled with a secular separation of private religion and public secularity. 
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chapter.  For example, I will present Al-Attas’s work first, on the faculties of knowledge.  This 
juxtaposes his epistemological theorizing against Saroush’s theory of the expansion and 
contraction of knowledge (as presented in chapter four).  I will show that variances in knowledge 
theory can lead to divergent conceptions of nature and human freedom – issues with serious 
implications for human rights bases.  Next I will present Sherman Jackson’s work on scripture as 
a sieve through which democracy and human rights should be sifted – retaining beneficial 
elements and discarding those inconsistent with Islam – in conversation with An-Na’im’s 
unequivocal endorsement of the secular state for Muslims.  I will then elaborate on Katherine 
Bullock’s proposal for alternative frameworks for understanding hijab to complicate Fatima 
Mernissi’s rendering of Muslim women’s singularly oppressed status under the hijab and male 
control of Islamic tradition.  I will also present Saba Mahmood’s critique of exclusively 
liberatory definitions of feminist agency, to question Lamptey’s argued need for Muslima 
theological reform.  Finally, I will posit Murad’s argument for fitra as primordial slavehood to 
God (a ‘radical authenticity’ that he argues consists of turning away from the modern world’s 
brilliant series of distractions), to question Sachedina’s focus on fitra as universal intuitive 
reasoning in a natural law framework. 
 In this way, I hope to place thinkers from across the theoretical spectrum of Islam and 
human rights discourse into conversation around important contemporary political themes 
through various lenses of key Islamic concepts.  At the least, this will demonstrate that there is 
tremendous scholarly variety among contemporary Muslim thinkers on questions of universal 
human rights.  I hope that the Islamic discursive tradition, as a lived and constantly renegotiated 
tradition in modernity with deep philosophical roots in premodernity, will be enriched through 
these contests over the meanings of key Islamic concepts (i.e. knowledge, political authority, the 
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female principle and fitra).  At most, I hope that global discourse on universal human rights can 
benefit from authentic, in-depth investigation into Islamic sources for protection of human 
dignity. 
 
The Faculties of Knowledge and the Intellective Organ of the Heart 
Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas is a philosopher and the co-founder of the 
International Institute of Islamic Thought (Malaysia).  He was one of the senior founders of the 
National University of Malaysia, and has won numerous international recognitions, chairs and 
honorary positions.  Al-Attas has published twenty-seven works on various subjects, including 
Islamic metaphysics, cosmology, Sufism and Malay culture and literature.  Where Saroush 
advances a rationalist epistemology consistent with Kant’s secularly based moral imperative, 
espousing toleration towards various religious beliefs and an agnosticism or indifference towards 
the existence of God, Naquib Al-Attas claims that Islam begins with God’s existence as the only 
necessary trait of existence, truth and knowledge.  Knowledge, in turn, is of two kinds: “that 
given by God to man; and that acquired by man by means of his own effort of rational enquiry 
based upon experience and observation.”9  The latter kind of knowledge, when systematized and 
maintained under the conceptual sovereignty of tawhid,10 becomes ‘ilm.  As Osman Bakar, 
scholar of Islam, science, and comparative philosophy and professor/director of the Sultan Omar 
Ali Saifuddin Center for Islamic Studies at the University of Brunei states, ‘ilm conveys a 
“comprehensive sense of an organized body of knowledge that constitutes a discipline with its 
distinctive goals, basic premises, and objects and methods of inquiry.”11 
 
                                                          
9 See Al-Attas (1995), 69.  Such a theory of knowledge differs substantially from the naturalist philosophy and 
scientific positivism that has come to constitute Western epistemology since the Enlightenment, and which 
constituted Kant’s theory of nature. 
10 See chapter 3 above, “Religion, The Secular and Din,” for an explanation of the concept of Divine Unity in the 
Qur’an, or tawhid. 
11 Bakar, 5. 
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Alparslan Acikgenc12 conveys ‘ilm/science as: 
“a body of knowledge (in the sense of discipline), which arises as a result of the process of 
determining a subject matter that is investigated by a scholarly developed method yielding 
theories.”13 
 
The ‘uloom (plural of ‘ilm), or sciences, are of many varieties.  Sciences are meant to 
express the truth of tawhid, through many types of discourses brought about by the variety of 
natures in the objects of knowledge.  The type of knowledge is dependent on two: the importance 
of the object in the created order, or universal scheme, and the human faculty, or method, 
through which it is obtained.  Both of these factors belong to a hierarchical scale within the 
Islamic metaphysical framework.  The existing objects of knowledge are said to range in their 
importance from heaven to earth; this, too, is a science, based on the proximity of each object to 
the object of the necessary premise of tawhid, i.e. God.  The corresponding sciences also range in 
the same way.  The process of obtaining knowledge is what Al-Attas has called adab, which is 
“right action that springs from self-discipline founded upon knowledge whose source is 
wisdom.”14   When adab is actualized in society, it manifests ‘adl (justice).  Among the objects 
of adab is also knowledge,  
“and its many branches and disciplines, some of which have more important bearing upon our life 
and destiny than others; if one grades them according to various levels and priorities and classifies 
the various sciences in relation to their priorities putting each one in its proper place, then that is 
adab toward knowledge.”15 
 
Some contemporary thinkers who espouse this traditional epistemological hierarchy criticize the 
arrangement of disciplines in liberal academia in the Muslim world that follows “the modern 
                                                          
12 See p. 104 above for Acikgenc’s credentials and his definition of ‘worldview.’ 
13 Acikgenc, 35. 
14 Al-Attas (1995), 16. 
15 Ibid., 18. 
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educational system where theology, psychology and geology are placed horizontally alongside 
each other like so many drawers in a cabinet each containing a certain amount of information.”16 
Premodern Islamic epistemology based on the Qur’anic worldview is saturated with a 
tawhidic focus and is inseparable from concepts of wisdom and justice.  Tawhid requires that the 
human knowledge scheme be arranged hierarchically, for since according to the Qur’anic 
worldview the created universe exists in a hierarchy, so too must knowledge of it.  The 
importance of this “recurring theme” in Islamic scholarship, according to Bakar, has been “the 
concern with the means of preserving the hierarchy of the sciences and with the delineation of 
the scope and position of each science within the total scheme of knowledge.”17  Nasr explains: 
“In the traditional Islamic universe, both the subject and the object of knowledge are considered to 
be hierarchic.  Object reality is not only the spatio-temporal world available to the senses.  There 
is first of all the Absolute Reality, Allah, who alone Is in the absolute sense of the word.  Then 
there are the angelic orders, the intermediate imaginal world (the ‘alam al-khayal), then the world 
of the jinn and the men and finally the natural world.”18 
 
In this way the classification of sciences and knowledge in traditional Islamic 
epistemology is an application of the Qur’anic worldview.19  As mentioned above, knowledge 
depends on two factors: the object of study and the human faculty undertaking the investigation, 
or to put it another way, the knower and the known.  This brings us to a third essential aspect of 
traditional Islamic epistemology: the human faculties of knowing and the states of the heart. 
According to the Qur’anic worldview, the human being has been endowed with several 
distinct faculties of obtaining knowledge, as follows. 
“Man can know through the senses, through the imaginal faculty, through reason with its own 
several levels of activity, through the heart-intellect so often mentioned in the Qur’an and finally 
                                                          
16 Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Bakar, xiv.  In this introduction, Nasr asks, “How can an Islamic education system accept a 
situation in which there is no hierarchy between the knowledge of the angels and of molluscs or between the 
method of knowledge based upon reason wed to the external senses and knowledge which derives from the 
certitude (yaqin) derived from heart-knowledge?” (xiv) 
17 Ibid., 1. 
18 Ibid., xi. 
19 See chapter 3 above, “Religion, The Secular and Din,” for a summary of Toshihiko Izutsu’s semantical study of 
God and the human being in the Qur’an, and my own discussion of the uses of ‘worldview.’ 
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through revelation which is the objective counterpart of intellection with the eye of the heart (‘ayn 
al-qalb).”20 
 
Both ‘external existence’ and ‘mental existence’ are pervaded by the tawhidic hierarchy.  The 
soundness or unsoundness of a scientific finding will be dependent upon how closely this 
hierarchy is maintained in the relevant parts of the theory, and more importantly on how pristine 
or sullied the human faculty that is leading the investigation.  Regarding the major faculties of 
the human being, and going back to the two kinds of knowledge, that which is given by God and 
that which is arrived at through human’s own rational capacity, the ways of arriving at each are 
different: 
“The first kind can only be received by man through his acts of worship and devotion, his acts of 
service to God (ibadat) which, depending upon God’s grace and his own latent spiritual power and 
capacity created by God to receive it, the man receives by direct insight or spiritual savoring 
(dhawq) and unveiling to his spiritual vision (kashf).  This knowledge (ma’rifah) pertains to his 
self or soul, and such knowledge…gives insight into knowledge of God, and for that reason is the 
highest knowledge…The second kind of knowledge (‘ilm) is acquired through reason, experience 
and observation; it is discursive and deductive and it refers to objects of pragmatical value.”21 
 
Put more succinctly, knowledge comes from God and “is acquired through the channels 
of the sound senses, true report based on authority, sound reason, and intuition.”22  The sound 
senses are five external and five corresponding internal senses of perception and observation.  
They perceive and arrange sensual impressions, storing them and using them for intellection.  
Sound reason refers to more than rational databasing, abstraction, law-giving and ordering.  
Reason does all this, but furthermore it acts in accordance with the intellect, which is a spiritual 
substance inhering in the heart (qalb).  The qalb is the seat of intuition.  Intuition includes 
apprehension of the self and the external world, but also of religious truths, God and existence 
                                                          
20 Bakar, xii. 
21 Al-Attas (1995), 69. 
22 Ibid., 118. 
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itself.23  True report consists of well-established continuity and sequence of trusted people, and 
the speech of a messenger sent by God. 
The qalb intellective organ is one of the defining features of traditional Islamic 
epistemology.  In the Qur’anic worldview, the creation of al-insaan, the human being, was a 
cosmically epic event.  The entirety of the natural world was brought into being in order to test 
humans.  The human being was made from a clay that sounds when struck, dust mixed with 
water and Divine breath.  Al-insaan was given dominion over the earth and all its animals as 
God’s delegate (the office of vicegerency, or khilafah), and was given the intellective organ 
(interchangeably ‘aql, qalb, and nafs) to achieve knowledge of all types.  In this scheme, the 
human and the natural environment are governed by the same Divine law, but this does not mean 
they share the same constitution in the scale of creation.24  As the esoteric Muslim poet 
Jalaluddin Rumi said, “the angel is free because of his knowledge, the beast because of his 
ignorance.  Between the two remains the son of man to struggle.”25 
 The human being in search of true knowledge who is governed by tawhid will also need 
to clean the instruments of her investigation (whether the senses, the reason or the heart) through 
belief, ritual worship and pious acts.  She will also have to avoid the trappings of excess and 
sicknesses which afflict each of these organs, a task which is accomplished through the 
moral/positive law of Islam (the shari’a) and through the esoteric science of tasawwuf.  As 
mentioned earlier, adab, or knowing the proper places of things within the tawhidic universe, 
becomes an important part of the methodologies of acquiring knowledge.  The source of all true 
knowledge being God, the attainment of knowledge is the same as growing closer to God in 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 The human soul is itself part vegetative, part animal, and part rational.  But it is also something else.  The human 
nature is not limited to or synonymous with any of these aspects.  Al-Attas (1995), 118. 
25 Quoted in Kabir Helminski, The Rumi Collection: An Anthology of Translations of Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi.  
Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1998: 16. 
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degrees.  Thus tawhid doesn’t just penetrate discourse, but comprises the believer’s agentive 
motivation through the vehicle of piety.  Epistemology and piety go hand in hand.  As stated by 
eighteenth-century hadith scholar and reformer Shah Wali Allah, 
“The most basic principle of piety and the mainstay of its various aspects is the doctrine of the 
unity of God.  This is because humility before the Lord of the worlds, which is the greatest of the 
virtues in acquiring ultimate felicity, depends on this.”26 
 
The main difference between the epistemology expounded by Saroush and Al-Attas lies 
in the relative importance given to rationality, and the characterization of the human heart.  For 
Saroush, human reason evolved from an immature, timid and obedient state in religious 
premodernity, to a mature, bold and history-making (architectonic) state in enlightened, secular 
modernity.27  His only mention of the human heart pertains to the private essence of faith.  He 
states that while faith can be expressed publicly, its essence is private: “The prophets founded a 
faithful-spiritual community, not a legal-corporeal society.”28  Islam, according to Saroush, 
started in faiths and hearts before preceding to rites and obligations, and now that humankind has 
evolved beyond religious control of the public space, religion should return to faiths and hearts. 
Al-Attas, by contrast, posits human reason as useful and necessary, but does not 
epistemologically privilege it in the manner of the Enlightenment.  Reason is one way of 
knowing among others, and furthermore, is not the primary vehicle of the intellect: 
“In the same way that we do not confine reason to sensational elements, we do not restrict 
intuition to the direct and immediate apprehension, by the knowing subject, of itself, of its 
conscious states, of other selves like itself, of an external world, of universals, of values or of 
rational truths.  We understand by intuition also the direct and immediate apprehension of 
religious truths, of the reality and existence of God, of the reality of existences as opposed to 
essences – indeed, in its higher levels intuition is the intuition of existence itself…it is intuition 
that synthesizes what reason and experience each sees separately without being able to combine 
into a coherent whole.”29 
 
                                                          
26 Shah Wali Allah, The Conclusive Argument from God: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi’s Hujjat Allah al-Baligha.  Trans. 
Marcia Hermansen.  Islamabad: International Islamic University, 2003: 175. 
27 See chapter 4 above, “Muslim Approaches to Human Rights I: Islam as Religion in the Modern Sense.” 
28 Saroush, in Sadri, 141. 
29 Al-Attas (1995), 119-120. 
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Where Saroush, consistent with post-Enlightenment positivist rationality, understands reason 
distinctly from spirituality, Al-Attas maintains that the intellect is a spiritual substance that 
resides in the heart: 
“In this way and through the mediacy of the intellect we have connected reason with intuition.”30 
 
The heart, al-qalb, is itself understood interchangeably with the intellect, al-‘aql, as well 
as the spirit, al-ruh.  In premodern Islamic philosophical anthropology, according to Al-Attas, 
the human being is a rational soul, indicated by its innate faculty of apprehending universals.  
This faculty, natiq, comes from the root nutq, from which is also derived al-mantiq, or the 
science of logic.  The human being is a ‘language animal’ or a ‘speaking animal’ in this schema 
(al-hayawan al-natiq), such that: 
“the articulation of linguistic symbols into meaningful patterns is no other than the outward, 
visible and audible expression of the inner, unseen reality which we call the intellect (al-‘aql).  
The term ‘aql itself basically signifies a kind of ‘binding’ or ‘withholding’, so that in this respect it 
signifies an active, conscious entity that binds and withholds objects of knowledge by means of 
words or symbolic forms; and it indicates the same reality that is denoted by the terms ‘heart’ 
(qalb), ‘spirit’ (ruh), and ‘self’ (nafs).  This conscious, active entity or reality has many names 
such as identified by the four terms above because of its many modes in its relations with the 
various levels of existence.  The intellect is then a spiritual substance by which the rational soul 
recognizes truth and distinguishes truth from falsity.”31 
 
We can see from this that the rational and spiritual faculties, pertaining to truths about the 
various levels of existence (i.e. Divine, heavenly, anthropological and natural), are inseparable in 
premodern Islamic epistemology.  Al-Attas espouses a theory of knowledge that is closer to a 
dini conception of Islam than to Islam as a religion in the modern sense of the term, as Saroush 
does. 
Saroush’s epistemology mirrors the Enlightenment emphasis on reason alone – to the 
exclusion of other human faculties of knowing – such that ritual worship can neither aid nor 
desist scientific investigation.  He does positively value religious belief, practice and knowledge, 
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but in a way that separates the private world of faith from the public universe of scientific 
knowledge.32  Such a point of view is at odds with Al-Attas’ exposition of premodern (in his 
view the authentic Islamic position) Islamic commitments to the qalb as the intellective organ 
and seat of intuition, and the relation of ibada (worship) to the soundness or unsoundness of 
rational findings – not to mention the idea that all knowledge comes from God. 
 Theories of nature and freedom are also intimately affected by epistemological and 
philosophical differences between a modernist tradition (one that draws from Kant’s moral 
autonomy doctrine33) and a traditionalist focus on tawhid.34  For Kant, nature was the authoress 
of her own laws,35 and at the same time was a mere substance, to be dominated.36  Saroush 
echoes this view of nature when he claims: 
“Everything that enters nature, including religion and revelation, bends to its ways.  Everything 
that enters human society becomes social and human.  This means that in the realm of nature and 
human society, there is no such thing as supernatural and metaphysical phenomena.”37 
 
This is very different from the premodern Islamic rendering of nature, which holds that the order 
of nature derives from “the prototype of all existence…the Pen (al-Qalam) and the Guarded 
                                                          
32 See chapter 4 above. 
33 See chapter 2 above, “Human Rights in Historical Perspective and Today,” for an elaboration of Kant’s moral 
autonomy tradition constituting one of three major approaches to human rights today. 
34 ‘Traditionalist,’ particularly when posed distinctly from ‘modernist,’ signifies premodern Islamic.  See Jasser 
Auda, Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach.  London: The International Institute 
of Islamic Thought, 2008.  In chapter 5, Auda conducts an in-depth survey of contemporary theories of Islamic law.  
He identifies the three ‘classic’ classifications of Islamic ideologies as traditionalism/fundamentalism, modernism 
and secularism.  He then lists classification schemes in circulation today, such as the Rand corporation’s typology 
and the schema used by script-based ‘centrists’ (the wasatiyyah).  Auda’s commentary on these various schemes 
reveals weaknesses in each (146-152).  He then proposes his own classification, based on the differing levels of 
authority (sound, reinterpreted, supporting evidence, something spurious in it, and invalid) ascribed to various 
types of texts/norms (contemporary values/rights, rationality/rulings of traditional madhaahib, higher maqasid, 
prophetic traditions, and Qur’anic verses).  I use ‘traditionalist’ in the sense ascribed by Auda in this scheme, in 
which he identifies three major tendencies of Islamic ideologies and theories of law today.  He labels them 
traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism.  Traditionalism includes scholastic traditionalism, scholastic neo-
traditionalism, neo-literalism and ideology-oriented theories.  Auda, 153-168. 
35 Kant (1964), 93. 
36 Adorno, 56-57 and 104-105. 
37 Saroush, in Sadri, 61. 
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Tablet (al-lawh al-mahfuz).”38  Ordered nature is confirmed by the insistence “that everything is 
created according to measure.”39  Nature is not “an independent domain of reality with its own 
independent order,” a notion “to which the Quran points constantly as outward proofs of God, 
His Wisdom and His Power.”40  A secular positivist framework could not accept a statement 
such as: 
“The very substance of the cosmos is the ‘Breath of the Compassionate’ (nafas al-Rehman) while 
cosmic forms and all that constitutes the order of nature emanate from the archetypal realities and 
ultimately the Divine Essence Itself…the order of nature is nothing but the Divine Reality 
manifesting itself on the plane of phenomenal existence.”41 
 
Disjuncture also exists between the rival epistemologies of Saroush and Al-Attas on the 
understanding of freedom.  For Saroush, freedom is inextricably intertwined with our 
rationality.42  This is consistent with Kant’s categorical statement that the “concept of freedom is 
the key to explain autonomy of the will.”43  Freedom must be presupposed as a property of the 
will of all rational beings.44  Kant maintains that the human being knows that pure reason 
independent of sensibility is the source of law.45  However, for Saroush, proponents of freedom 
and democracy today needn’t espouse atheism or make religion completely irrelevant for public 
life.  While “liberal freedom was freedom from the fetters of religion and metaphysics,”46 it is 
possible and desirable for contemporary Muslims to decouple liberalism from democracy and 
arrive at religious democracy.47 
                                                          
38 Seyyed Hossein Nasr.  Religion and the Order of Nature: The 1994 Cadbury Lectures at the University of 
Birmingham.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1996: 60. 
39 Ibid., 61. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 61-62. 
42 Saroush, in Sadri, 90. 
43 Kant (1964), 114. 
44 He states: “And I maintain that to every rational being possessed of a will we must also lend the Idea of freedom 
as the only one under which he can act.” Ibid., 116. 
45 Ibid., 121. 
46 Saroush, in Sadri, 137. 
47 Ibid., 138-141. 
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According to Nasr, the tawhidic notion of freedom is so far removed from Western 
humanist understandings of it, that it may first be necessary to forget the modernist definition of 
the term: 
“The discussion of the concept of freedom in the West today is so deeply influenced by the 
Renaissance and post-Renaissance notion of man as a being in revolt against Heaven and master 
of the earth that it is difficult to envisage the very meaning of freedom in the context of a 
traditional civilization such as that of Islam…It is meaningless to try to study the notion of 
freedom in Islam from the point of view of the meaning which has been attached to this term in 
the West since the rise of humanism.”48 
 
Whereas for Kant – and also for Saroush49 – the autonomy of the will came from its submission 
to reason alone against the heteronomy of private interests, tawhidic personal freedom lies in 
surrender to the Divine Will, and in purifying the self from the pressures of the carnal soul.50  As 
such, ‘infinite freedom’ exists only in proximity to the Infinite (i.e. God), while all lower levels 
of existence are conditioned by cosmic exigencies and the limitations imposed by the Ultimate 
Reality (i.e. God) upon humans.51  Nasr explains the different meanings given to freedom in 
different traditional Islamic sciences: according to jurists, rights and freedoms are consequences 
of obligations (to God, nature, other human beings), and freedom in its most universal sense is 
aimed at by maximizing social equilibrium (hence the legislative role of the shari’a); according 
to the theologians, the antinomy of human freedom (ikhtiyar) and Divine determinism (jabr) 
constituted much debate;52 and according to the esotericists (i.e. the Sufis), freedom is not 
individualistic, but consists in integration with the Universal (i.e. God) – a task of transcendence 
which is pursued through strict observance of the shari’a.53 
                                                          
48 Nasr (1981), 16. 
49 Saroush states that justice “as a value, cannot be religious.  It is religion that has to be just.”  In Sadri, 131. 
50 Nasr (1981), 17. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Abdulaziz Sachedina focuses on the ‘Ashari theological siding with divine determinism, and the Mu’tazila siding 
with individual autonomy.  See chapter 4 above. 
53 Nasr (1981), 18-21. 
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 To recapitulate, Naquib Al-Attas presents a distinctly premodern, or traditionalist Islamic 
epistemology.  In it knowledge is attained through the spiritual substance of the heart-intellect, 
with help from the use of reason.  The faculties of knowledge are arranged hierarchically 
(spiritual intuition, true report, rational intellection, sense perception) as are the objects to be 
known (God, the angelic orders, the human being, the natural world).  Tawhid constitutes every 
truth-value, and is consistent with every true knowledge.  The human being’s faculties of 
knowing will be more or less accurate depending on how consistently (in both theoretical 
discourse, as first premise, as well as through practice, as lived belief) tawhid comprises the 
principle criterion of the knowledge sought.  The modern sense of religion does not 
accommodate such a spiritually entangled temporal world of discourse.  Rather, it delegates to 
religion the private sphere of personal belief, and organizes the public realm rationally (i.e. 
scientifically and secularly).  In this way, Al-Attas’ conception of knowledge extends the notion 
of Islam as din. 
 
Scripture as Sieve and the Historicized Modern State 
 Sherman Jackson is the King Faisal Chair of Islamic Thought and Culture and Professor 
of Religion and American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California.  He has 
authored several works on Islam, including on the constitutional jurisprudence of Al-Qarafi, the 
theological tolerance of Al-Ghazzali, the Sufism of Ibn Ata’Allah, and Islam and the problem of 
Black suffering in America.  In his theorizing on liberalism and universal human rights, Sherman 
Jackson takes a critical, historicizing perspective.  He finds both strengths and weaknesses in 
human rights discourse, and advocates for a partial adoption and partial reworking of human 
rights from a Muslim perspective.  This leads him to propose an alternative framework for 
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understanding universal human rights, a two-tier scheme in which rights are valued 
differentially.  In his theorizing on the modern state, Jackson challenges its monopoly over law, 
calling for a limiting of its legal scope.  He also examines the American state in racial-historical 
perspective, bringing to the surface a number of systemic issues pertaining to ‘false universals’ 
confronting American Muslims.  In all these different works, Jackson espouses premodern 
traditional Sunni Islam (in its Qur’anic worldview, epistemology and importance of the shari’a) 
and evaluates political phenomena and discourses through the sieve of scripture. 
 In a lecture delivered at Duke University entitled “Western Muslims and Human Rights: 
an Alternative Framework?”  Jackson, citing the work of University of Sussex (United Kingdom) 
law and anthropology professor Marie Benedict-Dembour, gives a brief survey of modern 
approaches to universal human rights.54  Jackson’s own position lies somewhere between all the 
schools surveyed by Benedicte-Dembour, but he cannot adhere to any one of them because they 
all place human rights on the same plane.  Jackson agrees that freedom from torture, rape, 
murder, and unlawful confiscation can be termed human rights, but does not believe freedom 
from hijab, polygamy, and shari’a are human rights.  Not even freedom from racism constitutes 
human rights, says Jackson, and if so, certainly not on the same plane as freedom from torture, 
etc.55  Jackson cites human rights attorney Macawa Mauwa, who has argued that human rights 
conceal the hidden agenda of liberal democracy. 
Elsewhere, Jackson has stated the need to disentangle liberalism and democracy, a point 
to which I return below with regard to Jackson’s analysis of the modern state’s monopoly over 
                                                          
54 Based on Marie Benedicte-Dembour, “What are Human Rights?  Four Schools of Thought.”  Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb. 2010): 1-20.  Benedicte-Dembour identifies four main contemporary approaches to 
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law.  In his discussions of universal human rights, he proposes an alternative framework that is 
comprised of two tiers of rights.  He bases his model on the work of the thirteenth century Maliki 
scholar Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi.56  Al-Qarafi articulated a distinction between the ‘rights’ of God 
and the ‘rights’ of humans.  He defined the rights of humans as everything we have the ‘right’ to 
forfeit, in contrast to the rights of God, which are human entitlements that can’t be forfeited.  The 
basis of all this is Divine dispensation, placing the shari’a in a determinative role.  For example, 
a human can’t choose to participate in usury, because he/she doesn’t have the right to do so.  A 
human can pardon the murderer of his/her family member, because he/she does have the right to 
do so.57 
The ‘rights’ of God in this scheme are inalienable human rights, while the ‘rights’ of 
human beings are alienable.  In Jackson’s scheme, these would correspond, respectively, to 
primary and secondary human rights.  Among the primary rights of God, the most prominent is 
the sanctity of the public space, which has traditionally been responsible for enabling people’s 
livelihoods and necessary social relations.  The public space embodies such values as: freedom 
from genocide, torture, rape, murder, unlawful confiscation, etc.  Jackson proposes that the rights 
of the religious practices and beliefs of Muslims and non-Muslims alike can easily be interpreted 
as rights of God based on the principle of the sanctity of the public space.  Another right of God, 
human freedom from usury and exploitation, “addresses various ravages of modern capitalism,” 
and also points to the extension of human rights concerns “beyond the exclusively political 
abuses of the state.”58   In this way, Jackson is proposing a new space for critiquing the limits of 
the present human rights discourse, as well as making the radical proposition that Islam, more 
                                                          
56 See also Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihab al-Din al-
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than just needing to be tolerated, can contribute positively to the debates.  He also provides a 
basis for establishing the rights of non-Muslim minorities in a Muslim human rights system that 
radically bypasses the freedom-of-religion paradigm of universal human rights. 
 Jackson also gives mixed reviews to democracy as a political form.  He neither privileges 
nor shuns the democratic state as a political form, but rather cautions theorists to question which 
background is given “priority…in terms of what we consider to be a normative discussion of the 
issue of Islam and democracy.”59  Articulations and histories of Islam always having been 
multiple, and democracy being distinct from liberal democracy, Jackson urges against theoretical 
conflations that blur specificities.  He also maintains that scripture serves as a sieve through 
which existing institutions ought to be sifted by Muslims.  Neither the democratic state nor 
Islamic political forms are ahistorical, and as such, are always open to evolutionary development. 
To this end, Jackson challenges the modern state in at least two ways.  First, he questions 
the state’s monopoly over law.  He does so by juxtaposing the scope of the interpretative 
authority of Muslim jurists according to the shari’a, and the ever-intrusive lawmaking monopoly 
of the modern nation-state.60  Common misunderstanding of these two issues helps explain why 
Islam and democracy are often posited at odds.  In fact, says Jackson, rethinking the scope of 
Muslim juristic authority and the reach of the modern nation-state would allow for democracy to 
flourish alongside Muslim legal settings. 
Jackson shows that there is precedent within the Islamic legal heritage for separating law 
from fact.  Jurists were to be trusted to generate law – rulings for new situations based on 
interpretation of the sacred sources – but not to establish the facts activating those laws.  In other 
                                                          
59 See “Sherman Jackson on Islam and Liberal Democracy,” posted by berkleycenter.  Available at 
http://youtu.be/0w7g4FD-BhQ.  Accessed June 13, 2013. 
60 Sherman Jackson, “Shari’ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, 
and Pluralism.”  Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 1 (2003): 88-107. 
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words, a jurist would rule on what the position of the sun must be for a particular prayer time to 
be in, but could not speak authoritatively on whether or not the sun was in such a position.  This 
separation of authority – legal from factual – promoted a tremendous flexibility.  Changing times 
and conditions necessitated changing legal rulings, and the people played the part of connecting 
the law to concrete reality.  The other issue is that of the reach of the modern nation-state, with 
its tendency to regulate and legislate every detail of modern life.  If law could be understood in 
somewhat of a plural sense, with regard to different communities, then religious pluralism and 
toleration could more likely be realized.61 
The second way Jackson questions modern democracy is by historicizing it.  In the 
particular case of democracy in the United States, he shows how the established tradition of 
white supremacy – historically and institutionally sanctioned by American liberal democracy –
has helped shape Blackamerican and immigrant Muslim subjectivities and religious practice.  In 
Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection, he calls for 
Blackamerican and immigrant-American Muslims to disentangle themselves from the tyranny of 
false universals in both national and religious myths.62  Blackamerican Muslims must caste off 
internalized white supremacy as well as the superiority complex purported by ‘immigrant Islam.’  
Immigrant Muslims must free themselves from the mistaken belief in their own culture-free 
mastery over the intellectual legacy of Islam. 
The Blackamerican Muslim must settle upon a self-definition which is both enabling and 
‘authentic.’63  As such, this community must struggle on the one hand against institutionalized 
white supremacy in the United States, and on the other against the presumed authority of 
immigrant Muslims (mainly Arab and South Asian) over the religious tradition.  Both immigrant 
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63 Ibid., 2-3. 
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Muslims in the US and native Blackamerican Muslims have been affected by particular historical 
processes, as well as by the institution of white supremacy. 
Jackson argues that white supremacy, as a seminal force of the American sociopolitical 
order, shapes the context of American Islam in important ways.  It makes Blackamerican 
Muslims complicit to the hegemonic presumptions of immigrant Muslims, as the two groups are 
processed differently by boundaries of American whiteness.  Immigrant Muslims presume that 
Blackamericans are too cultural (i.e. not universal enough) when they try to express their 
cultural, social and political realities in the United States, and that their own collective vision of 
Islam in America is untainted by historical baggage.  But in fact, argues Jackson, this is not the 
case.  The virtual monopoly enjoyed by immigrant Muslims in directing Islam in America is 
actually weighed down by the particularity of their own historical experiences, of what Jackson 
terms post-colonial religion:64 
“And yet, the history of the modern Muslim world was far from either ‘pure’ or unadulterated.  It 
included, inter alia, brutal Western colonialism, staggering poverty and economic backwardness, 
widespread illiteracy, artificial national boundaries and thus artificial nationalities, intransigent 
social and class stratification, gross scientific and technological dependency, an ossified and 
embattled religious and intellectual tradition, and the unprecedented centralization of state 
apparatuses presided over by autocratic, dictatorial rulers and corrupt, inefficient 
bureaucracies…These bitter experiences gave rise to a number of situation-specific responses, the 
majority of which were as informed by need-born pragmatism and Third World notions of anti-
imperialism and national liberation as they were by Islam.”65 
 
In fact, argues Jackson, the classical Sunni tradition “rarely informs the actual substance 
of the doctrines of Immigrant Islam,” at least not directly.66  Among the effects of this false 
universalism on the part of immigrant Muslims is that ‘the West’ has emerged as American 
Islam’s new ‘counter-category,’ replacing white supremacy.67  Particularly American issues like 
police brutality, the mistreatment of blacks in media and entertainment, the ‘war on drugs’ and 
                                                          
64 Ibid., 77-78. 
65 Ibid., 78. 
66 Ibid., 13. 
67 Ibid., 72. 
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the prison industrial complex, unemployment, gross inequalities in education, inner-city violence 
and broken families, etc., were all replaced by a spotlight on the problems of the Muslim world 
(i.e. Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan, etc.).68  As a result, Islam began losing its relevance and 
potential for the problems of American ghettoes.  Whereas earlier epochs in the history of Islam 
in America endowed disadvantaged communities with “such values as manly pride, fiscal 
responsibility, or civic consciousness,”69 the immigrant takeover of American Muslims’ 
collective vision sacrificed these native exigencies (i.e. specifically American social and political 
problems) to more Middle Eastern and South Asian political concerns.  Jackson’s historical 
approach can be summed up in his contention that no doctrine or school is transcendent.  
Accordingly, “there is no ‘real’, ‘true’, or ‘authentic’ Islam apart from the historical 
instantiations (read interpretations) of the religion in the world.”70 
 Jackson’s vision of a third resurrection71 in Blackamerican Islam includes an 
endorsement of traditional Sunni epistemology.  Specifically, the advantage offered by the 
tradition is to be found: 
“in certain structural features of classical Muslim ecumenicism whose function it was to reconcile 
the competing interests of interpretive integrity and intrareligious pluralism.  Given the breadth of 
its geographical expansion and its conscious decision not to adjudicate doctrinal disputes through 
a centralized ecclesiastical authority, classical Sunnism was forced to develop alternative 
mechanisms for this purpose.  These mechanisms provided the ability to adjust to changing 
circumstances as the religion moved through space and time.  It is primarily these mechanisms, 
rather than any body of fixed medieval doctrines, that the Third Resurrection seeks to enlist into 
the cause of Blackamerican Islam…The synergy between the doctrine of Prophetic infallibility 
and the principle of Unanimous Consensus laid the foundation for intra-Muslim pluralism.  As 
long as a jurist’s view showed itself to be grounded in authoritative sources and based on 
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recognized principles of interpretation, no one could legitimately deny him the right to express it – 
regardless of substance – as long as it did not violate a pre-existing Unanimous Consensus.”72 
 
Jackson endorses perpetuation of the classical Sunni tradition as the means by which 
Blackamerican Muslims can transcend the false universalisms they suffer along with their 
immigrant sistren and brethren.  He does so by analyzing two different strains of contemporary 
Sunni Islam in America, what he terms modern and modernized Islams. 
 According to Jackson, modern Islam consists of Islamists (adhering to the doctrines of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jama’at-i-Islami, and to lesser extent, Hizb al-Tehrir) and 
neofundamentalists (the Salafi movement).  The Islamists have a decidedly political orientation, 
while the neofundamentalists reject politicized agendas.  The neofundamentalists reject what 
they perceive to be the ‘intellectualism’ of traditional Sunni ecumenicism and unity, focusing 
instead on vigilant practice and symbolic doctrines that set them apart from less scrupulous 
Muslims.  They are literalist and reject Islam’s mystical dimensions.73  Jackson deems both 
Islamists and neofundamentalists ‘modern’ because both are products of the modern world.  Both 
are characterized by two love-hate relationships: one with the West, the other with the classical 
tradition.  He states: 
“Modern Islam also borrows from the modern West the latter’s universalism, according to which 
only that which is universally true can be true at all, and that which is true (or useful) must also be 
‘Islamic’.  Among Salafis, this is manifested in the surfeited and overinclusive use of the concept 
of ‘unsanctioned innovation (bid’a),’ as the proscriber of all that was not embraced and allegedly 
handed down by the Pious Ancestors.  Among Islamists, it appears in the increased use of the 
neologism ‘Islamic’…Both of these tendencies go beyond the simple preference for institutions 
that are based on scripture and/or authentic Tradition, a preference shared by all committed 
Muslims.  These tendencies are, rather, mechanisms for converting the choices and preferences 
(including imported choices and preferences!) of the contemporary Muslim world into normative 
if not binding religious institutions for Muslims everywhere.  At bottom, both of these conversion 
mechanisms mask a deep and abiding obsession with issues of identity, according to which the 
compromising or shedding of an Eastern identity (or the taking on or retaining of a Western one) 
is equated with a loss or compromise of religion.”74 
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 This translates into the modernists’ hostility towards culture.  They embody “an 
extremely cramped aesthetic,” between premodern Muslim accretions and Western hegemonic, 
corrupting culture.75  “In its attempt to insulate itself from all of this,” modern Islam experiences 
“the entire space between the home and the mosque – the space for leisure activity, recreation, 
cultural production, and social interaction” – as a threat.76  The underlying cause of this approach 
is modern Islam’s relation to traditional Sunni methodology.  The Islamists and 
neofundamentalists are “driven by a results-oriented thinking by which the validity of the 
classical theory is judged and made subservient to their Post-Colonial ‘vision of the truly 
Islamic.’”77  This is precisely why, says Jackson, modern Islam “is incapable of transferring 
religious authority outside itself,” why it “can neither promote nor accommodate the 
indigenization of Islam in America” but “can only function as an instrument of religion-based 
domination for Blackamerican Muslims.”78 
 In contrast to modern Islam, modernized Islam seeks to perpetuate traditional Sunni 
epistemology, “ostensibly calibrated to the realities of modern times… a true genetic descendent 
of the classical schools of thought, the so-called madhhabs.”79  Modernized Islam draws on this 
highly sophisticated tradition of jurisprudence and hermeneutics for actualizing intrareligious 
pluralism.  In distinguishing between essential and coincidental features, traditional shari’a can 
accommodate cultural specificity across various groups (i.e. bridging the impasse between 
Blackamerican and immigrant Islam).  In premodernity, traditional shari’a’s affinity for 
intrareligious pluralism prevented a conflation of unity with uniformity: 
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“Having established an independent theory of interpretation (the so-called usul al-fiqh) upon 
which it conferred the authority to validate any view that could show integrity thereto, all views so 
validated were admitted, ceteris paribus, into the sanctum of ‘orthodoxy.’  And, because this 
classical theory was equally accessible to all Muslims, there was rarely a period in premodern 
Islam during which religious authority did not transfer in a timely fashion.”80 
 
The traditional view that all action is permissible until proven otherwise can alleviate the 
situation between Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims in the US, because it would allow for 
the validity of Blackamerican historical experiences, habits and customs, and for the transferring 
of religious authority from one group to another (rather than religious-based domination).81 
 Jackson hopes that both groups of American Muslims transcend their racial and ethnic 
essentialism to arrive at a shared historical consciousness.  Such a third resurrection of Islam in 
America can occur only in conjunction with the methods and principles of a traditional Sunni 
outlook and methodology.  Specifically, Blackamerican Muslims must appropriate and master 
the Sunni orthodox tradition, and thereby “emerge as self-authenticating subjects rather than 
dependent objects of and in this tradition.”82 
In one important way, Jackson neither privileges nor shuns the democratic state as a 
political form, but rather cautions theorists to question which background is prioritized in 
normative discussions of Islam and democracy.83  This is markedly different from An-Na’im’s 
unequivocal endorsement of secular constitutional democracy as the best political form for 
Muslim-majority states.  An-Na’im disapproves of legally pluralistic proposals that would have 
secular constitutions coincide with institutionalized religious law.84  He also advances secular 
governance as the most desirable type from the point of view of religious freedom, for only in a 
secular system could freedom of faith truly flourish.  An-Na’im does not problematize the 
                                                          
80 Ibid., 86-87. 
81 Ibid., 90. 
82 Ibid. 6. 
83 “Sherman Jackson on Islam and Liberal Democracy”… 
84 See chapter 4 above. 
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deficiencies or historicize the claims of secular democracy like Jackson does.  For example, 
where Jackson identifies white supremacy as a historical American institution that processes 
identities and mitigates social relations and economic reality, An-Na’im accepts formal equality 
among citizens of liberal democracies as an unproblematic given.  Where Jackson breaks down 
universal human rights into its liberal heritage and the storied values that would advance 
‘second-tier’ alienable rights, An-Na’im speaks of human rights as truly universal, universally 
rational and culturally foundationless. 
In these differences, Jackson and An-Na’im relate to the shari’a differently.  For Jackson, 
the role of the shari’a is determinative.  It contains within it sufficient mechanisms for necessary 
renewal over time and across cultural space, as well as for transfer of juristic authority.  For An-
Na’im, the shari’a as it has been passed down to contemporary Muslims is anachronistic to 
present needs.  It represents an antiquated set of historical accretions which must be radically 
altered – in both content and method – to reflect the universally rational norms represented by 
human rights discourse.  This is very different from Jackson’s proposal, which calls for present 
norms to be sifted through the sieve of scripture.  These two ways of relating to the shari’a help 
identify Jackson and An-Na’im with two different definitions of Islam: Jackson adheres to a dini 
definition of Islam, in its deep texture as publicly and privately relevant and transformative, 
while An-Na’im adheres to a modern definition of religion in its apolitical formulation. 
 
A Positive Theory of the Veil and the Unnamed Subtext of the Women and Islam Discourse 
 Katherine Bullock is professor of political science at the University of Toronto at 
Mississauga.  She co-founded the Tessellate Institute, an independent non-profit research 
institute that documents the lived experiences of Canadian Muslims in a number of media.  In 
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Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging Historical and Modern Stereotypes, 
Bullock utilizes a multi-disciplinary approach to examine various discourses surrounding the 
Muslim woman’s traditional headdress.85  She begins with a historical approach in the first 
chapter to show that attacking the veil was essential to the colonial project.  In so doing she 
hopes to establish the constructed nature of the anti-veil discourse.  The next chapter presents 
interviews with numerous Canadian Muslim women on the veil and related issues.  She employs 
a feminist methodology that allows women’s experiences to be foundational for knowledge.  The 
third chapter is a survey of sociological, anthropological and historical literature on why women 
are re-veiling in the Muslim world.  The fourth chapter is a critique of Fatima Mernissi’s work, 
particularly her anti-veil discourse.  In this critique, Bullock shows that alternative readings of 
the veil – not based on Mernissi’s personal experiences86 – are possible.  The fifth chapter 
focuses on Bullock’s ‘home discipline’, i.e. political theory.  In it she posits a positive theory of 
the veil: that that it is liberating vis-à-vis both capitalist exploitation and the oppressive aspects 
of the male gaze. 
 Bullock situates herself in the study as a believing, practicing, veiling Western Muslim 
woman.87  Her underlying assumption: 
“that Islam as a political theory (a theory of political community) does not oppress women guides 
my critiques and formulation of a positive theory of the veil.”88 
 
                                                          
85 Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil: Challenging Historical and Modern Stereotypes.  
London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2002. 
86 Bullock acknowledges that Mernissi’s experiences with veiling – growing up in postwar Morocco under French 
occupation – must have been very traumatic indeed.  But the problem is that Mernissi conflates her experiences 
with the meaning of veiling per se.  Bullock, 138. 
87 Bullock uses ‘the West’ as a discursive shorthand even while she advocates for an end to its usage.  The duality 
of the East/West binary is problematic because it “simplifies global politics, and most importantly, erases areas of 
similarity between ‘West’ and ‘East’.”  But because there is no agreed-upon alternative yet, she uses ‘the West’ 
and ‘Western’ in this limited, qualified sense.  Ibid., xxxvi-xxxvii. 
88 Ibid., xl. 
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She does not deny that repressive practices and discourses exist amongst Muslims, pertaining to 
veiling and other matters affecting women.  However, Bullock takes issue with competing 
renditions for what constitutes normative Islam, or the Qur’anic vision.  The problem occurs 
when negative experiences of veiling become stand in for the meaning of veiling per se:89 
“Clearly some women experience covering as oppressive.  My point is that the ‘veil is oppressive’ 
notion has become a paradigm in which the ‘meaning’ of the veil as oppressive assumes the status 
of a truth claim…I disagree with that interpretation.”90 
 
Her outline for understanding a normative Islam that doesn’t oppress women encompasses 
traditional law and sacred text, as well as the legitimacy for producing new mechanisms as 
needed: 
“An assumption of this book is that ‘Islam’ does not oppress women, and that where ‘Islam’ finds 
its expression in law, that law should not oppress or discriminate against women; and that where 
such burdens are to be found in law, they should be amended or removed, and that the Qur’an and 
Sunnah provide the legitimacy and wherewithal so to do.”91 
 
 Bullock emphasizes that the Qur’anic vision is not a static relic from ancient times, but an 
ongoing aspiration: 
“I understand that real Muslim communities may not reflect the positive normative outline that I 
describe.  However, just as liberalism remains an ongoing aspiration for the creation of a good 
society that has not yet been achieved in reality – a society free of racism, poverty, sexism and so 
on – so I hold to a theory of Islam that is an ongoing aspiration for the creation of a good 
society.”92 
 
Bullock enumerates the sources of this normative outline, what she terms “what Islam 
requires.”93  She does this in a way that is consistent with standard traditionalist accounts of 
orthodox Sunni Islam.  Normative Islam is constituted (hierarchically) by: the Qur’an, the 
prophetic utterances and agentive examples (i.e. the ahadith and Sunna), the shari’a law and local 
customs (where these don’t contravene the higher sources).94  The Qur’an and Sunna provide the 
                                                          
89 According to Bullock, this is what Mernissi does.  Ibid., 138. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., xxv. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 154. 
94 Ibid., 154-157. 
189 
 
mechanisms necessary for refining the tradition, law, practice, etc. to remove deleterious, 
oppressive elements.  In this way, unlike Mernissi, Bullock does not suggest a radical 
epistemological break with premodern Islamic tradition for the purpose of improving Muslim 
women’s situations.  Rather, she believes that alleviation ought to be sought intra-traditionally. 
 Before reading Bullock’s alternative, positive theory of the veil, it is important to 
understand her critique of the unnamed subtext of the women-and-Islam discourse.    The liberal 
feminist judgment that ‘the veil = oppressive’ is based on specifically liberal understandings of 
‘equality’ and ‘liberty.’95  Because ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ are unstable categories, Bullock 
rejects the subsequent tenet that ‘modernity = unveil.’96  Bullock asks, how can we even measure 
and determine what counts as oppressive practices?  She espouses a viewpoint similar to 
MacIntyre’s argument regarding the rationality of traditions97 when she states: 
“Our different judgments about veiling have to do with differences in our worldviews and in 
ideological and political commitments and contexts.”98   
 
In feminist religious studies, one finds a bias such that women’s negative experiences are 
implicitly posited as the authentic ones, while their positive experiences are accounted for as 
products of false consciousness that reinscribe patriarchal norms.  In the specific case of the 
women and Islam field, certain liberal assumptions about society and human nature play this 
part.99  Bullock wishes to problematize the paradigmatic assumptions about the veil as 
oppressive by pointing to the constructed nature of the anti-veil discourse. 
 Bullock devotes a considerable portion of her work to critiquing Fatima Mernissi.  This is 
because of the special place that Mernissi occupies in the women and Islam field: 
                                                          
95 Ibid., xii, xv.  This point will be discussed in greater detail below, in the section on Saba Mahmood’ work The 
Politics of Piety. 
96 Ibid., xxi. 
97 See chapter 1 above, “Introduction: The Rationality of Traditions.” 
98 Bullock, xxviii. 
99 Ibid., xxxi. 
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“Mernissi has codified for the academic world a popular cultural view of Muslim women as 
dangerous beings needing control.  In so doing, however, she has failed to say that that is what she 
is doing.”100 
 
While Mernissi’s characterization does correspond to certain instances and practices of Muslim 
women’s subordination and oppression/seclusion, 
“The problem is her acceptance of those practices as truly Islamic ones, with no interrogation of 
them, and with no careful analysis of the complex relationship that exists between actual cultural 
practices and the Qur’an.”101 
 
Bullock’s principal disagreements with Mernissi pertain to: “1) an ahistorical approach to the 
meanings of religious symbols that fails to contextualize how people react differently in different 
times and places; and 2) a reductive approach that does not acknowledge the multiplicity of 
discourses around veiling.”102  Bullock enumerates and rebuts many of the details in Mernissi’s 
arguments pertaining to the veil.  These include: Islam views women as a threat to the social 
order; Islam considers femaleness as anti-divine; women are a threat to men and male piety; 
women are excluded from the community of believers (the ummah) and subjugated by seclusion 
and the veil; the veil is a symbol for Islam’s control of and contempt for women; defining 
Muslims as living in a theocratic state; and postcolonial Muslims being of only two types 
(fundamentalists or uncovering women).103 
 Mernissi’s work is an important symbol for some shortcomings in liberal and 
poststructuralist feminist theorizing.  Because many such theorists assume that human behavior 
and desire are socially constructed,  
“Any strategy, like hijab, that appears to cement traditional male-female differences is 
suspect…patriarchy has used false male/female distinctions to keep women subjugated, 
and…anything that looks like acceptance of fundamental male/female difference (that is, hijab) is 
oppressive for women.  This critique of hijab relies on liberal assumptions about human nature, 
the meaning of sexuality, liberation, oppression and equality.”104 
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The unnamed subtext of certain feminist theorizing remains problematic when Muslim women 
and veiling become the objects of study.  This can be seen in the debates about essentialism.  
Bullock considers the imputation of essentialism to be “one of the main feminist 
misinterpretations of hijab that lead to negative critiques of covering.”105  While essentialism can 
be dangerous when it enshrines the superiority of one group over another (i.e. men over women), 
the Qur’an posits that the male and female are of an essential sameness.106 
 Another unnamed subtext of the women and Islam discourse – which is, to be sure, a 
Western discourse107 – is in its individual choice doctrine, which sometimes posits the 
superiority of Western ways.108  Bullock also rebuts claims (by Mernissi and many others) that 
veiling secludes women,109 negates femininity and female sexuality,110 and absolves men of their 
moral responsibility to respect women (regardless of how they are dressed).111  She does this by 
resorting to sources in her normative Islam outline, i.e. mainly by citing Qur’anic verses and 
prophetic sayings and precedents. 
 Once Bullock has completed the tasks of showing the historical colonial roots of anti-veil 
discourse, presenting (a small sample of) Muslim women’s responses to questions about belief, 
gender and veiling, critiquing Mernissi’s arguments against the veil, and identifying and situating 
the unnamed subtexts of some feminist theorizing on women and Islam, she constructs her own 
                                                          
105 Ibid., 206. 
106 Bullock is referring to the Qur’anic concept of pairs, and how the nafs (soul) and its zawj (spouse) are used to 
explain the creation of male and female complementarity.  Ibid., 201. 
107 Bullock states: “The women and Islam field as a whole [is] (a Western field of knowledge), despite reflexivity 
and despite the presence of the indigenous researcher…” Ibid., 225. 
108 Ibid., 221.  This point will be elaborated in greater detail in my treatment, below, of Saba Mahmood’s critique of 
liberal feminism’s exclusively liberatory definitions of women’s agency. 
109 Ibid., 200-201.  On accusations of seclusion, Bullock maintains: “the Qur’an is arguing [in 33:59] that in the 
public arena there is something about male-female relations that can be harmful to women, and that wearing an 
outer garment might alleviate.” Ibid., 201. 
110 Ibid., 194-199.  She states that the veil “does not smother femininity or sexuality.  Rather, it regulates where 
and for whom one’s femininity and sexuality will be displayed and deployed.” Ibid., 199. 
111 Ibid., 206-207. 
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favorable political theory of the veil.  Bullock’s alternative, positive theory of the hijab posits it 
“as a gateway into a faith tradition that assists its adherents to withstand the corrosive effects of 
modern materialism.”112  Such corrosive effects have been addressed in feminist theory, and 
include: the objectification and commodification of women’s bodies in capitalist culture, the 
harm done to women by the promotion of a beauty ideal, and women’s internalization of the 
male gaze. 
 Bullock cautions that her presentation of the Qur’anic vision as a normative ideal of 
Islam should not be misunderstood as romantic or uncritical/unreflective: 
“In presenting an argument that hijab frees women from the negative effects of the male gaze, I 
am not arguing that hijab is a magical device that halts all male aggression against women.  That 
would be to deny the feminist insight that male aggression against women is often an expression 
of power (not sex).  Male harassment of women is, sadly, a worldwide phenomenon, and Muslim 
men (also sadly) are no exception.  However, these men are lacking the proper Islamic etiquette of 
male/female relations and are no more representative of the Islamic ideal than are Western men 
who harass women exemplars of a Judeo-Christian or secular-liberal ideal.  For some reason, 
critics of hijab often misunderstand this point.”113 
 
The benefits of veiling are also religious and spiritual for the women who practice it willingly.  
Hijab is a barrier to unlawful sexuality, something every believing woman and man strives to 
avoid.  Since women are acknowledged in the Qur’anic vision as sexual creatures – and this in a 
non-shameful way114 – another benefit of veiling from an Islamic hermeneutic is that it helps 
women lower the gaze of their own desires.115 
 One of the important themes of Bullock’s Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil turns 
out to be a critical questioning of how we understand the relationship between a text and 
historical lived experiences in all their contextual diversity.  The specificities and historical lived 
experiences of Muslims should not be ignored, whether to claim the backwardness (as 
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Orientalists did and do) or the progressiveness (as apologetic Muslims do) of Islam.116  When 
faced with the reality of Muslim women being often unduly restricted, Bullock asks, where do 
we place the blame?  It isn’t correct to equate Islam with the oppression of women; a religious 
text doesn’t necessarily exert causal force on how people live.  There are many other factors to 
take into consideration, such as textual interpretation, prevailing discourse, local customs, and 
political, social and economic factors.117 
Lilah Abu-Lughod makes a very similar argument in Do Muslim Women Need Saving?118  
Abu-Lughod is professor of anthropology and women’s and gender studies at Columbia 
University, and has published several works of ethnography dealing with issues of poetry, 
nationalism, media and gender politics.  She states that when Muslim women are treated as an 
undifferentiated mass, “the sorts of debates and strategies they engage, and how frequently their 
experiences are misunderstood and the complexities of their situations ignored” all become 
eclipsed.119  The multiple forms of oppression that women endure – from hunger to poverty to 
illness, state-sanctioned violence and war – independently of culture (i.e. Muslim culture), are 
not accounted for in most accounts of Muslim women’s oppression.120 
 Bullock calls out the feminist tendency to present social science as ‘objective.’121  By 
keeping themselves out of the research on women and Islam, some feminists give the impression 
that their societies do not experience women’s oppression.122  Abu-Lughod makes this point as 
well.  In her survey of the pulp non-fiction genre that increasingly focuses on fantastic tales of 
Muslim women’s traumatic lives, she states: 
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“The strange thing that happens along the way is that women’s rights issues become pertinent only 
elsewhere.  The only American or European women who appear in the 280 pages of Half the Sky 
are altruistic high school students who raise money to build schools in Cambodia, or women who 
give up their jobs to devote themselves to working in health clinics in Africa…Gender injustice 
feels transcendent to them, I would suggest, because they do not ground it in the world they 
know…In order to make their (legitimate) case for concern about lethal sex discrimination, they 
trivialize gender issues in the United States and Europe…the overriding message of Half the Sky, 
like the other popular books discussed here, is that Westerners are the ones who must change the 
world…”123   
 
Unlike Mernissi, who is at home with mainstream feminist theorizing on women and Islam, 
Bullock problematizes the discourse by identifying its unstated, universalizing assumptions.  She 
places part of the responsibility for the falsities and generalizations of the anti-veil discourse on 
“the inability of the predominantly liberal-oriented mainstream from recognizing their own 
positionality with respect to their own culture and that of others.”124  This last point constitutes 
the main thrust of Saba Mahmood’s work, to which I now turn. 
 
Pietistic Female Agency and Islamic Tradition 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Jerusha Tanner Lamptey proposes the development 
of a Muslima theology to redress present deficiencies in Islamic thought and practice.  
Particularly, the oppressions of patriarchy and religious chauvinism against women and non-
Muslims could lessen if feminist and pluralistic/tolerant theories are brought to bear on Islamic 
theological understandings.  In so proposing, Lamptey seems to accept the philosophical 
foundations behind universal human rights norms, and places all religions on a horizontal 
equality in the manner of the modern definition of religion.  However, Saba Mahmood brings to 
question the assumptions about liberatory agency that underwrite many liberal and feminist 
rights formulations.125 
                                                          
123 Abu-Lughod, 62-63.  She is referring specifically in this excerpt to Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn’s Half the 
Sky: Turning Oppression Into Opportunity for Women Worldwide.  New York: Random House, 2009. 
124 Bullock, 226. 
125 See Mahmood (2005). 
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Mahmood is professor of social cultural anthropology at the University of California, 
Berkeley.  In addition to Politics of Piety, she has authored several scholarly articles and co-
authored Is Critique Secular?  Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech with Wendy Brown and Talal 
Asad (2013).  Mahmood conducted fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt analyzing women’s mosque 
participation in the piety movement that began in Egypt in the early 1980s.  She argues that a 
liberally defined concept of agency is insufficient for understanding the logics, ethics, 
motivation, performativity and practices of the women she observed and interviewed.  These 
women undertake technologies of the self (a la Foucault) in order to remake their subjectivities 
in keeping with Islamic virtues and forms of reasoning.  This often entails performing embodied 
capacities within traditional norms, discourses and authority structures rather than subverting or 
resisting them.  For this reason, the liberal feminist emphasis on resistance, history-making and 
subversion of traditional authority structures does not register the agentive work of the Egyptian 
female pietists.  In liberal forms of analysis: 
“Agency…is understood as the capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weight of 
custom, tradition, transcendental will, or other obstacles (whether individual or collective).  Thus 
the humanist desire for autonomy and self-expression constitutes the substrate, the slumbering 
ember that can spark to flame in the form of an act of resistance when conditions permit.”126 
 
Mahmood argues that it is impossible to identify a universal category of acts (such as 
‘resistance’) outside of the political, ethical contexts that inform their meaning.  Rather, the 
concept of agency substantively imbued with the category of resistance imposes a teleological 
politics of progress upon its objects of study, blocking out those forms of being and reasoning 
that focus on the reinscription of norms. 
Mahmood points out that not only has the liberal discourse of freedom and individual 
autonomy become “naturalized” in gender studies, but social scientific language in general 
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claims a “transparent universalism” for itself.127  This has been in part due to the Kantian 
tradition of viewing morality as a rational matter independent of context (i.e. social virtues, habit, 
character formation, etc.).  This went against the Aristotelian notion of virtues, which tied the 
realization of virtues to outward forms and practices.128  But for Kant, virtue was to be realized 
against the weight of inclinations and habit, not through them.129  Mahmood prefers instead to 
operationalize Foucault’s concept of ‘positive ethics,’ in which ethical practices are performed 
within historically and culturally specific disciplinary techniques to yield agency.  As such, the 
women in the mosque movement: 
“analyze the movements of the body and soul in order to establish coordination between inner 
states (intentions, movements of desire and thought, etc.) and outer conduct (gestures, actions, 
speech, etc.)…[They display a desire to channel] rational and emotional capacities so as to 
approximate the exemplary model of the pious self.”130 
 
Mahmood thus demonstrates that “the meaning of agency must be explored within the grammar 
of concepts within which it resides.”131 
For the female mosque participants, concept-congruent agency involved teaching and 
attending regular lessons in the mosque.  They emphasized practice for making religious 
doctrines, moral precepts and ritual worship relevant to everyday life.  In doing so, they created 
new structures of learning and new pedagogical modes to address the absence of values 
previously present in Egyptian society.  This is where one finds Mahmood’s criticism of the 
state.  The postcolonial Egyptian state, following the European modernist template, “sought to 
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130 Ibid., 31. 
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establish itself as the sole and legitimate undertaker” of, in an Islamic context, amr bil ma’ruf.132  
Amr bil ma’ruf is an Islamic injunction, found numerous times throughout the Qur’an, to “enjoin 
the good.”  It is an individual as well as collective duty, and summarily captures the spirit of 
Islam’s moral imperative.  In Egypt’s postcolonial politics, the secular modern state model that 
already increasingly regulated the privatized religious sphere, now “took over many institutions 
of religious learning and training…for its own nationalist project.”133  By the time of Mahmood’s 
fieldwork, the Egyptian state was requiring a two-year training program and certificate license 
for preachers.  If one was caught preaching without it, the penalty would be up to three months in 
jail or a fine of one-hundred Egyptian pounds.  Government employees would also record 
mosque lessons.134 
Mahmood illustrates the context-specific meanings that broad concepts can take in the 
use of arguments from ‘rights’ and ‘choice’ by the mosque teachers.  One teacher would often 
craft her enjoinders to the participants in the language of rights and choice, but these terms did 
not signify the same meanings as secular usages of the same terms.  The teacher inflected:  
“these notions in ways that are quite different from their treatment within liberal humanism…[her 
argument] does not, for example, propose that personal preferences and inclinations be made the 
basis for how one chooses from among the juristic opinions.  Rather, the form of reasoning one 
follows in exercising a choice must be guided by the requisite rationale and capacities that the 
jurists have deemed authoritative, thereby complicating the sovereign subject of liberal-humanist 
discourse.”135 
 
While the teacher maintained that there can be no discussion [munaqasha] when it comes to 
God’s commands [ahkam], she reminded participants that they can choose from the 
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interpretations offered by the ulama for the many issues left unresolved by the Qur’an.  It was 
“within this space of nonresolution” that the teacher’s emphasis on choice unfolded.136 
Mahmood’s characterization of how women teachers and students in the Cairo mosques 
pedagogically related to historical Islamic understandings shows a similarity to how Jackson,137 
Azizah Al-Hibri138 and Murad139 – as well as Alasdair MacIntyre140 – characterize the internal 
processes of a tradition.  Mahmood operationalizes Foucault’s concept of tradition (a discursive 
formation, made possible by a certain relation between past and present, outlining the limits and 
possibilities of what can be said and done) as well as Talal Asad’s (a link through time by way of 
pedagogy and various types of knowledge – i.e. practical, scholarly, embodied, etc.).  She arrives 
at the following:  
“Tradition, viewed in this way, is not a set of symbols and idioms that justify present practices, 
neither is it an unchanging set of cultural prescriptions that stand in contrast to what is changing, 
contemporary, or modern.  Nor is it a historically fixed social structure.  Rather, the past is the 
very ground through which the subjectivity and self-understanding of a tradition’s adherents are 
constituted…”141 
 
Such a conceptualization of discursive pasts has tremendous theoretical consequences for 
understanding agency.  For example, in the liberal view, sabr (patience) would be seen as lack of 
action, or a failure to act under the weight of tradition.  But for the mosque women, it was part of 
their “constitutive project: a site of considerable investment, struggle, and achievement.”142  
Where for certain secular liberal notions, agency involves the undoing of tradition, for 
traditionalist Sunni thought agency involves walking the path laid down and well-trodden by 
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tradition, albeit transforming the non-essential components to fit with contemporary conditions.  
This, in fact, is Mahmood’s main point in Politics of Piety: 
“Significantly, such a concept does not assume all-powerful voluntary subjects who manipulate 
the tradition for their own ends, but inquires into those conditions of discursive formulation that 
require and produce the kind of subjects who may speak in its name.  The central question…[is:] 
how is the present made intelligible through a set of historically sedimented practices and forms of 
reasoning that are learned and communicated through processes of pedagogy, training, and 
argumentation?”143 
  
The mosque participants were not blindly imitating past practices and doctrines in an 
anachronistic way.  Rather, they were building discursive and performative continuities with the 
past while “refracting” these through contemporary reality. 
Such a practice goes against the Kantian notion of ethics, which is understood abstractly 
(i.e. regulatory principles, norms, values, etc.) and does not concern the concrete manifestation 
that ethical acts take.  Mahmood, following Foucault, prefers a model of positive ethics, such 
that “the particular form that ethics takes is not a contingent but necessary aspect of 
understanding its substantive content.”144  The Aristotelian notion of habitus also helps explain 
the pietists’ mosque participation, in that external performative acts create corresponding internal 
dispositions.  There’s no liberal assumption at play here, that there exists a natural disjuncture 
between one’s own true desires, and external culture or religion. 
 Prominent Turkish sociologist and director of Paris’ School of Advanced Studies in the 
Social Sciences, Nilufer Gole, has made a similar observation with regard to the contemporary 
veiling revival in Turkey.  In The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, Gole posits the 
controversy surrounding Muslim women’s wearing of headscarves in Turkish universities within 
the broader Western discourses of gender emancipation, the religion-secular and public-private 
                                                          
143 Ibid., 116. 
144 Ibid., 120. 
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binaries and universal progress with its unidirectional notion of evolutionary progress.145  She 
argues that the terms of the discourse and controversy eclipses the agency of the individual 
Muslim woman in hijab: 
“Typical social theories explain Islamist movements in general and veiling in particular by 
assigning priority either to sociopolitical factors or to the essence of religion itself, presumed to be 
alien to a series of transformations, such as reformism and secularism, that took place in the 
West.”146 
 
The first type of explanation points to the social, political and economic conditions in which 
Islamism grows, but fails to explain the appeal itself.  The second explanation assumes an 
immutable Islamic essence and ignores the religion’s historical and political context.  For both 
approaches, 
“the veiled women are an extension of a wider phenomenon: either as subsidiary militants of the 
fundamentalist political movement or as passive transmitters of traditional values.  Such analyses, 
giving priority to the determinism of the system and structure, ignore the questions of agency and 
the formation of an Islamic actor and their contribution to the (re)production of the Islamic social 
order.”147 
 
 Gole and Mahmood’s critiques of the gaze through which Muslim women’s pietistic 
activity and veiling are often interpreted differ decisively from Lamptey’s thought, although they 
all address Muslim women’s agency and authority within the Islamic tradition today.  Lamptey 
blanketly paints Muslim women as silenced and voiceless; Mahmood criticizes the assumptions 
behind such an interpretive lens that would fail to register non-liberatory forms of agency.  
Lamptey draws on the work of Muslim feminists like Asma Barlas, Riffat Hassan and Amina 
Wadud.  These thinkers argue against Islamic truth-claims to men’s superiority over women and 
Islam’s superiority over other systems.  However, Mahmood shows that it is possible for fully 
agentive Muslim women to arrive at non-egalitarian conceptions of the good.  The female 
pietists surveyed by Mahmood assumed an embodied form of Islamic reasoning and action that 
                                                          
145 See Nilufer Gole, The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling.  Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1996. 
146 Ibid., 8. 
147 Ibid., 9. 
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did not attempt to subvert patriarchal practices in Cairo.  Rather, the female teachers and students 
attempted to forge arguments rooted in traditional Islamic notions, values and lines of reasoning 
to create particular subjectivities of embodied virtues. 
 It would seem that Lamtpey advances a modern sense of the term religion, insofar as she 
submits Islamic theology to universal human rights norms (i.e. religious and gender equality).  
Lamptey also frames religions (in the plural) on a horizontal plane of equality.  According to 
Cavanaugh, Smith and Masuzawa, this type of ordering is characteristically modern, as one of 
the functions of the modern invention of ‘religion’ was to enable comparison.  It also participates 
in the modern tendency to relativize extra-rational truth claims (i.e. if religion is essentially 
private and a mtter of conscience, then it is subjective).  By contrast, Mahmood’s fieldwork and 
analytical commentary shows us cases where Islam is understood in a premodern dini sense, 
deeply entangling belief and practice – public as well as private – as in the Egyptian women 
pietists.  For the mosque participants, religious learning and knowledge were at once embodied 
and transformative of family and social relations. 
 
Fitra as Primordial God-Consciousness 
 As elaborated in the previous chapter, Abdulaziz Sachedina draws on the Qur’anic 
concept of fitra, which he characterizes as universal intuitive reasoning, to propose Islamic 
theological reform in approximating human rights standards.  Abdalhakim Murad, too, draws 
heavily on fitra, but paints it in a completely different way and arrives at conclusions very 
different from Sachedina’s.  Murad (formerly Timothy Winter) is the Dean of the Cambridge 
Muslim College, Director of Theology and Religious Studies at Wolfson College and the Shaykh 
Zayed Lecturer in Islamic Studies at Cambridge University.  He has published and edited a 
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number of scholarly works on Islam.148    For Murad, fitra is the human being’s primordial 
nature, and the seat of God-consciousness. 
In identifying the major task of Muslims in the modern world, Murad calls for a return to 
‘radical authenticity.’  Unlike Sachedina, who sees in modern philosophical developments the 
trajectories of rationalization, freedom and civility, Murad uses the term ‘radical authenticity’ in 
the context of analyzing the crisis of modern consciousness: 
“When we say ‘modernization of Islam,’ a phrase that is frequently heard, we have to make sure 
that what this means is the perpetuation of Islam in its radical authenticity in the modern context, 
not the injection of the anti-religious logic of the materialistic modern world within Islam.”149 
 
To embody and practice Islam in radical authenticity involves remembering and enacting the 
tradition’s forgotten virtues.  These include: zuhd (detachment; asceticism), in order to combat 
runaway consumerism; dhikr (remembrance, i.e. of God), to resist mental confusion; ikhlaq 
(practice of virtue, morality, and good manners), so that Muslim minorities conduct themselves 
with the proper etiquette of guests/minorities/neighbors; and rifq (gentleness), because according 
to one prophetic hadith there is nothing that it touches which it doesn’t ennoble.  The primary 
vehicle for accomplishing this type of agency is following the Sunna, or way, of the Prophet 
Muhammad; the prophetic perspective, according to Murad, is truly radical.  Politically what this 
means for Muslim minorities is to embark on an internal hejirah, or migration, and to question 
the terms of the external hejirah that brought them to non-Muslim minority lands in the first 
place.150 
Murad’s prescription underscores a particular expression of politics within the Islamic 
created order.  By emphasizing both the hierarchy of the various levels of existence, and the 
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congruence between them in the overall unity of the created order, Murad questions some 
contemporary epistemic ideas.  The task before the Muslim today ultimately involves focusing 
on the meanings God has put in creation, by emphasizing the interconnectedness of haqiqah 
(truth and reality; the inner dimension of religion), tariqah (the true spiritual path), and shari’ah 
(the outermost form, involving rituals and laws).  These three aspects of the religion each 
provide a distinct perspective, but also form an inseparable unity.151 
 It is such a context that gives meaning to Murad’s call for a true Islamic radicalism in our 
age, one that involves the Qur’anic focus on aakhira over dunya (the hereafter over the earthly 
life).  The secret of the believer in this and any age is solitude in the crowd.  This does not imply 
quiescence, nor a refusal to partake in worldly activity.  In fact, the Muslim is commanded to 
partake in his/her share of the dunya.  But the focus, and motivation, must ultimately be the life 
to come.  Muslims must remember that not a leaf falls without God’s knowledge, and that less-
than-happy socio-political or economic circumstances are, nonetheless, in the best of hands.  
They must remember to have hope (despair and grief being signs of unbelief), and not concede to 
the logic of modernity.152 
 To be estranged from dunya is always a source of irada (joy), while to be intimate with 
dunya is always a source of hazn (grief).  Of course the Muslim must partake in his/her share of 
the worldly life, but he/she mustn’t regard its tools with a secularist mindset: 
                                                          
151 Osman Bakar states: “knowledge of the Haqiqah or the divine reality…is the most excellent of the three 
fundamental forms or levels of knowledge contained in the Qur’an.  The other two divisions of the Qur’anic verses 
deal with the Tariqah and the Shari’ah, both of which reflect the Haqiqah at their own levels.  The Tariqah, the 
esoteric spiritual path to God, is the qualitative and vertical extension of the Shari’ah, the divine law which is the 
general path to God…the hierarchic structure of the Qur’an reflects the structure of objective reality.” In Bakar, 44-
45. 
152 “True Islamic radicalism in our age does not mean envy and resentment because the other people have all the 
gadgets and the power and the weapons.  That is a kind of radicalism that is a radical concession to the logic of 
modernity – which is always a zero-sum game, because those who compete for the aakhira know that, aakhira 
being infinite, has enough for everybody.  But those who compete for dunya have to be in the grip of envy because 
the resources of dunya are always finite.”  See Murad – Crisis. 
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“Human sa’ada [happiness] has to do with a state of the soul, with security, optimism, a sense of 
direction, a sense of meaning, a sense of the value of self-sacrifice that secularity, by its nature, 
can’t really supply…[the] tsunami of gadgets…does not bring with it greater social stability, 
greater human happiness, a greater sense of self-worth.  Instead we will find, at best, the 
possibility of being distracted from the central gap in our consciousness which is the gap where 
spirituality used to be.  Increasingly that is the function of technology: to provide distraction and 
entertainment to prevent us from looking at the catastrophic reality which is that where there was 
once meaning and truth, now there is confusion and relativism.”153 
 
The modern world, says Murad, is a “brilliant series of distractions.”  Our technology blocks us 
from experiencing the “real world” of nature and the spirit within.  It prevents us from realizing 
how unhappy we have become, and cannot catch up with the widening gulf that it itself 
exacerbates.  By contrast, the believer is happier, and with less things, because his/her life 
genuinely has meaning and direction.  This is why Muslims must return to the forgotten virtue of 
zuhd (detachment; asceticism).154 
 To illustrate his rendition of fitra within his broader thought, Murad recounts a story by 
the famous thirteenth-century Sufi poet Jalaluddin Rumi.  In this story, a woman is growing 
distressed at the crying of her infant.  She offers the baby morsels of kebab, but he refuses.  She 
offers him bread, then apple, but nothing satisfies the screaming infant.  Finally, when she gives 
him of her milk, he is quieted.  Rumi says that each of us holds in our hands a crying baby, who 
can only be satisfied with true nourishment.  That crying baby is our primordial nature, or fitra, 
and the authentic nourishment is dhikr Allah, the remembrance of God.  Murad states that the 
human soul will not be satisfied with bits and pieces of distraction, but must recall God to be at 
ease.  The vehicle for the practice of this radical authenticity is only the Sunna of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  This Sunna, or way, involves recalling the Great Covenant, which is perfectly 
symbolized by the act of ritual prayer, or salaat.  The Qur’an states: 





“When your Lord brought forth from the Children of Adam from their reins, their seed, and made 
them testify of themselves, He said, ‘Am I not your Lord?’  They said, ‘Yea!  We testify!’  That 
was lest you should say on the Day of Arising: ‘Of this we were unaware.’”155 
 
 Other forms of ritual worship also embody “the ancient simplicity and dignity of the 
human condition.”156  Fasting is timeless, going back to the only commandment given to Adam 
and Eve in the Garden; daily ritual prayers require no paraphernalia (“just the human creature 
and its Lord”); and the pilgrimages require the pilgrim to “wear the simplest of garments.”157  
However, Murad reminds, to be meaningful and bring the human worshipper to claim his/her 
status as khalifah (God’s deputy on earth), these acts must be performed in sincerity.  Only then 
do they have a transformative effect.158  Inner devotion leads to the purification of outward acts, 
and vice versa – and to achieve both of these requires the Muslim to follow diligently in the 
example of the Prophet Muhammad, who was, after all, al-insan al-kamil, the prototypical, 
perfect human being.159  In this intimate connection between inner belief and external 
manifestation, Murad echoes Mahmood’s description of the Egyptian female pietists, espousing 
a dini rather than a modern rendition of Islamic religion. 
                                                          
155 Qur’an, 7:172. 
156 See Abdal Hakim Murad, “The Sunna as Primordiality.” Available at  
http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/sunnah.htm. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Murad states: “Poor manners, crude language, lack of compassion for others, are all sure signs that we are 
offering salat incorrectly…A besetting problem we face…is that of the mechanical prayer: we proclaim Allahu 
akbar, but immediately…turn on a kind of autopilot, awakening from a vague somnambulence some minutes later 
with the salaam.”  Instead, salaat must be performed with khushu’, or attentive humility, an awareness of the 
presence and majesty of God.  Ibid. 
159 Murad states: “The road to the reclamation of our natural norm is open only in the form of the Sunna…We live 
in a time of ‘lifestyle choices’…Modernity holds up to us a range of ideal types to imitate…There is a long menu of 
alternatives.  But when set beside the radiant humanity of Rasulullah…there is no contest at all.  For the Prophet is 
humanity itself, in its Adamic perfection.  In him, and in his style of life, the highest possibilities of our condition are 
realised and revealed.”  Ibid. 
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 Since Murad’s vision of ‘radical authenticity’ consists of an inner as well as outer 
dimension, he enjoins British and American Muslims to observe proper etiquette, good manners, 
neighborliness and rifq (gentleness) as minorities in non-Muslim majority states.160  He states: 
“The Sahaba [men, women and children companions of the Prophet Muhammad] converted 
millions of men and women, most of them devout Christians, Buddhists, Jews and Zoroastrians, 
even without speaking to them. The Qur’an was not translated, and few of them learnt the local 
languages. But the sheer radiance of their presence, and the natural beauty of the sunna, with its 
graciousness, dignity and poise, won over the hearts of those who saw them.  Today it is possible 
to meet Muslims who follow the outward aspects of the Sunna, and yet do not cause hearts to 
incline towards them; but to be repelled.  ‘Had you been rough and hard of heart, they would have 
scattered from around you.’ (3:159)  We seem to have edited that verse out of the Holy Qur’an.  If 
some of our activists, with their flak jackets, their Doc Marten boots, and their aggressive 
demeanour, could be taken back to the seventh century, it is unlikely that the Christians, Buddhists 
and others would have found them very impressive.  They, and the Sahaba themselves, would 
have regarded them as religious failures, driven by anger and a sense of marginalisation into a 
religious form marked by aggressiveness, not the hilm, the gracious clemency which was the 
hallmark of the Prophet…and without which he could never have won so many hearts.”161 
 
In this and other instances, Murad directly speaks against the isolationist tendency prevalent 
among a growing minority of Muslims.162  He insists that Muslims in these socio-political 
spaces, who may have emigrated for purely economic reasons,163 must “engage in some form of 
cultural migration as well.”164  Host countries would be right to be suspicious of Muslims who 
fail to “acclimatize themselves to the ambient values and sense of collective purpose to their 
countries of citizenship.”165 
 What is needed, therefore is a redefinition of Muslim selfhood in these minority settings: 
                                                          
160 See Abdal Hakim Murad, “Tradition or Extradition?  The Threat to Muslim-Americans.”  Available at 
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161 Ibid. 
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elsewhere.”  Ibid. 
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racially segregated state of American Islam.  He also offers an excellent analysis as to why this problem has been so 
invisible – to both parties – through the present day. 




“It is this new generation that is called upon to demonstrate Islam’s ability to extend its traditional 
capacities for courteous acculturation to the new context of the West, and to reject the radical 
Manichean agenda, supported by the extremists on both sides [Muslim extremists and 
Islamophobe extremists], which presents Muslim minorities as nothing more than resentful, 
scheming archipelagos of Middle Eastern difference.”166 
 
This is particularly urgent given the United States’ long and sad history of violent nativism, 
whose current manifestation lies in the War on Terror and the PATRIOT Act.  A radically 
authentic Islamic identity in the US, Britain and elsewhere would advance true fitra, consisting 
of the following: 
“Unless American Muslims can locate for themselves, and populate, a spiritual and cultural space 
which can meaningfully be called American, and develop theological and social tools for 
identifying and thwarting local extremism, they will be increasingly in the firing line.”167 
 
Muslim minorities in Europe and the United States must engage in an internal hejirah – in the 
sense of turning away from and cold-shouldering those qualities and practices which are at odds 
with Islam’s ‘forgotten virtues’ – while at the same also critically re-examine their outer 
participation in these settings. 
Murad again enjoins the interconnectedness and inseparableness of the inner and outer 
dimensions of the religion.  He calls American Muslims to remember how the Muslims sent by 
the Prophet Muhammad to seek refuge with the Christian Negus king in Abyssinia from 
Quraishite persecution reported back on their experiences: 
“Umm Salama, another eyewitness, narrates the respect with which the Muslims attended upon the 
Christian king. They would not compromise their faith, but they were reverent and respectful to 
the beliefs of an earlier dispensation. Their choice of the annunciation story from the Qur’an was 
inspired, showing the Christians present that the Muslim scripture itself is not utterly alien, but is 
beautiful, dignified, and contains much in common with Christian belief. Stressing what they held 
in common with their hosts, they made a hugely favourable impression, and their security in the 
land was assured.”168 
 
Murad laments that Muslims have forgotten this attitude.  Instead, many contemporary sermons, 
rather than praise the positive qualities of surroundings and neighbors, decry the dangers of 
                                                          
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid.  Murad quoting Ibn Ishaq, Sira, tr. A. Guillaume as The Life of Muhammad (Oxford, 1955): 146-154.  The 
‘annunciation story’ is described in the Qur’an, chapter 19. 
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Westernization.  He claims that the Companions’ spirit of courteous conviviality must be 
recalled and lived.  Muslims must show their neighbors faces full of joy and light.  It is only once 
Muslims have “relearned the traditional science of the spirit” (i.e. tasawwuf, or Sufism, which is 
the traditional Islamic science of self-improvement and spirituality) that American Muslims will 
be able to “enrich America.”169 
Securing the community’s safety and freedoms as minorities in liberal orders, as well as 
positively contributing to public space and debate, involves that Muslims forge alliances with the 
right groups.  Whereas Tariq Ramadan has suggested that Muslims ally themselves with 
environmentalist and left-wing groups who oppose anti-immigrant sentiment and policies,170 
Murad claims such alliances would be “at best, a tempestuous marriage of convenience.”171  
Muslims and leftists might converge on certain issues, but others would starkly divide them.  
And since, in Europe, the increasing pressure being brought upon Muslims relates to social – not 
doctrinal – beliefs, Muslims should instead forge alliances with socially conservative members 
of Christian and Jewish communities.  Religious communities in Europe are all facing very 
similar challenges to their social visions, and so banding together would “deflate, in a non-
sectarian and non-narrow way, the potentially xenophobic and increasingly Islamophobic 
possibilities which are implicit in current processes of European self-definition.”172 
 This understanding of fitra as transformative primordial God-consciousness is a 
reaffirmation of the inherent interconnectedness of haqiqah, tariqah and shari’ah.173  Each of 
these three aspects of the religion provide a distinct perspective, but also form an inseparable 
                                                          
169 Murad, Tradidion. 
170 See Tariq Ramadan, To Be A European Muslim.  Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1999. 
171 Abdal Hakim Murad, “Can Liberalism Tolerate Islam?”  Oslo Litteraturhuset, March 20, 2011.  Available at 
http://www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/ahm/AHM-Can-Liberalism-tolerate-islam.htm.   
172 Ibid. 
173 See p. 203 above (especially footnote 151).  See also p. 209 and 215 below. 
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unity.  Nasr defines religion as the Divine guidance which allows the human being to remember 
what he/she may have forgotten.174  Consonant with Murad’s depiction of fitra, Nasr’s dini 
understanding of religion represents the primordial tradition of the human being, al-din al-hanif.  
The nature of tradition itself is that of “a whole and a totality, a unity within diversity, a circle 
with a center which itself is found everywhere and on every point of the circumference.”175  The 
analogy of the rim and the center in the wheel of existence is one which Nasr expands and 
explains in great detail elsewhere.176  The meaning is to emphasize the totality and unity of 
existence, and the continuum which joins the exoteric law (shari’ah) and pure esotericism 
(haqiqah).  In every facet of life can be found the principle of Unity by synthesis and 
integration.177   
 This principle of divine unity (i.e. tawhid)178 can be found in an examination of how 
Muslims of different specializations – jurists, theologians, and Sufis – theorized freedom.179  The 
traditionalist (premodern) understanding of shari’a in these multidisciplinary formulations of 
freedom directly connects the inner and outer dimensions of life and religion, producing a bridge 
between belief and action that transcends the modern definition of religion as disembodied, 
privatized belief.  The law is understood to be “the embodiment of Divine Will,” a “transcendent 
reality which is eternal and immutable, as a model by which the perfections and shortcomings of 
human society…are judged.”180  Reality, or haqiqah, constitutes the highest state of existence.181  
And the physical realm constitutes the lowest and furthest removed from the Divine essence.  For 
                                                          
174 See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man: Revised and Enlarged Edition.  ABC International, 
2001.  Especially chapter 1. 
175 Nasr (1981), 4. 
176 Nasr (2001b), chapter 1. 
177 Nasr (1981), 13-17. 
178 See chapter 3, “Religion, the Secular and Din,” for an explanation of the Qur’anic concept of tawhid. 
179 See p. 175 above. 
180 Nasr (1981) 25. 
181 One of the Qur’anic names for God is Absolute Reality, or Pure Being (Al-Haqq). 
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“Islamic doctrine, like all other traditional metaphysics, is based on the belief that reality is 
comprised of multiple states of existence (maratib al-wujud).”182 
 Murad’s vision of radically authentic Muslimness consists in the inner virtues and outer 
social and civic participation of Muslim minorities.  In so proposing, Murad sets forth a different 
paradigm of what constitute ‘human rights’ than what Sachedina espouses.  In Murad’s work we 
find that the human being has the right to: be socially conservative, live free from a hyper-
commercialized environment, be free of envy and the entanglements of the overarching logic of 
capitalist competition and avarice, maintain a livelihood for one’s family without coercion from 
globalized agrobusiness, etc.  In other words, a simple life of faith should be a human right.  This 
type of piety-oriented theorizing is not to be found in the human rights discourse of Saroush, An-
Na’im, Mernissi or Sachedina.  In their thought, the focus is on bodily and political safety, the 
freedom of self-development (within the connotations of history-making as agency), and the 
promotion of moral autonomy and lifestyle pluralism.  Freedom of religion takes on the form of 
the freedom of private, disembodied belief with no coercive power in the public realm.  Murad’s 
framework prefers rights that underscore the interconnectedness of belief and practice. 
 To give an illustrative example of Murad’s fitra conception and how it frames human 
rights concerns, I will elaborate his position on gender equality.  Murad explains that the Qur’an 
puts forth a completely different model of gender equity than those embodied in most secular 
feminist norms.  He begins with a distinction: from a secular perspective, gender is all about 
society, but from the traditional Islamic understanding, every principle has a spiritual meaning.  
As such, the shari’a secures real equality, i.e. equality of the spirit.  This is something secular 
modernity cannot accomplish since it has no religious project.  The equality offered by secular 
modernity is illusory, unattainable equality in the life of this world, since it purports that “we are 
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all lumps of flesh destined for the crematorium, with no higher glory at all.”183  It is the differing 
metaphysics behind the secular and Islamic conceptions of the human purpose, according to 
Murad, that distinguish each’s conception of gender and rights. 
Only by understanding that in Islam, every principle has a meaning, can the shari’a’s 
agenda in allocating roles, spaces and ideals differently to men and women be understood.184  
Murad states that the Islamic definition of justice is “a thousand times more nuanced” than the 
secular modern conception of justice as equality.185  He explains: 
“Our concept of justice means, ultimately, not the equal access of human beings to goods and 
services and to rights and responsibilities and to opportunities for personal enjoyment.  Our 
definition of justice may incidentally encompass some of those things, in its own way.  But our 
definition of justice really is about the guaranteeing of human equality in the issue that really 
counts, which is becoming luminous candidates for salvation…What we really care about is 
providing men and women with equal, maximized opportunities for becoming beings who are 
pleasing to Allah…equality of opportunity for salvation.”186 
 
This conception renders secular criticism of Islamic social arrangements irrelevant, according to 
Murad, because the two traditions don’t share the same objectives. 
Murad states categorically that nowhere in Islamic theology or spirituality can one find a 
privileging of the male principle over the female.187  To the challenge that God is gendered in the 
masculine, Murad explains that it is “a central part of our aqeeda [Islamic doctrine] that we do 
not attribute gender to Allah.”188  Because God is absolutely transcendent, He is above any 
accident in human form, and has no gender, whether actual or metaphorical.  God never 
describes Himself as ‘father’ in Islam, and as to the use of the male pronoun, Murad explains that 
theologians emphasize that this is not even a metaphor.  Rather, Arabic routinely uses the third-
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212 
 
person singular masculine pronoun to refer to neuter nouns.  Similarly, Arabic also uses the 
sound feminine plural to refer to objects that may be neuter in the plural.  It is merely a 
convention of the language.189  All the prophets have been male according to majority opinion, 
while the dissenting opinion of a small minority of ulama (i.e. Ibn Hazm) includes Mary and the 
mother of Moses in prophethood on the basis that they were spoken to by God.  Murad explains 
that a prophet is not God incarnate, and that the conditions for prophethood are largely 
pragmatic, designed to maximize the acceptance of the divine message.  The prophet’s male 
gender, therefore, is an accidental rather than essential factor.190 
In fact, if one finds the privileging of one of the genders over the other, maintains Murad, 
it is the female over the male.  The evidence for this claim is to be found in tasawwuf, or the 
esoteric, mystical dimension of Islam which deals with the states of the qalb.191  When Sufis 
reflect on the meaning of gender, they have traditionally invoked the prophetic hadith (utterance) 
transmitted by Tirmidhi which identifies that God has ninety-nine names.  The Sufis point out 
that some of these names are names of majesty, or jalaal, and others are names of beauty, or 
jamaal.  These are understood as predominantly masculine and feminine attributes, respectively.  
The male principle is associated with strength and rigor, and the female with beauty and 
compassion.  Recalling that God is absolutely transcendent over any human quality (including 
gender), the important point is that these metaphorically ‘gendered’ names do not privilege one 
gender over the other.  The Sufis, if anything, lean towards privileging the female principle, as 
the most conspicuous divinely revealed name is Al-Rehman, the Most Merciful.   God begins His 
self-description with this name, and has prescribed for Himself rahmah (mercy).  The semantic 
                                                          
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 The intellective heart-organ; see Al-Attas on p. 166-176 above. 
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root of the word rahmah is rahim, which is the womb.192  God’s creative fecundity can be said to 
have strongly maternal resonances, without going beyond the clear meanings of the hadith on the 
subject themselves.193  God’s creation of the two principles, male and female, does not translate 
into inequitable social roles for Murad.  The male and female principles are beyond measurement 
or comparison.194 
 Murad also addresses the history of female scholarship in the Sunni tradition.  Islam 
doesn’t only advocate education for women, but has a rich history of women as educators.  He 
finds precedent in the mothers of the believers:195 
“The fact that they, during his [the Prophet Muhammad] lifetime and after his death, became 
educators is a sufficient indication of the intentions of the Lawgiver [God] with regard to the 
educational value of women…much of the edifice of Islam depends on these women scholars.  
Without people like Umm Salama, ‘Aisha, Maymuna, Umm Habiba, and other very distinguished 
luminaries in the first generation of Islam, Islam as we know it would not exist.”196 
 
Through their insights from the prophet, fatawa (legal opinions) and fiqh (jurisprudence), these 
female scholars played a pivotal role in the perpetuation of the religion in its first generation.  
Female transmitters in hadith were judged on the same criteria of soundness and unsoundness as 
male transmitters (i.e. without regard to their femininity).  According to Murad, this tradition 
continued through the classical period of Islamic scholarship, and began to wane in the thirteenth 
Islamic century (about two hundred years ago).197 
 Murad’s arguments for true gender equity in Islam also cover the area of sexuality.  As 
embodied creatures, human beings according to the Islamic tradition must engage body, mind 
and spirit in a harmonious way to bring about a holy, balanced individual.  Islam, like most 
                                                          
192 Murad, “Does God Have a Gender.” 
193 Ibid. 
194 Abdal Hakim Murad, “Breaking the Two Desires: Part 1,” posted by ‘ByChoiceMuslim’ on May 18, 2012.  
Available at http://youtu.be/TnsvV-s0kNc. 
195 The mothers of the believers in the Islamic tradition were the wives of the Prophet Muhammad. 
196 Abdal Hakim Murad, “Legacy of Female Islamic Scholarship,” posted by Dawud Israel on January 6, 2012.  




traditions, is very ‘sex-positive,’ admitting sexuality as part of the reality of human 
creatureliness.198  The theoretical basis of Murad’s concept of women and gender is his emphasis 
on traditional Islamic metaphysics and its understanding of the human being’s substance, 
purpose and relation to God.  He posits that abuses and confusion in understandings of gender 
and other issues stem from a turn away from tawhidic fitra.  Unlike Sachedina, who identifies 
fitra as universal intuitive reasoning within a natural law framework that can form the basis of 
human rights appropriations, Murad identifies the major task of Muslims in the modern world as 
a cultivation of ‘radical authenticity,’ i.e. reconnection between belief in tawhid and the virtuous 
embodiment of this belief in outward acts of piety, public as well as private. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 In chapter 3 (‘Religion, the Secular and Din’), I argued that the category ‘religion’ is a 
modern invention, such that: 
“Religion in modernity indicates a universal genus of which the various religions are species; each 
religion comes to be demarcated by a system of propositions; religion is identified with an 
essentially interior, private impulse; and religion comes to be seen as essentially distinct from 
secular pursuits such as politics, economics, and the like.”199 
 
The thinkers I surveyed in the previous chapter (Saroush, An-Na’im, Mernissi, Lamptey and 
Sachedina), in negotiating the relationship between contemporary Islamic praxis and universal 
human rights, all posit Islam as a religion in the modern sense.200  By contrast, the thinkers 
presented in this chapter – Al-Attas, Jackson, Bullock, Mahmood and Murad – evaluate themes 
relevant for human rights in ways that do not pose Islam as a religion in the modern sense.  
Rather, they discuss Islam in alternative ways, which I have compiled under the label din. 
                                                          
198 Abdal Hakim Murad, “Sexuality: An Islamic Perspective, Session 5/5,” posted by ‘Islam on Demand’ on August 
21, 2011.  Available at http://youtu.be/TWbzI99LeD0. 
199 Cavanaugh, 69. 
200 See chapter 4 above. 
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 In this alternative to the modern sense of religion, Islam: is not assumed to lack truth 
claims over and above other religions; is more than a doctrinal system of propositions, but is 
heavily embodied and involves disciplining the body/soul totality; is not an interior impulse but 
is of a social character and touches every ‘mundane’ or ‘secular’ aspect of human life, such as 
economic activity and political relations; and this includes a determinative role for the shari’a 
beyond strictly private matters.201  Where Saroush claimed that, all truths being commensurate, 
each realm possesses its own logic (science and religion, for example), Al-Attas claims that the 
Divine Reality reigns supreme and unifies all lower orders of existence as well as human 
knowledge of these.  Nasr adds that the shari’a is part of a continuum of haqiqah and tariqah 
(reality and spiritual path, respectively) – all three being consistent and manifestations of Divine 
dispensation on different levels of existence. 
Where An-Na’im poses the secular democratic state as the only political form that will 
allow Muslims living in Muslim-majority nations to truly fulfill their faith – for only in the 
context of freedom of religion (in the modern sense of ‘religion’) can faith be freely exercised – 
and calls for Muslims to undergo an Islamic Reformation that would bring their religion under 
the standards of universal human rights norms, Jackson historicizes the modern liberal state 
(naming white supremacy as one of its organizing logics that conditions how Islam is socially 
and civilly embodied), questions the state’s law-making monopoly, and proposes an alternative, 
two-tiered human rights framework that would operationalize traditional Islamic concepts (i.e. 
the rights of religious minorities as rooted in the sanctity of the public space, which is a right of 
God).  An-Na’im calls for a nearly wholesale emptying of inherited shari’a, emphasizing the 
                                                          
201 The public/private distinction was itself part of the project of separating ‘religion’ from ‘secular,’ as were the 
binaries of internal/external and belief/practice.  See Cavanaugh, 69-84 and 92. 
216 
 
need for reasoning independent of precedent (i.e. ijtihad).  Jackson, on the other hand, prescribes 
Muslim American agency through traditional shar’ia and Sunni orthodoxy. 
Where Mernissi takes a full rejectionist stance to the hijab and calls on Muslims to 
cleanse the tradition of all such male elitist accretions, Bullock roots the veil within the broader 
Qur’anic vision (what she calls ‘normative Islam’) and develops a positive political theory of the 
veil.  In so doing, she calls into question the terms and assumptions of the women-and-Islam 
discourse.  Saba Mahmood also questions the underlying assumptions of certain liberal feminist 
tendencies when evaluating the agentive motivations of pietistic Muslim women.  Both Bullock 
and Mahmood find that measuring and assessing Muslim women’s choices and practices through 
the prism of secular values does not result in a fair representation.  Instead, the teleology and 
ethical commitments of Muslim women must enter into analyses seeking to understand what 
may appear to be patriarchal realities.  Where Mernissi and Lamptey take a negative approach (in 
differing degrees) to traditional Islamic theology and jurisprudence, Bullock and Mahmood find 
positive value in women’s perpetuation of the tradition, for spiritual commitment to a normative 
Qur’anic vision (Bullock) and for the exercise of their agency within a paradigm of learning and 
authority (Mahmood). 
Where Sachedina proposes theological and ethical reform in Islam today in keeping with 
universal human rights standards, Murad warns that Islam in modernity must not concede to the 
logic of modernity, which he states is essentially materialistic.  Both of these thinkers ground 
their arguments in the Qur’anic concept of fitra, albeit in very different ways.  Sachedina defines 
fitra in a natural law sense, as universal intuitive reasoning.  Murad defines fitra as primordial 
God-consciousness.  For Sachedina, fitra has the potential to lead all people (through dialog and 
negotiations) to a universal scheme of peaceful cooperation in which human rights are upheld 
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and mutually repsected.  For Murad, fitra is thoroughly tawhidic, and while it exists primordially 
in every human being, will only flourish if cultivated through the prophetic example.  In other 
words, Sachedina’s scheme is tradition-free, and Murad’s relies essentially on the traditional 
path. 
The dini thinkers reviewed in this chapter do not posit Islam as ‘religion’ in its 
disembodied, privatized and apolitical significations.  Rather, the stress is on the 
interconnectedness of the inner and outer dimensions of religious life, where practice and belief 
cannot be disentangled.  They allow traditional Islam’s ethical, moral, legal complex of 
sensibilities, i.e. the shar’ia, to remain central and authoritative in informing Muslim praxis.202  
This includes legitimating that Islam make demands – in the embodied practices of believers as 
individuals as well as in collectivities – of political activity (Murad on Muslim minorities in 
Europe and the U.S.; Jackson on authentic and enabling self-definitions for Blackamerican and 
Immigrant Muslims), and economic activity (Bullock and Murad on how to interact with the 
ravages of capitalism, disabling the beauty industry and the male gaze, and zuhd or asceticism, 
respectively).  Din presents itself as a sustainable alternative to ‘religion’ in the modern sense of 
the term for defining Islam.  This, in turn, has serious implications for Islam’s interface with 
universal human rights discourse. 
 
                                                          
202 See p. 86-89 and 98 above for Hallaq’s description of premodern shari’a.  It is impossible, based on such a 
characterization, to refer to shari’a in either its abstractly/spiritually moral or positively legal senses in isolation. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Universal Human Rights, Empire and the Postsecular Turn 
 
“Rights were the noblest institutional innovation of modernity, the ‘man’ of rights, the best 
crystallization of Enlightenment principles.  And yet, endless exclusions have accompanied every 
statement of right.  Rights are both protections used by people against a voracious state or 
intractable powers and, tools in the modern arsenal for creating and disciplining the subject.”1 
 
“When we speak in a secular sense and in secular democracy about freedom…I would help them 
formulate, I think, their dialectic.  And it becomes…actually freedom of the nafs from the khalq.  
Freedom is attained by disengaging the nafs from the khalq to whatever degree possible…But that 
philosophy is incomplete.  Because the way it understands the human nature is this.  There is a 
khalq outside and there is a nafs…when we rise, philosophically and epistemologically, to the 
level of the qalb, now we are attaining higher degrees of freedom: the freedom of the qalb from the 
nafs.”2 
 
 I began in my introduction by examining various Muslim voices in the public debate that 
followed the June 2016 mass shooting in an Orlando nightclub.  The public debate focused on 
two main issues: 1) mass shootings are an American epidemic and we need to legislate stricter 
gun control laws; and 2) to what degrees is Omar Mateen, a Muslim (homophobic?) killer, 
other/same?  A corollary of the first issue was the democratic potential erupting in Congress by 
way of a direct action by certain of its members to demonstrate the legislation’s urgency.  A 
corollary of the second issue was how to prevent, detect and eliminate ‘radical Islam’ from 
infiltrating our country.  When you add the two together, you see that among the consequences 
of the Orlando shooting was the disenfranchisement (withdrawal of permission to bear arms) of a 
certain raced population (those individuals under surveillance that are suspected of sedition and 
placed on a no-fly list).  That homosexuality is a human right formed a background, uncontested 
assumption.  Muslim voices participating in the public intellectual space contributed text- and 
tradition-based arguments both to their communities and congregations and to various public 
                                                          
1 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism.  Routledge-Cavendish: 
New York, 2007: 111. 
2 Mokhtar Maghraoui, ‘Dhunoob and Freedom of the Qalb,’ in “Purification of the Hearts,” Vol. I.  Zawiyah 
Productions, 2004, compact disc.  Nafs means appetitive soul/volition; khalq means creation/the created world; 
and qalb is the intellective heart organ. 
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fora such as vigils and blood drives, editorials, public apologies and distantiations and social 
media.  These arguments hinged on the atrocious and sinful nature of Mateen’s act, and the 
permissibility/impermissibility of homosexuality in Islam.3 
The shooting and its aftermath are also part of broader structures and discourses, i.e. how 
liberal states employ sexual rights to coercively instrumentalize the freedom norm, particularly 
against immigrants or tortured prisoners;4 how the nation is scripted in relation to 
others/enemies; how religion, particularly Islam, is suspect politically and sexually; the 
increasing scope of law to investigate, determine and legislate what/who/where threatens the 
nation; etc. 
I return full circle in the conclusion to bodies and populations, state power and torture.  
This time, I cast these problematics in the light of the intervening chapters that tried to 
disentangle politics, religion, secularism and competing moral traditions within universal human 
rights.  It may appear at first glance irrelevant, emotion-provoking or misguided to bind a 
critique of secularly-premised human rights’ universality claims with the leather of Sovereignty 
and death.  But it is precisely in the most exterior, material and base extensions of freedom- and 
life-promising universal human rights that their contradiction unfolds; that human rights fold in 
upon themselves. 
 In this chapter I will discuss universal human rights and the argument from empire, and 
the (mis)uses of human rights in emergent ‘postsecular’ feminist discourse.  These forays 
provide support for the argument I have tried to make thusfar – that human rights: advance a 
secular power configuration that scaffolds the state and privatizes religion, stripping the latter of 
its holistic character and political power; rest on a secular definition of the human being; are 
                                                          
3 See chapter 1, ‘Introduction: The Rationality of Traditions.’ 
4 See Judith Butler’s argument, presented in Chapter 1, above. 
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championed by some thoughtful Muslim arguments but critically challenged by others; and 
therefore are not universal.  Based on the various challenges I level against human rights 
universality claims, I return in the closing section to MacIntyre’s points that every tradition has 
its articulation of justice and its own rationality, and that liberalism, despite claims to the 
contrary, is one such tradition, valued and storied.  The liberal project of universal human rights 
ought, then, in aiming for universality, begin by dropping its independent claims to such. 
 
Human Rights and Empire  
 Aside from the limitation of human rights’ exclusively secular premises, there is another 
argument to be made against their universality claims: the argument from empire.  Costas 
Douzinas, Professor of Law at Birkbeck University of London, argues that despite numerous and 
meaningful gains made by petitioners who operationalize human rights language, human rights 
are a concession to the logic of empire.  Rights are not universal, but created by politics.5  In the 
case of torture, Douzinas points to the embarrassing way some liberal commentators have taken 
to justify and juridically regulate torture.6  It is through the torture found in camps such as Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay that the ‘human’ of human rights is outlined; the human is defined 
via the inhumane realities of biopower.7 
 As a matter of fact, if we glean the register of deadly violence, horrific and torturous wars 
that have decorated modern history, certain undeniable facts provisos are attached to the concept 
of ‘humanity’: 
“…a strange paradox accompanies increased humanitarian activism.  Our era has witnessed more 
violations of human rights than any previous less ‘enlightened’ one.  Ours is the epoch of 
massacre, genocide, ethnic cleansing, the age of the Holocaust.  At no point in human history has 
                                                          
5 Douzinas, 99. 
6 Ibid., 6. 
7 Ibid., 120-121. 
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there been a greater gap between the North and the South, between the poor and the rich in the 
developed world or between the ‘seduced’ and the excluded globally… 
 
“Some ten million Congolese died in the early twentieth century as a result of Belgian forced 
labour and mass murder.  Millions died of avoidable famines in India under colonial rule.  Up to 
one million Algerians died during their war of independence.  These were crimes by humanity but 
not against humanity.”8 
 
For Douzinas, the colonial past and the ‘nation-building’, human rights-dominated new world 
order form a single continuum; indeed, nation-building is a new type of tutelage.9 
 Rights serve a vital function in present systems of power, domination and oppression.  
They “are not opposed to the exercise of power; they are one way through which the effects of 
power are distributed across the social body.”10  Increases in the number and scope of rights 
resulting from adjudication of competing claims map the social landscape and thereby replicate 
the existing order of power and subjugation.11  Douzinas states: 
“The new world order is moral-legal. Human rights, freedom and democracy provide the 
justification for the new configuration of political, economic and military power and the just cause 
for war.”12 
 
As the “official ideology” of the post-Cold War new world order, human rights have become its 
lingua franca, a way of doing business and making friends in the global marketplace.13  Rights at 
once acknowledge and conceal the gaps between idyllic justice and oppressive realities, and 
represent, in the spirit of contract, “entitlements of those who have accepted the established 
distributions.”14 
 Like Moyn,15 Douzinas historicizes the post-World War II rise of human rights, when 
“pre-war principles and institutions had failed.”16  Like Massad,17 he shows that political beliefs 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 71-74. 
9 Ibid., 83, 140. 
10 Ibid., 101. 
11 Ibid., 104. 
12 Ibid., 148. 
13 Ibid, 12, 32. 
14 Ibid., 93, 107. 
15 See chapter 2. 
16 Douzinas, 27. 
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color and constitute the supposedly neutral jurisprudence of human rights agendas; that 
governments champion human rights when it serves their political interests.18 
 Despite the lofty, often well-intended claims of governments and rights professionals and 
activists, human rights universality continues to be founded on exclusions: “adding a new right 
or right-bearer to the existing group does not eliminate exclusion; it only alters its shape and 
scope.”19  Rather, these transformations represent a politics of consensus. 
“The legal quest for the creation of new rights or for the extension of existing ones to new groups 
or individuals has become a prime example of the politics of consensus.  Rights stabilise inter-
subjective relations by giving minimum recognition to identity; they codify the liberal ideology of 
limited freedom and formal equality; they express and promote individual desire.”20 
 
This is how human rights embolden states and depoliticize conflict.  The French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which substantively informed the universal human rights 
project, declares that all rights are natural, inalienable and equal, but must nonetheless rely on the 
nation, to whom belongs all sovereignty.21  Douzinas states: 
“The declarations set out the universality of rights but their immediate effect was to establish the 
boundless power of the national state and its law…If the declarations ushered in the epoch of the 
individual, they also launched the age of the nation – the mirror-image of the individual.”22 
 
Huma rights “confirm the paradoxical principle that the national is the only persistent 
universal.”23  Douzinas acknowledges that: 
“Successful human rights struggles have undoubtedly improved the lives of people by marginal 
rearrangements of social hierarchies and non-threatening redistributions of the social product.  But 
their effect is to de-politicise conflict…”24 
 
Human rights proponents need to place the actions of sovereigns in socioeconomic and 
international contexts in order to avoid HR’s “depoliticizing trap.”25 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 See chapter 2. 
18 Douzinas, 25-26. 
19 Ibid., 97. 
20 Ibid., 107. 
21 Ibid., 92. 
22 Ibid., 97. 
23 Ibid., 98. 
24 Ibid., 108. 
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 As a concession to power, human rights help fashion a particular type of subject.26  
Human rights divide people into three groups: “the suffering victim, the atrocious evil-doer and 
the moral rescuer.”27  In the discourse’s emphasis on care for victims, pity replaces politics and 
even leads to an anti-politics, whereby causes and conditions of suffering are not investigated but 
only the alleviation of suffering is sought.28 
As a result, the complexity of history, the thick political context and the plurality of possible 
responses to each new ‘humanitarian tragedy’ is lost…Pity has replaced politics, morality reason, 
suffering progress.  The universal exchange of suffering and market capitalism have finally 
become global currency.”29 
 
Such humanitarian activism proceeds “without the slightest interest in the collective action that 
would change the causes of poverty, disease or war.”30 
 According to Douzinas, human rights also accepts power’s partitioning of human beings 
into rulers, the ruled and the excluded: 
“The ruled are the seduced majority of the postmodern world.  Rights are inducements or rewards 
offered to them for their acceptance of the balance of power.  The excluded are the 
outsiders…populations considered surplus to the needs of capitalism and left to their ‘natural’ or 
‘man-made’ fate from earthquakes and tsunamis, Aids and famines or, ethnic cleansing and small-
scale genocides.”31 
 
HR also posit their subjects as mutually antagonistic, desire-pursuers moving always towards 
greater degrees of self-realization.32  Both legal rights and autonomy promote “the value of 
desire or desire as ultimate value.”33  It is an arrangement where freedom has been replaced by 
choice; Douzinas claims that this is consistent with the fact that the “freedom to choose is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Ibid., 295. 
26 See also chapter 3, in which I detail Talal Asad’s argument, albeit from a different theoretical viewpoint, that 
human rights require a specifically history-making subject. 
27 Douzinas, 69. 
28 Ibid., 81-84. 
29 Ibid., 81-82. 
30 Ibid., 84. 
31 Ibid., 100. 
32 Ibid., 36, 84, 284. 
33 Ibid., 285. 
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way of late capitalism.”34  The subject of natural rights was assumed to be free-standing, stripped 
of history, tradition, religion, gender, race, etc.35  In modernity, this autonomous subject is 
likewise non-social, with inter-relations based on self-interest or legal obligation only.36  The 
subject shaped by human rights is the unencumbered self. 
To draw another connection with the Pandora box of the Orlando nightclub shooting, let 
us turn to Rutgers University professor of Women’s and Gender Studies Jasbir Puar, who has 
made an argument similar to Douzinas’ with regard to the modern state’s control of sexual 
normativity.37  In his critique of human rights’ complicity with empire, Douzinas posits the non-
citizen ‘alien’ as “the gap between human and citizen.”38  Puar identifies homonationalism as the 
gap between the state’s ascendant-whiteness and heteronormativity on the one hand, and its 
racializing/queering of the figure of the terrorist on the other.  Homonationalism refers to the 
increased inclusion of queers into American and European national narratives, but this 
“benevolence toward sexual others is contingent upon ever-narrowing parameters of white racial 
privilege, consumption capabilities, gender and kinship normativity, and bodily integrity.”39  Not 
only does the path to queers’ acceptability have to pass through whiteness and wealth, but 
terrorist bodies are specifically produced against such acceptable queer subjects.40 
According to Puar, gay marriage in Europe: 
“justifies further targeting of a perversely sexualized and racialized Muslim population…who 
refuse to properly assimilate, in contrast to the upright homosexuals engaged in sanctioned kinship 
norms.  Gay marriage reform thus indexes the racial and civilizational disjunctures between 
                                                          
34 Ibid., 128. 
35 Ibid., 93. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: homonationalism in queer times.  Durham: Duke University Press, 
2007. 
38 Douzinas, 99. 
39 Puar, xii. 
40 Ibid., xiii. 
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Europeans and Muslims, while effacing the circuits of political economy (class, immigration) that 
underpin such oppositions.”41 
 
It is in this way that many queer activists codify the distinction between “us” and Muslims 
according to the war on terror’s protocols, between barbarous Islam as especially homophobic 
and threatening and civilized, progressive homonationals.42 
 Resonating with Saba Mahmood’s critique of liberal feminists’ inability to respectfully 
register female Muslim piety,43 Puar criticizes how queerness is defined in problematic terms 
privileging resistance as agency.  Queerness is framed as freedom from norms, as can be seen in 
coming-out narratives.  Queerness cast this way: 
“resonates with liberal humanism’s authorization of the fully self-possessed speaking subject, 
untethered by hegemony or false consciousness, enabled by the life/stylization offering of 
capitalism, rationally choosing modern individualism over the ensnaring bonds of family.  In this 
problematic definition of queerness, individual agency is legible only as resistance to norms rather 
than complicity with them, thus equating resistance and agency.”44 
 
Puar describes the situations of queer ethnics.  To be acceptable on account of their queerness, 
they must be able to engage the ascendancy of whiteness.  They must have access to capital for 
ownership and consumption, through which they: 
“reorient their loyalty to the nation through market privileges…that masquerade as forms of 
belonging to the nation and mediate the humiliation of waiting for national love.”45 
 
The market mitigates the ethnic’s entry into acceptable homonormativity.46  Just as Douzinas 
states that the suffering victim and barbarous evildoer is necessary for the formation of the savior 
humanitarian subjectivity,47 so too according to Puar is homonationalism and increased liberal 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 20. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See chapter 5. 
44 Puar, 22. 
45 Ibid., 26-27. 
46 Ibid., 27-28. 
47 Douzinas states: “Human rights campaigns construct the post-political Western subjectivity: they promise the 
development of a non-traumatised self (and society) supported by our reflection into our suffering mirror-images 
and by the displacement of the evil in our midst onto their barbaric inhumanity.” (84) 
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inclusiveness for queers a process that parallels the increased demarcation of populations slated 
for death, subjugation, surveillance, etc.: 
“…it is precisely within the interstices of life and death that we find the differences between queer 
subjects who are being folded (back) into life and the racialized queernesses that emerge through 
the naming of populations, thus fueling the oscillation between the disciplining of subjects and the 
control of populations.”48 
 
Universal Human Rights and the Postsecular Turn 
 Emerging postsecular feminism attempts to transcend the falsification of secularization 
theory while redeeming and reaffirming liberal emancipatory politics.  Secularization theory was 
falsified in light of the fact that religion has not disappeared from public life, that religiosity fails 
to wane in liberal states or elsewhere.  Historian of British and American history J. C. D. Clark 
notes that historians of the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries who had generally shared confidence in 
the grand narrative of secularization must now unsettle the literature’s classic narratives of 
modernization, secularization, urbanization and industrialization.49  Not only has secularization 
theory been empirically falsified but ‘postcolonial multicultural reflexivity’50 tests the limits of 
European pluralism and American nativism. 
 Despite this commendable goal, since postsecular feminism is still operating on a liberal 
epistemological grid, that is, since it tries to accommodate the secular’s ‘other’ without 
unsettling its own necessarily secular theory of knowledge, there are a number of trappings that 
can be discerned in even the earliest stages of the discourse.  To begin, many postsecular 
                                                          
48 Puar, 35. 
49 See J. C. D. Clark, “Secularization and Modernization: the Failure of a ‘Grand Narrative’.”  The Historical Journal 
(Cambridge University Press), Vol. 55, No. 1 (2012): 161-194. 
50 I’m borrowing the term from Gregor McLennan, who states: “Yet this social imaginary and its meta-topics 
[Charles Taylor’s idea of the public as a metatopical space and the people as a metatopical agency] are now, in an 
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scrutiny.  It is this gathering force of questioning that I am designating as the ‘postsecular’ moment.”  See Gregor 
McLennan, “Towards Postsecular Sociology?”  Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 5, Special Issue on Sociology and its Public 
Face(s) (Oct. 2007): 857-870; 858. 
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emancipatory aspirations continue to uncritically rely on human rights as a ‘neutral court of 
appeal.’51  Unsettling the universality and neutrality claims of human rights would force a 
postsecular feminism to resort to tools outside the liberal political tradition to meaningfully 
engage difference among women of the world and their conditions. 
 Another important assertion among postfeminists is that the religion/secular binary is no 
longer sustainable.52    However, the simple claim that the religion/secular binary is false and 
arbitrary does not receive further treatment.  Absent theoretical elaboration of the terms of this 
claim, the unintended consequence may be to naturalize secularism as the mute backdrop upon 
which ‘religion’ can be rationally theorized.  While it is true that ‘religion’ is a concept of 
modern invention, one that should be unpacked and problematized, this does not imply that 
secularism and secularity do not exist, issues I took up in chapter 3.  There I argued that the 
modern concept of religion has ‘the secular’ as its epistemic context.  The secular is a field of 
power that enables various types of knowledge, desire and action through new institutional and 
discursive spaces.53  To claim that the secular is an arbitrary designation along with religion on 
account of their false binary pairing is akin to concluding, from the fact that ‘race’ is invented, 
that we live in a post-race America: it simply is not true.54  Postsecular feminism may 
unintentionally reinscribe the invisible (i.e. normative) power of secularism by dismissing the 
false religion/secular binary. 
                                                          
51 A term used by Alasdair MacIntyre to describe liberalism’s pretention of possessing a fictitious space where rival 
accounts of justice and competing rationalities can be evaluated according to some universal, tradition-free 
criteria.  See MacIntyre (1988), 333 and 346. 
52 See for example Laura Levitt, “What is Religion, Anyway?  Rereading the Postsecular from an American Jewish 
Perspective.”  Religion & Literature, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 2009): 107-118. 
53 See chapter 3, for Smith, Cavanaugh and Masuzawa on modern ‘religion’, and Talal Asad on ‘the secular.’ 
54 See for example Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color Blindness.  New 
York: The New Press, 2010. 
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Another important feature of emerging postsecular feminism is its unequivocal 
affirmation of democracy.  Across various theoretical approaches, postsecular feminists hang 
their hopes on democratic politics as the corrective to institutionalized patriarchy and gender 
injustice.  National University of Ireland-Galway professor of Political Science and Sociology 
Niamh Reilly states that feminist approaches as disparate as the communitarian, postmodernist, 
global South and critical Enlightenment: 
“[a]ll emphasize ‘democracy’ and the values that underpin it as the larger discursive frame in 
which ideas of secularism and secularity can be redefined with emancipatory intent.  This common 
ground in democracy is, I argue, at the heart of non-oppressive articulations of feminism that both 
retain a commitment to norms of gender equality and human rights and actively respect women’s 
differences, including in relation to religious identity.”55 
 
There are a number of problems with this consensus around democracy.  First, democracy as a 
political form is a package.  Its conceptual bundle includes the modern state with its monopoly 
over law and violence,56 the strict separation of law and morality and the dichotomy of the 
public/private realms.  Second, some postsecular feminists place their faith in democracy 
because they believe the public sphere to be a neutral space amenable to equitable deliberation.  
However, Asad makes the point that the public sphere is necessarily, not just contingently, 
constituted by power.57  Not everything can be said, because not all values are negotiable.  The 
public space is inhabited by subjects who have learned to speak and listen according to the logic 
of privatizing religion in the first place.  Organized religion, being understood as based on 
authority and constraint, is perceived as a threat to the mutual freedom promised by the public 
sphere. 
 Sociologist Jurgen Habermas recognizes the undue burden experienced by religionists in 
the public sphere.  He states: 
                                                          
55 Niamh Reilly, “Rethinking the Interplay of Feminism and Secularism in a Neo-secular Age.”  Feminist Review, No. 
97, Religion and Spirituality (2011): 5-31. 
56 See chapter 3 for my discussion of Wael Hallaq’s work on the modern state and paradigmatic premodern shari’a. 
57 See chapter 3 above, for Asad on the public sphere. 
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“Yes, religious cultures must adapt, with difficulty, to four inescapable conditions of modern 
secular life – the presence of other strong faiths, the authority of science, the universalist mode of 
positive law, and a pervasive profane popular morality.  But they should not be subjected to unfair 
psychological or socio-cultural pressure in so doing.  Postsecular culture must therefore openly 
recognize religion not just as a set of private beliefs but as an all-embracing source of energy for 
the devout, and, actually, for society in general too.  Except at the highest institutional levels, the 
case goes, the demand that people cease to speak politically in religious terms must be dropped.”58 
 
But Habermas’ faith in reasonable deliberation remains strong.  His constructivist democratic 
model entails that the criteria for gauging the reasonableness of citizens’ deliberations are 
universalizable norms.59  Foremost among the norms is autonomy.  While Habermas admits that 
the actual content of autonomy must be understood and realized in context-specific ways, the 
secular liberal values of self-invention and self-sovereignty60 are reconstituted in the ‘neutral’ 
public sphere, severely curtailing the norm-altering capacities of religion.  Asad states that 
religion has two options with regard to the modern state’s law/morality dichotomy as enshrined 
in the strict separation of public and private realms: it can either accept the space of thoroughly 
privatized belief and worship, or else it can engage public talk that makes no demands on life.61 
 Another emergent theme in postsecular feminism is cosmopolitanism.  While earlier 
families of feminist theorizing – radical, socialist, cultural, etc. – laid the groundwork for 
conceptualizing global sisterhood and international common cause,62 the present cosmopolitan 
feminism with its global orientation may represent a political commitment to the convergence 
thesis.  The convergence thesis advanced by some liberal thinkers celebrates that public 
international law increasingly treats not only states, but individuals.  This undermines national 
                                                          
58 Jurgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere.”  European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2006): 1-25; 7-
10. 
59 See Stefan Rummens, “The Semantic Potential of Religious Arguments: A Deliberative Model of the Postsecular 
Public Sphere.”  Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 2010): 385-408; 390-391. 
60 Rummens states: “Recognizing the autonomy of moral and political individuals implies that they are free to 
shape and reshape their own values and preferences in response to the changing circumstances of the historical 
society in which they are situated.”  Ibid., 395. 
61 Asad (2003), 199. 
62 See Josephine Donovan, Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions.  Third edition.  New York: Continuum, 2000. 
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sovereignty by converging it with human rights.63  As I discussed in chapter 2, Joseph Massad 
has shown that the history of the governmentalization and internationalization of gender issues, 
beginning in the 1970s, was deeply implicated in Western hegemony.64 
 It may be argued that much feminist theory today goes against convergence, particularly 
the proponents of multiple modernities.  The theory of multiple modernities developed to explain 
diversity among societies in light of modernization theory’s emphasis on their similarities along 
the singular path to modernization.  Modernization theory thus stresses convergence while 
multiple modernities stresses divergence.65  It is also of course true that many feminists are 
conscious of earlier concessions to Western hegemony, and actively work against such 
tendencies.  However, closer inspection of cosmopolitan feminism’s constituent parts reveals 
that it sees secularism as suitable for being reimagined with emancipatory content for the 
religious.  Secular dialogic public space is not anti-religious, but is tolerant of competing 
interpretations.66  Removed as a normative principle from feminism, secularism would ensure 
human freedom, which would entail religious pluralism.67 
But is such an account somewhat circular?  In other words, what guarantees that the 
liberal definition of human freedom is non-abusive?  What guarantees that democracy is non-
abusive?  Charles Mills has shown that accounts of personhood in the liberal social contractarian 
tradition were simultaneously and explicitly theories of racialized sub-personhood.68  Subsequent 
elaborations of justice, democracy, equality, property law, etc. flourished while gross social 
                                                          
63 See chapter 2 for my discussion of the convergence thesis, and Peter Danchin’s work on the Enlightenment 
patter of secularity inscribed in human rights. 
64 See chapter 2; see also Massad (2015), particularly chapter 2. 
65 See Volker H. Schmidt, “Modernity and Diversity: Reflections on the Controversy Between Modernization Theory 
and Multiple Modernists.”  Social Science Information, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2010): 511-538. 
66 Reilly, 26-27.  See also Oh (2007). 
67 Reilly, 25. 
68 See chapter 2 for my discussion of Charles W. Mills’ The Racial Contract. 
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inequalities were violently institutionalized and maintained against non-whites.  Reilly claims: 
“Moreover, this cosmopolitan feminist perspective embeds feminism in democratic practice 
oriented towards the substantive realization of human rights and freedoms.”69  I caution that this 
itself does not avert oppressive requirements for homogenization with a secular global public 
law, i.e. it is not necessarily postsecular in any substantive way. 
 As I have suggested in the earlier chapters, universal human rights suffers a crippling 
limit to its universality.  Human rights rely upon a secular definition of the human and a 
privatized rendition of ‘religion.’  These facts are celebrated by human rights thinkers, as 
secularism is considered the most neutral and tolerant arrangement.  However, as I showed in 
chapters 4 and 5, the secular subtext and philosophical anthropology of universal human rights 
create very real contradictions and problematics for Muslims.  Muslim political thinkers in the 
Western public debate produce a variety of positions vis-à-vis human rights.  At the very least, 
the literature confirms a lack of consensus, and therefore the concept and framing of human 
rights cannot be said to be universal.  This is extremely relevant for postsecular feminism 
because many feminist emancipatory aspirations today – including ‘postsecular’ ones – continue 
to uncritically rely on human rights as a ‘neutral court of appeal.’70  They end up allying 
themselves with the ‘good Muslims’ who are on board with human rights norms, and cannot 
begin to dialog with ‘bad Muslims’ who question the connection between human rights and 
Western secularity and hegemony.  Unsettling the universality and neutrality claims of human 
rights discourse would force a postsecular feminism to resort to tools outside the liberal political 
tradition to meaningfully engage difference among women of the world and their conditions. 
                                                          
69 Reilly, 26. 
70 A term used by Alasdair MacIntyre to describe liberalism’s pretention of possessing a fictitious space where rival 
accounts of justice and competing rationalities can be evaluated according to some universal, tradition-free 
criteria.  See MacIntyre (1988), 333 and 346. 
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 So do human rights represent a suitable framework for postsecular feminism’s 
emancipatory aspirations?  Asad has argued that the secular comprises our epistemological 
categories – how we know what we know, such as time and space.71  Without legitimate non-
secular complex time and complex space, multiple ways of life cannot exist.  Only the multiple 
identities advocated for by cosmopolitan feminists and constructivist versions of dialogic 
democracy can exist in the homogenous time and space of the modern state – and that is not the 
same thing as multiple ways of life, i.e. a substantive respect for difference. 
Given Asad’s definition of the secular as a field of power with discursive and institutional 
aspects, the theoretical and philosophical problems universal human rights pose for the Islamic 
tradition become political problems as well, particularly in light of the discourse’s liberal 
universalism and homogenization impulse.  What does this mean for postsecular feminism?  
Postsecular feminism is committed to protecting Muslim women and Islam from the coercive 
instrumentalization of the freedom norm and state violence and imperialism.72  But can it 
accomplish this noble task by uncritically naming human rights, as if the discourse was natural, 
ahistorical, philosophically neutral and universal?  Or would such a reliance only mask and 
exacerbate liberal cosmopolitanism’s secular proselytization impulse? 
 
Conclusion: The Rationality of Traditions as Antidote 
 In chapters 4 and 5, I surveyed two bundles of contemporary Muslim theorizing on Islam 
and human rights.  I have suggested that there may be a real connection between whether Islam 
is posited as a religion in the modern sense or as din (i.e. more akin to premodern religio) on the 
one hand, and whether universal human rights are fully endorsed or problematized on the other.  
                                                          
71 See chapter 3 above. 




In other words, I propose that full, uncritical or enthusiastic endorsement of universal human 
rights (as can be found in the works of Abdullahi An-Na’im, Abdolkarim Saroush, Fatima 
Mernissi, Abdulaziz Sachedina and Jerusha Tanner Lamptey) requires that Islam be defined as a 
religion in the modern sense of the term.  As William Cavnaugh has argued (see chapter 3), this 
means religion is essentially a private matter of personal belief, and is distinct from politics.  
This bundle of theorizing on Islam and human rights maintains that: the secular state is the best 
protector of the freedom of religion; rationality enjoys a privileged position in epistemology, and 
other ways of knowing should be subjected to it; the Islamic tradition should undergo 
theological, epistemological and legal reform according to universally rational human rights 
norms; traditional authoritative structures such as the madhdhaahib (schools of jurisprudence 
and their methodologies) should be cleared away as inherited, antiquated accretions; the primary 
Islamic texts – and in these they tend to favor the Qur’an over the prophetic example – should be 
reinterpreted from a clean slate, based again on universally rational HR norms; gender equality 
should be sought and achieved on the pattern of secular liberalism; and democracy is the most 
desirable political form, including for Muslim-majority nation-states. 
The second set of Muslim theorizing on Islam and human rights that I have surveyed here 
(in chapter 5) relies on posing Islam as something other than religion in the modern sense.  What 
I have termed “Islam-as-din,” based on Al-Attas’ etymology of din in the Qur’an, and Izutsu’s 
semantic study of the Qur’anic worldview (see chapter 3), is a distinct methodological approach 
that unsettles human rights’ strong conceptual currency.   Thinkers like Sherman Jackson, 
Naquib Al-Attas, Saba Mahmood, Abdulhakim Murad (also known as Timothy Winter) and 
Katherine Bullock are more critical of universal human rights and do not advocate for their full 
adoption.  Espousing a more holistic view of Islam that allowed by the modern concept of 
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‘religion,’ these thinkers bring important critical challenges to bear on human rights discourse 
and its philosophical grounds.  These challenges include: the liberal state espouses a false 
universalism; democracy, like all human institutions, should be neither automatically shunned 
nor adopted, but should be put through the “sieve” of scriptural principles; rationality is only one 
way of knowing among the human faculties of knowledge, and is neither free-standing nor the 
most important; liberal feminism with its liberatory/tradition-subverting definition of agency 
cannot compute other forms of female agency that Muslim women may desire to embody and 
enact; gender equality from a secular point of view pertains only to material social arrangements 
while gender equality in a more traditionalist perspective is ‘more meaningful’ and pertains to 
opportunities for God-consciousness and salvation; and the inherited madhdhaahib and 
theological schools should not be wiped clean away, but themselves contain (like all traditions 
do) the mechanisms for necessary renewal and change over time. 
Upon cross-examining these ten Muslim political thinkers’ treatments of Islamic human 
rights themes like fitra, the equality of women and men and the place of rationality in 
epistemology, I concluded that there are limits as well as possibilities to human rights 
universality among Muslim settings.  The argument from empire, as in the works of Judith Butler 
(see chapter 1), Costas Douzinas and Jasbir Puar (see above, in this chapter), also unsettles HR’s 
universality claims, because human rights are historically imbricated in and officially affiliated 
with deadly imperial violence. 
My final task in questioning human rights’ universality claims was examining the 
emergent field of postsecular feminism.  I find that while postsecular feminism aims to transcend 
the falsification of secularization theory and reaffirm feminism’s liberatory aspirations, it does so 
in a way that uncritically relies on the human rights concept.  Human rights are articulated as a 
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politically neutral and universally moral ground upon which the liberal inability to deal with 
difference can resolve itself.  In other words, postsecular theorists fail to name the liberal 
political values at the root of institutions like democracy and human rights, and propose that 
these ought to serve as the liberatory arbiter of oppressive and exclusionary practices.  I propose 
that, in order to achieve its liberatory and inclusionary vision, postsecular feminism should begin 
with a critical self-reflection of the tradition it stems from and extends: secular liberal modernity. 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s 1988 work Whose Justice? Which Rationality? has new relevance 
today in this regard.  According to MacIntyre, all enquiry is constituted by tradition, and is 
essentially historical.  Every form of enquiry begins from the beliefs, institutions, and practices 
of some community, which authorizes particular texts and voices.  Tradition is not universal, but 
always to some degree local.73  One of the Enlightenment’s central aspirations was to provide 
standards and methods of rational justification for debate in the public realm so that reason could 
replace tradition and authority.  However, MacIntyre argues that all rational enquiry emerges 
from some tradition, which itself provides the standards of rational justification within its own 
history.  MacIntyre’s characterization of inquiry posits tradition as against “one of the central 
characteristics of cosmopolitan modernity: the confident belief that all cultural phenomena must 
be potentially translucent to understanding, that all texts must be capable of being translated into 
the language which the adherents of modernity speak to each other.”74  Postsecular feminists, 
proponents of empire and human rights professionals all seem to participate in this belief, 
specifically in their practices assuming universal translatability. 
Together with Macintyre, Talal Asad’s recent theorizing on traditions provides a useful 
toolkit for feminist thought aiming at transcending the trappings of secular (and secularizing) 
                                                          
73 See chapter 1 for my treatment of MacIntyre’s ‘rationality-of-traditions’ thesis. 
74 MacIntyre (1988), 327. 
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epistemology.  Asad has used tradition in two ways: 1) as a theoretical location for questioning 
authority, time, language use and embodiment; and 2) as an empirical arrangement of everyday 
life connecting discursivity and materiality.75  The discursive aspect of tradition is the language 
through which learning and relearning occurs, and is something passed down.  Embodied 
practices cultivate sensibilities that can change the self (i.e. emotions, language, dispositions) and 
the environment.76  What is learnt, says Asad, is not a doctrine but a mode of being, a capacity 
for experiencing that can’t be renounced.  Like MacIntyre, Asad affirms that disagreements are a 
constitutive part of traditions.  In theory, traditions can accommodate rupture as well as 
continuity.  There are entries and exits.77 
The relevance of a rationality-of-traditions approach to postsecular feminist theory – and 
universal human rights more broadly – is that it may humble and thereby critically open 
proponents in their subject/object relations with non-secular women and communities.  There is 
no consensus among contemporary Muslim political engagements with human rights as to 
whether Islam is a religion in the modern, privatized, disembodied (apolitical) sense or if it is 
something else.78  As such, applying a ‘traditions’ approach to encountering and interpreting 
Muslim commitments would help open up space for non-modernist/non-secular renditions (i.e. a 
true respect for difference).  As Blaney and Inayatullah argue, cosmopolitanism and human 
rights perpetuate neo-modernization theory and an inability to deal with difference.  An 
important task that theorists of human rights and emergent postsecular feminism should commit 
                                                          
75 Asad (2014). 
76 Ibid.  See also Saba Mahmood (2005).  Mahmood’s famous treatment of the female pietists of Egypt’s Islamic 
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78 See chapters 4 and 5 above. 
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to is critical self-reflection by way of a rationality-of-traditions approach.  In this way, they may 
be able to enrich the discourse on human rights and Islam, as well as name and criticize liberal 
epistemological trappings – two tasks I have attempted in this thesis by way of a critique of 
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